T-1505-90
Christopher Williams (Applicant)
v.
Regional Transfer Board, Prairie Region (Correc-
tional Service Canada) and Michael Gallagher,
Warden of Edmonton Institution (Respondents)
T-1506-90
Harold Dubarry (Applicant)
v.
Regional Transfer Board, Prairie Region (Correc-
tional Service Canada) and Michael Gallagher,
Warden of Edmonton Institution (Respondents)
T-1507-90
Ken McIntyre (Applicant)
v.
Regional Transfer Board, Prairie Region (Correc-
tional Service Canada) and Michael Gallagher,
Warden of Edmonton Institution (Respondents)
T-1508-90
Arthur Winters (Applicant)
v.
Regional Transfer Board, Prairie Region (Correc-
tional Service Canada) and Michael Gallagher,
Warden of Edmonton Institution (Respondents)
T-1509-90
Eugene Campbell (Applicant)
v.
Regional Transfer Board, Prairie Region (Correc-
tional Service Canada) and Michael Gallagher,
Warden of Edmonton Institution (Respondents)
INDEXED AS: WILLIAMS V. CANADA (CORRECTIONAL SERVICE,
REGIONAL TRANSFER BOARD, PRAIRIE REGION) (T.D.)
Trial Division, Rouleau J.—Calgary, August 28;
Ottawa, September 24, 1990.
Penitentiaries — Emergency involuntary transfer of inmate
to high maximum security institution after knife fight, refus
ing to return to cell and holding officers in Unit — Warden's
belief transfer required for proper administration of institution
reasonable — No breach of Charter, s. 7 or duty of fairness in
not providing inmate with progress summary report, contrary
to Commissioner's Directive — Charter, s. 10(b) right to
counsel relating to initial arrest or detention, not to penitentia
ry convicts — No improper delegation of authority to make
transfer decision.
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Life, liberty and
security — Emergency involuntary transfer of inmate after
knife fight, refusal to return to cell and holding of officers in
Unit — Warden's belief transfer required for proper adminis
tration of institution reasonable — Failure to provide progress
summary report, contrary to Commissioner's Directive, not
breach of Charter s. 7 — Notifications of transfer containing
sufficient detail to allow applicant to respond in meaningful
way.
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Criminal process
— Convict denied opportunity to retain counsel prior to emer
gency involuntary transfer to high maximum security institu
tion — No breach of Charter, s. 10(b) — Right to counsel
depending upon circumstances — "Arrest or detention" in s.
10(b) applying to initial arrest, not to penitentiary convicts —
Absence of counsel not hindering applicant's presentation of
case.
This was an application for certiorari to quash the decision to
transfer the applicant from Edmonton Institution to the High
Maximum Security Unit of Saskatchewan Penitentiary. The
applicant and several other convicts refused to return to their
cells after a knife fight and the recovery of only one of the
weapons, and held two corrections officers in the Unit. The
Warden felt applicant's activities posed a threat to the good
order and discipline of the Institution and that he had demon
strated such potential for violent behaviour that he posed a
persistent and serious risk to the safety of others. The applicant
was given a notification of recommendation for involuntary
transfer with reasons therefor. He was not allowed to retain
counsel. Two days later, the applicant received a supplementary
notification, to which he submitted a written response. The
Regional Transfer Board approved the transfer. The applicant
alleged: (1) there was a lack of evidence to support the involun
tary transfer; (2) the failure to provide a progress summary
report, contrary to the procedural provisions set out in Commis
sioner's Directive 540, constituted a breach of the principles of
procedural fairness and Charter, section 7; (3) he had been
denied his right under Charter, paragraph 10(b) to retain and
instruct counsel; and (4) there was an improper delegation of
authority to the Board because the Board did not have the
jurisdiction to make the decision to transfer.
Held, the application should be dismissed.
(1) A decision to transfer a convict must be supported by a
reasonable belief that the prisoner should be moved for the sake
of the orderly and proper administration of the institution. The
facts indicate that the Warden's belief that the applicant should
be transferred on an emergency basis was reasonable, as was
his belief that the applicant had been involved, in a significant
way, in a serious security matter.
(2) The absence of a progress summary report amounted to
a breach of neither the duty to act fairly nor Charter, section 7.
The duty to act fairly merely requires adequate notice and a
fair opportunity to answer allegations. The notifications con
tained sufficient detail to allow the applicant to know the case
against him and to respond in a meaningful way. Although the
requirement set out in the Commissioner's Directive that the
progress summary report be attached to the notification was
not met, procedural defects will not necessarily invalidate a
transfer, if the general process was fair. The question is not
whether there has been a breach of prison rules, but whether
there has been a breach of the duty to act fairly in all the
circumstances. There was no such breach here. Furthermore, as
no progress summary report had been prepared, it was not a
question of information being withheld.
(3) On the facts of the case, and in view of the emergency
nature of the situation, the refusal to allow the applicant to
retain counsel did not constitute a breach of the duty to act
fairly nor of any of the applicant's Charter rights. An inmate
who is subject to an involuntary transfer made on an emergen
cy basis does not have an absolute right to retain counsel as
provided for in Charter, section 10. Whether there is an
inherent right to representation by counsel depends upon the
circumstances of the case. Furthermore, "arrest or detention"
in paragraph 10(b) has been held to refer to a restraint of
liberty, either physical or by the demand or direction of a
person in authority. The right to retain and instruct counsel has
been held to apply only to initial arrest or detention, not to
convicts in a penitentiary. The applicant was not hindered in
the presentation of his case by the absence of counsel.
(4) There was no improper delegation of authority to the
Regional Transfer Board to make the decision to transfer.
Among those authorized by the Commissioner's Directives to
approve intra-regional transfers, was the Assistant Deputy
Commissioner, Operations. The applicant's transfer was
approved by the person acting in that capacity.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY
CONSIDERED
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I
of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act
1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II,
No. 44], ss. 7, 10(b).
Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, ss. 129, 279(2) (as
am. by R.S.C., 1985 (1st Supp.), c. 27, s. 39).
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
Camphaug v. Canada (1990), 34 F.T.R. 165 (F.C.T.D.);
Demaria v. Regional Classification Board, [1987] 1 F.C.
74; (1986), 21 Admin. L.R. 227; 30 C.C.C. (3d) 55; 53
C.R. (3d) 88; 5 F.T.R. 160; 69 N.R. 135 (C.A.); Mar-
tineau v. Matsqui Institution Disciplinary Board, [1980]
1 S.C.R. 602; (1979), 106 D.L.R. (3d) 385; 50 C.C.C.
(2d) 353; 13 C.R. (3d) 1; 15 C.R. (3d) 314; 30 N.R. 119;
Howard v. Stony Mountain Institution, [1984] 2 F.C.
642; (1985), 19 D.L.R. (4th) 502; 11 Admin. L.R. 63; 19
C.C.C. (3d) 195; 45 C.R. (3d) 242; 17 C.R.R. 5; 57 N.R.
280 (C.A.); Latham v. Solicitor General of Canada,
[1984] 2 F.C. 734; (1984), 9 D.L.R. (4th) 393; 5 Admin.
L.R. 70; 12 C.C.C. (3d) 9; 39 C.R. (3d) 78 (T.D.).
CONSIDERED:
Hnatiuk v. Canada (1987), 12 F.T.R. 44 (F.C.T.D.).
REFERRED TO:
Gallant v. Canada (Deputy Commissioner, Correctional
Service Canada), [1989] 3 F.C. 329; (1989), 36 Admin.
L.R. 261; 68 C.R. (3d) 173; 25 F.T.R. 79; 92 N.R. 292
(C.A.); Jamieson v. Commr. of Corrections (1986), 51
C.R. (3d) 155; 2 F.T.R. 146 (F.C.T.D.); Mitchell v.
Crozier, [1986] 1 F.C. 255; (1986), 1 F.T.R. 138 (T.D.).
COUNSEL:
Charalee F. Graydon for applicants.
Larry M. Huculak for respondents.
SOLICITORS:
Bishop & McKenzie, Edmonton, for appli
cants.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
respondents.
The following are the reasons for order ren
dered in English by
ROULEAU J.: The applicant, an inmate of the
federal penitentiary known as Edmonton Institu-
tion, seeks an order in the nature of a writ of
certiorari quashing the decision of the Warden to
transfer him from "A" Unit of the Institution to
the High Maximum Security Unit of Saskatche-
wan Penitentiary and further, quashing the deci
sion to place the applicant in administrative segre
gation after his return to Edmonton Institution.
On November 5, 1989, a knife fight between
two inmates occurred in the courtyard of the
Edmonton Institution. Since only one of the weap
ons used in the fight was recovered, the Assistant
Warden, in charge of the Institution at the time,
ordered a lock-down, a procedure whereby all
inmates are required to return to their cells. The
inmates of "A" Unit, including the applicant,
refused to obey the order and further refused to
allow two corrections officers to leave the Unit. As
a result of these incidents, the Warden was of the
view that the maintenance of good order and
discipline of the Institution was threatened by the
activities of the applicant and the other inmates
involved. It was also the Warden's opinion that the
applicant had demonstrated such potential for vio
lent behaviour that he posed a persistent and
serious risk to the safety of staff and inmates at
the Edmonton Institution and accordingly, should
be transferred, on an emergency basis, to the High
Maximum Security Unit at the Saskatchewan
Penitentiary. This decision was made on
November 6, 1989.
On the same date, the applicant was provided
with a notification of recommendation for involun
tary transfer which alleged that on November 5,
1989, he had prevented completion of an institu
tion emergency lock-up of inmates and it was
considered that he should be transferred to high
security on an emergency basis. The applicant
requested that he be allowed to contact legal coun
sel in respect of the recommended involuntary
transfer but such request was denied. The appli
cant was placed on an airplane and transferred to
the High Maximum Security Unit at the Sas-
katchewan Penitentiary.
On the airplane, the applicant received a copy of
a notification of recommendation for involuntary
transfer, dated November 6, 1989 and signed by
the Warden. On or about November 8, 1989 the
applicant received a further notification of recom-
mendation for involuntary transfer dated
November 7, 1989 and signed by the Warden,
which was supplementary to the first notification
of recommendation for involuntary transfer. Both
notifications provided to the applicant contained
the reasons for the Warden's recommendation of
transfer and further stated that the applicant had
the right to provide a written response thereto. The
applicant did in fact submit a written response to
the notice stating his denial of the allegations
made therein and setting out his version of events
with respect to the incident in question.
On December 22, 1989, the applicant and four
other inmates of the "A" Unit received letters
advising them that the Regional Transfer Board
had reviewed the information presented by the
Edmonton Institution in support of their transfer
as well as the inmates' written submissions. On the
basis of this information, it was decided to approve
the transfers of each of the inmates to the High
Maximum Security Unit, Saskatchewan Peniten
tiary. On May 10, 1990, the applicant was trans
ferred back to Edmonton Institution, where he was
maintained in administrative segregation pending
a preliminary inquiry in relation to charges laid
pursuant to sections 129 and 279(2) [as am. by
R.S.C., 1985 (1st Supp.), c. 27, s. 39] of the
Criminal Code [R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46] until his
release from custody on May 26, 1990.
The applicant now seeks a writ of certiorari on
the grounds that the Regional Transfer Board had
no jurisdiction to approve the transfer; that it
failed to exercise its jurisdiction in that it did not
separately and independently inquire into the
applicant's case; that the respondents acted con
trary to the principles of procedural fairness and
section 7 of the Charter [Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Consti
tution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982,
1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II,
No. 44] ] in the recommendation and decision to
transfer; that the respondents denied the applicant
his right under paragraph 10(b) of the Charter to
retain and instruct counsel; and that the Warden
of Edmonton Institution acted unreasonably and
contrary to procedural fairness and section 7 of the
Charter in placing the applicant in administrative
segregation.
It is the applicant's contention that jurispru
dence has established the duty of procedural fair
ness and section 7 of the Charter requires an
inmate subject to a recommendation for involun
tary transfer be provided with adequate notice and
reasons for the transfer, as well as an opportunity
to make representations opposing such transfer. It
is submitted by the applicant that the procedural
provisions set out in Commissioner's Directive 540
define the conduct which must be observed by
correction officials in respect of both an emergen
cy transfer and an involuntary transfer to a high
maximum security unit. One of the requirements
of the Directive is that an inmate who is subject to
an involuntary transfer be presented with a
progress summary report. Such a report is to
provide a detailed account of the incidents which
prompted the transfer, excepting only security or
informant information as well as any previous
incidents or behaviour which contributed to the
decision to recommend involuntary transfer. The
applicant maintains that at no time was he pro
vided with a progress summary report in support
of his transfer nor was he provided with any
confidential or security information which may
have been considered in relation to his transfer.
The applicant further alleges the respondents
breached their duty of procedural fairness and
contravened section 7 of the Charter by failing to
address their minds separately and independently
in relation to the involuntary transfer of the appli
cant to the High Maximum Security Unit of the
Saskatchewan Penitentiary. In addition, the
respondents contravened paragraph 10(b) of the
Charter by denying the applicant an opportunity
to contact legal counsel on November 6, 1989
when he was detained and transferred to the High
Maximum Security Unit of the Saskatchewan
Penitentiary.
According to the applicant, the decision-maker
erred in approving the involuntary transfer in the
absence of any evidence that the applicant had
demonstrated such potential for violent behaviour
that he posed a persistent and serious risk to the
safety of staff or inmates in any institution of a
lower security level.
Finally, it is contended there has been an
improper delegation of authority to the Regional
Transfer Board because, according to the appli
cant, that Board did not possess the jurisdiction to
make a decision concerning the transfer of the
applicant to the High Maximum Security Unit of
the Saskatchewan Penitentiary.
In response to these allegations, the respondents
submit the duty of procedural fairness and the
duty contained in section 7 of the Charter were
met. It is true the applicant did not receive a
progress summary report, as required by the direc
tives. However, the respondents argue, in an emer
gency transfer of this nature, notice of the recom
mendation for the transfer and the reasons
therefor, can properly be served on an inmate at
the time of transfer or shortly thereafter, provided
the inmate has been given sufficient detail of the
reason so that he is able to meaningfully respond
to them in writing when the transfer is being
reviewed. The issue is not, in the respondents'
opinion, whether an inmate has received every
document relating to the transfer, but whether he
can meaningfully respond to the transfer notice
and has been given a fair opportunity to answer
the allegations in writing.
With regards to the alleged infringement of
paragraph 10(b) of the Charter, the respondents
submit that an involuntary transfer is an adminis
trative act and therefore does not give rise to the
applicant having an absolute right to obtain
counsel.
Last, the respondents maintain there has been
no improper delegation of authority to the Region
al Transfer Board, which acts as an advisory
Board. The decision to approve the transfer was
made by the Acting Assistant Deputy Commis
sioner, Operations, in accordance with Commis
sioner's Directive 540, after reviewing the material
before him, including the written submission of the
applicant.
I intend to deal first with the applicant's allega
tion of lack of evidence to support the involuntary
transfer. According to Commissioner's Directive
(C.D.) 540, Article 13, the only reason an inmate
may be transferred to high maximum security is
that "the inmate has demonstrated such potential
for violent behaviour that he poses a persistent and
serious risk to the safety of staff or inmates" in the
lower security institution. In Camphaug v. Canada
(1990), 34 F.T.R. 165 (F.C.T.D.), Mr. Justice
Strayer, referring to the decision of Marceau J.A.
in Gallant v. Canada (Deputy Commissioner, Cor
rectional Service Canada), [1989] 3 F.C. 329
(C.A.), stated that a decision to transfer is not like
a conviction for an offence: what is required on the
part of the decision-maker is a reasonable belief
the prisoner should be moved for the sake of the
orderly and proper administration of the institu
tion.
It is trite law that the function of this Court in
this type of application is not to substitute its own
decision for that of a warden in recommending a
transfer or for that of an Acting Assistant Deputy
Commissioner, Operations, in approving such a
transfer. The Court will not put itself in the place
of the administrative authority in assessing facts
and credibility.
The determination I must make is whether there
was a reasonable belief on the part of the decision-
maker that the inmate should be transferred. I am
not hesitant to state, in my opinion, the Warden of
the Edmonton Institution acted reasonably in
making the decision which he did. He reasonably
believed, on the basis of information provided to
him, that the applicant had been involved in a
significant way, in a serious security matter at the
Edmonton Institution. As a result of these inci
dents, the Warden also held a reasonable belief the
applicant should be transferred on an emergency
basis to a higher security institution. In my view,
the facts support the Warden's belief: a knife fight
from which only one weapon was recovered, refus
al of the applicant to obey a lock-down, and the
applicant's role in the detention of two corrections
officers.
The next issue is the consequence of the
respondents' failure to provide the applicant with a
progress summary report. Article 7 of Annex A to
Commissioner's Directive 540 details the informa
tion required in the notification of recommenda
tion for involuntary transfer. Basically, the notice
is required to contain sufficiently detailed informa
tion to allow the inmate to know the case against
him and to be able to respond. Article 8, further
requires, where the transfer is to high maximum
security, the reasons why the inmate is considered
a serious risk to the safety of staff or inmates.
In the present case, these requirements have
been satisfied. The applicant received two notifica
tions of recommendation for involuntary transfer.
He was advised he had the right to make written
representations on them, and he did so. The notifi
cations contained sufficient detail to allow the
applicant to know the case against him and to
respond in a meaningful fashion. Indeed, having
examined the notifications, I am satisfied the
applicant was provided with as much information
as he reasonably could have been without jeopard
izing the security of the Institution.
Article 10 of Annex A to Commissioner's Direc
tive 540 states that a copy of a progress summary
report is to be attached to the notification of
recommendation for involuntary transfer. The
progress summary report is required to be either
signed by the inmate or contain some indication
that the inmate refused to sign it. There is no
question in the present case that Article 10 has not
been complied with. The question before me is
whether the omission . of a progress summary
report represents a fatal flaw to the procedure
followed by the decision-maker so as to require the
remedy of certiorari to correct any resulting
injustice.
On one point the case law is consistent: the
Court ought to exercise restraint in intervening in
essentially administrative acts such as those in
issue in this case. However, at the same time, the
Court must be satisfied that the basic require
ments of fairness have been observed.
An inmate does not possess a right to an oral
hearing prior to being transferred. (See: Jamieson
v. Commr. of Corrections (1986), 51 C.R. (3d)
155 (F.C.T.D.); Mitchell v. Crozier, [1986] 1 F.C.
255 (T.D.); Hnatiuk v. Canada (1987), 12 F.T.R.
44 (F.C.T.D.)). What the case law has established
is that an inmate is entitled, under C.D. 540, to
notice in writing of the reasons for transfer and of
his right to submit written objections within 48
hours. He is also entitled to a written decision
regarding whether the transfer is approved, includ
ing some indication that his response was con
sidered in reaching the decision.
In Demaria v. Regional Classification Board,
[1987] 1 F.C. 74 (C.A.), the Court held the duty
to act fairly in transferring a prisoner to increased
security includes adequate notice and a fair oppor
tunity to answer allegations. Where there is no
intention of holding a hearing, it is important that
the notice of the alleged conduct contain as much
detail as possible to ensure the right to answer does
not become illusory. The Court emphasized that
the burden is always on the authorities to demon
strate they have withheld only such information as
is strictly necessary to protect the identity of an
informant. As stated by Hugessen J.A., at page 78:
In the final analysis, the test must be not whether there exist
good grounds for withholding information but rather whether
enough information has been revealed to allow the person
concerned to answer the case against him.
However, it does not follow that procedural
defects will necessarily invalidate a transfer, if the
general process was fair. In Hnatiuk, supra, it was
held that failure to fully complete a required form
did not amount to a breach by the institutional
officers of their duty to act fairly. The Court relied
on the oft-quoted statement of Dickson J., as he
then was, in his decision in Martineau v. Matsqui
Institution Disciplinary Board, [1980] 1 S.C.R.
602, at page 630:
5. It should be emphasized that it is not every breach of
prison rules of procedure which will bring intervention by the
courts. The very nature of a prison institution requires officers
to make "on the spot" disciplinary decisions and the power of
judicial review must be exercised with restraint. Interference
will not be justified in the case of trivial or merely technical
incidents. The question is not whether there has been a breach
of the prison rules, but whether there has been a breach of the
duty to act fairly in all the circumstances. The rules are of
some importance in determining this latter question, as an
indication of the views of prison authorities as to the degree of
procedural protection to be extended to inmates. [Emphasis
added.]
In the case at bar, I am satisfied that, in all the
circumstances, there has been no breach by the
respondents of the duty to act fairly by reason of
no progress summary report being served on the
applicant. Fairness in the making of a decision to
transfer an inmate does not require that the
inmate be given all the particulars of all alleged
wrongdoings. It will be sufficient if he can ade
quately make representations to demonstrate that
the recommendation he be moved is an unreason
able one. It is clear the applicant was provided
with sufficient detail to know the case he had to
meet and to make his submissions on the reasons
given for that recommendation. The facts show
that the applicant was able to meaningfully
respond to the transfer notice and he was given a
fair opportunity to answer the allegations in
writing.
I am further convinced in my finding that the
lack of a progress summary report should not lead
this Court to intervene in the decision-making
process of the respondents by the fact that no such
report was prepared. It is not a question of infor
mation being withheld from the applicant; rather,
the individuals responsible for preparation of
progress summary reports were participating in a
strike at the time in question.
In the final analysis, I am satisfied that the
absence of a progress summary report, in the
circumstances of this case, does not constitute a
breach by the respondents of their duty to act
fairly nor does it constitute a breach of section 7 of
the Charter.
I turn now to the matter of the respondents'
refusal to allow the applicant to obtain and
instruct legal counsel after his request to do so on
November 5, 1989. The question of whether an
inmate who is subject to disciplinary proceedings
has a right to counsel was the subject of debate
before the Federal Court of Appeal in Howard v.
Stony Mountain Institution, [1984] 2 F.C. 642.
In that case the inmate was charged with discipli
nary offences under section 39 of the Penitentiary
Service Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1251 and subject
to a disciplinary hearing for which he requested
representation by counsel and was denied. Thurlow
C.J. formulated the following test as to whether an
individual is to be considered as possessing an
inherent right to counsel on page 663:
... it appears to me that whether or not the person has a right
to representation by counsel will depend on the circumstances
of the particular case, its nature, its gravity, its complexity, the
capacity of the inmate himself to understand the case and
present his defence. The list is not exhaustive. And from this, it
seems to me, it follows that whether or not an inmate's request
for representation by counsel can lawfully be refused is not
properly referred to as a matter of discretion but is a matter of
right where the circumstances are such that the opportunity to
present the case adequately calls for representation by counsel.
Furthermore, "arrest or detention" in paragraph
10(b) of the Charter has been held to refer to a
restraint of liberty, either physical or by the
demand or direction of a person in authority.
In Latham v. Solicitor General of Canada,
[1984] 2 F.C. 734 (T.D.), it was held a prisoner
appearing before the Parole Board for a review of
suspension of his parole is not entitled to an abso
lute right to obtain and instruct counsel as set out
in paragraph 10(b) of the Charter. Those rights,
the Court held, apply only to initial arrest or
detention, and any other application of paragraph
10(b), in a prison context, would result in a con
tinuing duty on the part of prison officials to
advise prisoners of their right to counsel on a
day-by-day basis.
In my view, an inmate who is subject to an
involuntary transfer made on an emergency basis
does not have an absolute right to obtain counsel
as provided for in section 10 of the Charter. That
is not to say that an inmate will never be able to
invoke the protection of the rights enshrined in
paragraph 10(b). However, I agree with Thurlow
C.J.: it is the circumstances of each case which will
determine whether that absolute right exists. In
the case at bar, I am satisfied the applicant was
well aware of the reasons for the transfer and was
able to respond, in a meaningful way, to the case
against him. He was provided with ample opportu
nity to present his case adequately and indeed he
did so. The applicant was not hindered in the
presentation of his case by the absence of counsel.
Considering the facts of this case, as well as the
emergency nature of the situation, the refusal to
allow the applicant to obtain counsel did not con
stitute a breach of any duty on the part of prison
officials to act fairly nor was it offensive to any of
the applicant's rights under the Charter.
Finally, the evidence does not support the appli
cant's allegation that there was an improper dele
gation of authority to the Regional Transfer Board
to make the decision to transfer. Under Commis
sioner's Directive 540, it is the Regional Deputy
Commissioner, the Assistant Deputy Commission
er, Operations and the Regional Administrator
Community and Institutional Operations who have
the authority to approve intra-regional transfers.
The approval of the applicant's transfer was made
by Mr. Linklater in his capacity as Acting Assist
ant Deputy Commissioner, Operations, after a
review of the material before him, including the
applicant's written submissions. There was, there
fore, no improper delegation of authority to the
Regional Transfer Board.
For all these reasons, I am unable to conclude
the respondents failed to fulfil their duty to act
fairly nor did their actions infringe any rights of
the applicant under the Charter. The application is
therefore dismissed with costs.
These reasons for order written in the case of
applicant Christopher Williams, File No.
T-1505-90, are also to apply to the following appli
cants: Harold Dubarry, T-1506-90; Ken McIntyre,
T-1507-90; Arthur Winters, T-1508-90; and
Eugene Campbell, T-1509-90. It should be noted
that though there may be slight discrepancies in
the facts in each file, the principles challenged
were the same.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.