T-1843-89
Mary Deer and William Rainey (Plaintiffs)
v.
The Mohawk Council of Kahnawake, being the
Council of the Kahnawake Band, purporting to be
duly constituted under the Indian Act, Grand
Chief Joe Norton, in his capacity as Grand Chief
of the Kahnawake Band and Chief of the Mohawk
Council of Kahnawake, Davis Rice, Walter Good-
leaf, Hazel Lazare, Paul G. Deer, Melvin Jacobs,
John Bud Morris, Thomas Phillips, Richard
White, Joe Delaronde, Billy Two Rivers, and
Alvin Delisle, the Councillors of the Mohawk
Council of Kahnawake, in their capacities as
Councillors of the said Council, and the Honour
able Pierre Cadieux, in his capacity as Minister of
Indian Affairs and Northern Development and in
his capacity as Superintendent General of Indian
Affairs and Her Majesty the Queen (Defendants)
INDEXED AS: DEER V. MOHAWK COUNCIL OF KAHNAWAKE
(T.D.)
Trial Division, Dubé J. —Montréal, November 8;
Ottawa, November 23, 1990.
Practice — Pleadings — Motion to strike — Appeal from
order striking paragraphs of statement of claim alleging Min
ister of Indian Affairs and Queen breaching duty to enforce
Indian Act and Charter — Plaintiffs married and residing on
reserve — Band Council passing resolution requiring female
plaintiff to evict non-Indian husband — Statement of claim
alleging Minister charged with enforcing Act; aware of Band
Council's actions, but doing nothing to stop them — Appeal
allowed — Not "plain and obvious" and "beyond doubt" no
case against Queen and Minister — Novelty of cause of action
not militating against plaintiffs — Courts reluctant to strike
allegations concerning Crown's fiduciary obligations to
Indians.
Native peoples — Appeal from order striking paragraphs of
statement of claim containing allegations Minister of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development and Queen breaching duty
to uphold law — Plaintiffs married and residing on reserve —
Band Council passing resolution requiring female plaintiff to
evict non-Indian husband — Statement of claim alleging
Minister charged with enforcing Act; knew of Band Council's
actions, but took no steps to prevent them — Alleging breach
of duties under Indian Act and Charter Appeal allowed —
Not plain and obvious no cause of action Review of Band
Council's powers under Indian Act Although Act criticized,
still valid and Minister having vast powers thereunder —
Judicial reluctance to strike allegations of breach of fiduciary
obligation owed by Crown to Indians.
This was an appeal from an order of the Senior Prothonotary
striking out paragraphs of the statement of claim alleging that
the Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development was
responsible for the enforcement of the Indian Act; that he knew
of the actions of the other defendants, but took no action to
prevent those actions, and therefore the Minister and the
Queen breached their duties under the Act and Charter. Para
graphs in the prayer for relief seeking declarations to that
effect were also struck. Consequently the Minister and the
Queen were struck out as defendants. The plaintiffs are mar
ried and live on the Kahnawake reserve. The Mohawk Council
pursuant to a resolution, demanded that the female plaintiff,
who is an Indian and a band member, evict her non-Indian
husband. The Senior Prothonotary held that the main question
was the validity of a by-law and that the Minister was not
entitled to intervene and decide whether a Council's by-law was
ultra vires. The plaintiffs argued that the legality of the by-law
was only one of a number of important issues raised in the
statement of claim. They wanted to assert their right to live
together on the reserve according to the Indian Act as amended
in 1985 and the Charter. Their position is that the Queen and
the Minister have a duty to uphold the law, and to ensure that
moneys disbursed by the band council are properly spent. The
Crown argued that it was for tribunals to decide the validity of
a by-law, not the Minister, as an Indian band council is an
elected public authority, with powers similar to those of rural
municipalities in that it can pass by-laws covering matters
similar to municipal by-laws. The issue was whether it was
"plain and obvious" and "beyond doubt" that the plaintiffs
have no cause of action against the Queen and the Minister.
Held, the appeal should be allowed.
The action against the Queen and her Minister was not
frivolous. It was not "plain and obvious" and "beyond doubt"
that the plaintiffs had no case against them. The novelty of the
cause of action cannot militate against the plaintiffs. It may not
be sustainable throughout but it is too early to limit the issue to
the validity of a by-law. In recent years, the Court has been
reticent to strike out allegations concerning the fiduciary obli
gations owed by the Crown to Indians. The Indian Act is still
valid, although subjected to strong criticism in a recent report
of the Canadian Human Rights Commission, and the Minister
is still vested with vast powers and responsibilities for the
proper administration of the Act.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY
CONSI DERED
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I
of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act
1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II,
No. 44].
Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663, RR. 336(5), 419.
Indian Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. 1-5, ss. 10(4), 81 (as am. by
R.S.C., 1985 (1st Supp.), c. 32, s. 15).
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapirisat of Canada
' et al., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735; (1980), 115 D.L.R. (3d) l;
33 N.R. 304; Operation Dismantle Inc. et al. v. The
Queen et al., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441; (1985), 18 D.L.R.
(4th) 481; 12 Admin. L.R. 16; 13 C.R.R. 287; 59 N.R. 1.
CONSIDERED:
Native Communications Society of B.C. v. Canada
(M.N.R.), [1986] 3 F.C. 471; [1986] 4 C.N.L.R. 79;
[1986] 2 C.T.C. 170; (1986), 86 DTC 6353; 23 E.T.R.
210; 67 N.R. 146 (C.A.); Glazer v. Union Contractors
Ltd. & Thornton (1960), 25 D.L.R. (2d) 653; 33
W.W.R. 145 (B.C.S.C.); LeBar v. Canada, [1989] 1 F.C.
603; (1988), 33 Admin. L.R. 107; 46 C.C.C. (3d) 103; 90
N.R. 5 (C.A.); Finlay v. Canada (Minister of Finance),
[1986] 2 S.C.R. 607; (1986), 33 D.L.R. (4th) 321;
[1987] 1 W.W.R. 603; 23 Admin. L.R. 197; 17 C.P.C.
(2d) 289; 71 N.R. 338; Seminole Nation v. United
States, 62 S.Ct. 1049 (1942).
REFERRED TO:
Whitebear Band Council and Carpenters Provincial
Council of Saskatchewan et al., Re (1982), 135 D.L.R.
(3d) 128; [1982] 3 W.W.R. 554; 15 Sask. R. 37 (C.A.);
R. v. Paul Indian Band and Attorney General of Alberta
and Attorney General of Canada (1983), 50 A.R. 190;
[1984] 2 W.W.R. 540; 20 Alta. L.R. (2d) 310; [1984] 1
C.N.L.R. (C.A.); Public Service Alliance of Canada v.
Francis et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 72; (1982), 139 D.L.R.
(3d) 9; 82 CLLC 14,028; [1982] 4 C.N.L.R. 94; 44 N.R.
136; Apsassin v. Canada (Department of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development), [ 1988] 3 F.C. 20; [ 1988] 1
C.N.L.R. 73; (1987), 14 F.T.R. 161 (T.D.); R. v. Spar
row, [1990] I S.C.R. .1075; [1990] 4 W.W.R. 410;
Guerin et al. v. The Queen et al., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335;
(1984), 13 D.L.R. (4th) 321; [1984] 6 W.W.R. 481; 59
B.C.L.R. 301; [1985] 1 C.N.L.R. 120; 20 E.T.R. 6; 55
N.R. 161; 36 R.P.R. 1; Desjarlais et al. v. Canada
(Minister of Indian Affairs & Northern Development),
[1988] 2 C.N.L.R. 62; (1987), 18 F.T.R. 316 (F.C.T.D.);
R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. et al., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295;
(1985), 60 A.R. 161; 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321; [1985] 3
W.W.R. 481; 37 Alta. L.R. (2d) 97; 18 C.C.C. (3d) 385;
85 CLLC 14,023; 13 C.R.R. 64; 58 N.R. 81; Blackfoot
Indian Band, No. 146 (Members) v. Canada and Black-
foot Indian Band, No. 146 (Chief and Councillors),
[1987] 2 C.N.L.R. 63; (1986), 5 F.T.R. 23 (F.C.T.D.);
Blackfoot Indian Band, No. 146 (Members) v. Canada
and Blackfoot Indian Band, No. 146 (Chief and Council
lors) (1986), 7 F.T.R. 133 (F.C.T.D.).
COUNSEL:
Diane Soroka for plaintiffs.
Jean-Marc Aubry for defendants Her Majes
ty the Queen and the Honourable Pierre
Cadieux.
Philip Schneider for defendants The Mohawk
Council of Kahnawake, Grand Chief Joe
Norton, Davis Rice, Walter Goodleaf, Hazel
Lazare, Paul G. Deer, Melvin Jacobs, John
Bud Morris, Thomas Phillips, Richard White,
Joe Delaronde, Billy Two Rivers and Alvin
Delisle.
SOLICITORS:
Hutchins, Soroka & Dionne, Montréal, for
plaintiffs.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
defendants Her Majesty the Queen and the
Honourable Pierre Cadieux.
Patenaude Dubois & Associés, Longueuil,
Quebec, for defendants The Mohawk Council
of Kahnawake, Grand Chief Joe Norton,
Davis Rice, Walter Goodleaf, Hazel Lazare,
Paul G. Deer, Melvin Jacobs, John Bud
Morris, Thomas Phillips, Richard White, Joe
Delaronde, Billy Two Rivers and Alvin
Delisle.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
DUBÉ J.: This appeal under Rule 336(5) [Fed-
eral Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663] is from an order
of the Senior Prothonotary dated June 7, 1990
granting a motion on behalf of two of the defend
ants, Her Majesty the Queen and the Honourable
Pierre Cadieux, and striking out paragraphs 33,
34, 35 and 36 of the plaintiffs' statement of claim
and subparagraphs (i), (j), (n) and (o) of the
prayer for relief and, consequently, striking out the
names of these two defendants, on the ground that
the paragraphs in question do not disclose a
reasonable cause of action against them. In his
order, the Senior Prothonotary outlined the follow
ing grounds for his decision:
1. The main question is to determine the validity of a by-law;
that belongs to the Court.
2. The Minister has specific powers; for example, sections 20,
28, 32, 34, 42, 43, 51, 52, 54, 55, 56, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 71,
74, 91, 93, 114; the Council of the band also has specific
powers; fur example 81-82-83.
3. The Minister is not entitled to intervene and decide if a
by-law adopted by a band's Council is ultra vires.
It appears in the statement of claim that the two
plaintiffs are married and reside on the Kah-
nawake reserve. The plaintiff Mary Deer is an
Indian and a member of the Kahnawake Indian
Band. The plaintiff William Rainey is not. On
May 23, 1989 the Mohawk Council demanded
that she evict her husband pursuant to a resolution
of the Council. The four paragraphs ordered
struck out by the Senior Prothonotary are as
follows:
33. DEFENDANT the Honourable Pierre Cadieux in his quality
as Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Development
and in his quality as Superintendent General of Indian
Affairs is responsible for the administration, implementa
tion and the enforcement of the Indian Act;
34. DEFENDANTS the Honourable Pierre Cadieux and preceed-
ing [sic] Ministers of Indian Affairs and Northern Develop
ment and Her Majesty the Queen have been informed and
have had knowledge of the actions of the other DEFEND
ANTS in this case;
35. DEFENDANTS the Honourable Pierre Cadieux and Her
Majesty the Queen have taken no action to prevent or stop
the illegal actions of the other DEFENDANTS in this case nor
have they taken appropriate measures to ensure the full
application of the Indian Act or to ensure that the rights to
which individuals such as PLAINTIFF, Mary Deer, are en
titled under the Indian Act, are implemented and respected,
thereby encouraging the other DEFENDANTS in this case to
continue and to pursue their illegal actions;
36. The tolerance of the above-mentioned illegal actions of the
other DEFENDANTS in this case and the lack of diligence in
the application, implementation and enforcement of the
Indian Act on the part of DEFENDANTS, the Honourable
Pierre Cadieux and Her Majesty the Queen constitute a
breach of their legal duties including:
(a) their duties under the Indian Act including the fiduci
ary duty owed by said DEFENDANTS to Mary Deer;
(b) their duty under the Charter to ensure that the rights
and freedoms guaranteed to PLAINTIFFS Mary Deer
and William Rainey thereunder are respected;
(c) their duty to ensure that the other DEFENDANTS in this
case, acting under authority delegated to them by legis
lation enacted by Parliament, carry out their respon
sibilities in a manner compatible with the terms of the
enabling legislation and the Charter;
The following subparagraphs of the prayer in
the statement of claim were also struck out:
(I) DECLARE that the Honourable Pierre Cadieux in his
quality as Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development and/or in his quality as Superintendent
General of Indian Affairs has been negligent in his duty
to see to the proper administration, implementation and
enforcement of the Indian Act;
(j) DECLARE that DEFENDANTS, the Honourable Pierre
Cadieux and Her Majesty the Queen are in breach of
their legal duties including:
(i) their duties under the Indian Act including the
fiduciary duty owed by said DEFENDANTS to Mary
Deer;
(ii) their duty under the Charter to ensure that the rights
and freedoms guaranteed to PLAINTIFFS Mary Deer
and William Rainey thereunder are respected;
(iii) their duty to ensure that the other DEFENDANTS in
this case, acting under authority delegated to them
by legislation enacted by Parliament, carry out their
responsibilities in a manner compatible with the
terms of the enabling legislation and the Charter;
(n) ORDER DEFENDANT Her Majesty the Queen to pay to
PLAINTIFF Mary Deer the sum of $25,000.00 for suf
fering and humiliation and deprivation of her legal
rights;
(o) ORDER DEFENDANT Her Majesty the Queen to pay to
PLAINTIFF William Rainey the sum of $10,000.00 for
suffering and humiliation;
Thus, the question to be resolved is whether it is
"plain and obvious and beyond doubt"' that the
plaintiffs have no cause of action against Her
Majesty the Queen and the Minister of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development.
It is trite law that in such strike out proceedings
under Rule 419 the allegations of fact advanced in
the statement of claim must be taken as true and
provable. In a nutshell, the plaintiffs allege that
the Minister is responsible for the administration
and enforcement of the Indian Act, 2 that he has
been informed of the actions of the Kahnawake
' See the test in Attorney General of Canada v. Inuit Tapiri-
sat of Canada et al., [1980] 2 S.C.R. 735, at p. 740.
z R.S.C., 1985, c. 1-5.
Council, that he has taken no measures to prevent
these actions, and therefore that he and Her
Majesty the Queen have breached their legal
duties under the Act and the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms [being Part I of the Consti
tution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982,
1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II,
No. 44]]. In their prayer, the plaintiffs seek a
declaration to that effect and damages.
The Senior Prothonotary held that the main
question to be determined is "the validity of a
by-law" and that "the Minister is not entitled to
intervene". This is essentially the position taken by
Crown counsel, namely that all actions complained
about by the plaintiffs emanate from the band
council, not from the Minister or the Queen, and
that it is for the tribunals to deal with these
actions if they are ultra vires.
Crown counsel argues that an Indian band coun
cil is an elected public authority, dependent on
Parliament for its existence, and is intended to
provide a form of local government. More specifi
cally, section 81 (as am. by R.S.C., 1985 (1st
Supp.), c. 32, s. 15) clothes the Indian band with
powers usually associated with rural municipali
ties, by way of delegation from Parliament, and
not from the Minister or the Crown (see White-
bear Band Council and Carpenters Provincial
Council of Saskatchewan et al., Re). 3 The only
operations or activities that a band council is
empowered, to carry on are those authorized by
Parliament under the Indian Act and particularly
under section 81 (see R. v. Paul Indian Band and
Attorney General of Alberta and Attorney General
of Canada). 4 That section gives the council power
to make by-laws, not inconsistent with the Act or
regulations, for many specified purposes which are
similarly covered by the by-laws of municipalities.
The council is a designated body of persons which
is given a specific role under the provisions of the
Indian Act (see Public Service Alliance of Canada
v. Francis et al.). 5 Of course, the Indian Act does
impose certain restrictions on the actions and on
3 (1982), 135 D.L.R. (3d) 128 (Sask. C.A.), at p. 133.
° (1983), 50 A.R. 190 (C.A.), at p. 195.
5 [ 1982] 2 S.C.R. 72, at p. 78.
the rights of status Indians but they are not "to be
treated at law somehow as if they were not sui
juris such as infants or persons incapable of
managing their own affairs .... They are fully
entitled to avail themselves of federal and provin
cial laws and of our judicial system as a whole to
enforce their rights, as they are indeed doing in the
case at bar" (see Apsassin v. Canada (Department
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development)). 6
It is well known that there are strong views to
the effect that the Indian Act ought to be abol
ished and the Department of Indian Affairs be
scrapped, to wit a recent report of the Canadian
Human Rights Commission, but the Act is still on
the books and the Minister is still vested with vast
powers and responsibilities for the proper adminis
tration of that Act.
The plaintiffs contend that the statement of
claim raises a number of important issues, only
one of which is the legality of the by-law in
question. The plaintiffs want to assert their right
to live together on the reserve by virtue of the
Indian Act as amended in 1985 and the Canadian
Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Minister is
responsible for the administration of the Indian
Act on the reserve. He is also named superintend
ent general of Indian Affairs. On that score, Mr.
Justice Stone of the Federal Court of Appeal said
as follows in Native Communications Society of
B.C. v. Canada (M.N.R.) 7 :
A cursory examination of the Indian Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. 1-6,
as amended reveals the extent of state involvement. I would
note, for example, that it may have a say in: establishing of
bands and the occupancy of reserve lands; the registration of
Indian people, the holding, management and expenditure of
Indian moneys; the compulsory taking or using, or the surren
der of lands of a reserve; descent of property, wills and the
distribution of property on intestacy; mental incompetency and
guardianship; trading with the Indians; enfranchisement;
schools. The statute is under the administration of the Minister
of Indian Affairs and Northern Development who is also the
superintendent general of Indian Affairs. It provides for a
"superintendent" which is defined to include a commissioner,
regional supervisor, Indian superintendent, assistant Indian su
perintendent, etc. as well as the superintendent for a particular
[1988] 3 F.C. 20 (T.D.), at pp. 46-47.
[ 1986] 3 F.C. 471 (C.A.), at p. 483.
band or reserve. From this elaborate set of provisions it may be
seen that the state has assumed a special responsibility for the
welfare of the Indian people. Unlike the vast majority of their
fellow citizens they are rather a people set apart for particular
assistance and protection in many aspects of their lives.
The plaintiffs claim that the Queen and the
Minister have a duty to uphold the law. The rule
respecting Indian status and band membership was
substantially overhauled in 1985, so as to conform
with section 15 of the Charter which came into
force on April 17 of that year. Under the new rule,
the band council has no power to determine who is
a status Indian. It has the option, however, of
adopting its own rules for band membership if it
complies with the procedure and requirements set
out in the Indian Act. These requirements include
a prohibition of any interference with rights
acquired by women who were reinstated as Indians
and band members under the terms of the amend
ments of the Act (see subsection 10(4)). The
Mohawk Council of Kahnawake has not opted to
adopt its own rules for band membership: it must
therefore follow the rules set out in the Act. Both
defendants may not disregard their plain duty to
ensure that the Indian Act is applied and enforced.
The plaintiffs refer to a British Columbia
Supreme Court decision, Glazer v. Union Contrac
tors Ltd. & Thornton,' where it was found that a
Minister of the Provincial Government was guilty
of contempt of court for not having complied with
the terms of an injunction of which he had infor
mal notice. Norris J. held, at page 678, that "his
actions throughout show a lack of a proper sense
of responsibility in the observance of the law".
The plaintiffs also refer to a decision of our own
Federal Court of Appeal, LeBar v. Canada, 9
wherein MacGuigan J. said as follows:
8 (1960), 25 D.L.R. (2d) 653 (B.C.S.C.).
9 [I989] 1 F.C. 603 (C.A.), at pp. 613 and 614.
Even if in the minds of its officials it has good reason to pause
and consider, it is not enough for the Government to remain
outwardly mute and disobedient in the face of a declaratory
judgment, because such an apparent failure to obey the law is a
ready occasion of scandal for the public. The Government must
be seen to be obedient to the law. If it has some reason for
uncertainty, it owes it to the principle of the rule of law to
reveal its position publicly, through a legal challenge to its
apparent duty as declared by the courts. In my view, the rule of
law can mean no less. I therefore reject the appellant's conten
tion that she had no obligation to follow the declaratory
judgment in Macintyre.
The plaintiffs also make the argument that the
Crown and the Minister are responsible for use by
the band of moneys voted annually and disbursed
through the Department of Indian Affairs. Both
have a duty to see that those moneys are used for
the benefit of all Indians who are members of the
band and for the proper carrying out of the duties
and responsibilities of the band council. In Finlay
v. Canada (Minister of Finance), 10 three Federal
Cabinet Ministers named as defendants in an
action moved to have their names struck out on the
ground that there was no nexus to the Crown. The
Supreme Court of Canada found that the plaintiff
Finlay had sufficient standing and a cause of
action against them. In this case, it was alleged
that the payments made by the Government of
Canada to the Province of Manitoba under the
terms of a federal-provincial cost-sharing agree
ment, authorized by the Canada Assistance Plan,
were illegal and the Province was not complying
with the terms of the Plan. On the merits, the
plaintiff Finlay won his case at all levels.
Thus, the plaintiffs affirm there is a fiduciary
duty owed by the Queen and the Minister to the
plaintiff Mary Deer, a duty to ensure that moneys
disbursed by the band council are properly spent.
They quote an American decision, Seminole
Nation v. United States," where the U.S.
Supreme Court found that:
In carrying out its treaty obligations with the Indian tribes the
Government is something more than a mere contracting party
... it has charged itself with moral obligations .... Payment of
funds at the request of a tribal council which, to the knowledge
" [19861 2 S.C.R. 607.
'' 62 S.Ct. 1049 (1942), at pp. 1054 and 1055.
of the Government officers charged with the administration of
Indian affairs and the disbursement of funds to satisfy treaty
obligations, was composed of representatives faithless to their
own people and without integrity would be a clear breach of the
Government's fiduciary obligation.
In recent years, the concept of the fiduciary
duty owed by the Crown to the Indians has been
greatly discussed and expanded upon by Canadian
courts. ' 2
The plaintiffs contend that there is a positive
duty owed by the Queen and the Minister to
ensure that the plaintiffs' rights are respected
under the Charter: both have a self-executory duty
to take all necessary steps to prevent and eliminate
any violation of their rights. The Charter is a
purposive document. Its interpretation, "a gener
ous rather than a legalistic one", is aimed at
fulfilling the purpose of the guarantee and secur
ing for individuals full benefit of the Charter's
protection. 13
Consequently, it is not "plain and obvious" and
"beyond doubt" that the plaintiffs have no case
against the Queen and her Minister. It is well
established that the courts ought to be careful and
hesitant before striking out a statement of claim,
or paragraphs from a statement of claim, as dis
closing no reasonable cause of action. As men
tioned by Madame Justice Wilson in Operation
Dismantle Inc. et al. v. The Queen et al.: 14 "nor
will the novelty of the cause of action militate
against the plaintiffs".
This action against the two defendants is not
frivolous. It may not be sustainable throughout but
it is too early to limit the issue to the validity of a
by-law. In recent years, this Court has been reti
cent to strike out allegations concerning the fiduci
ary obligations owed by the Crown to Indians.
Thus, in two decisions involving the Blackfoot
2 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; Guerin et al. v. The
Queen et al., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335; and Desjarlais et al. v.
Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern Develop
ment), [1988] 2 C.N.L.R. 62 (F.C.T.D.).
" R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. et al., [ 1985] 1 S.C.R. 295.
4 [ 1985]I S.C.R. 441, at p. 477.
Indian Band, my colleagues Reed J.' 5 on June 11
and Teitelbaum J. 16 on November 7, 1986 denied
the Crown's applications for a strike out.
Consequently, the plaintiffs' appeal is allowed
with costs in the cause.
15 Blackfoot Indian Band, No. 146 (Members) v. Canada and
Blackfoot Indian Band, No. 146 (Chief and Councillors),
[1987] 2 C.N.L.R. 63 (F.C.T.D.).
I 6 Blackfoot Indian Band, No. 146 (Members) v. Canada and
Blackfoot Indian Band, No. 146 (Chief and Councillors)
(1986), 7 F.T.R. 133 (F.C.T.D.).
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.