Judgments

Decision Information

Decision Content

T-1934-87
Thomas Jackson (Plaintiff) v.
Disciplinary Tribunal, Joyceville Penitentiary, namely Donald Schlichter, Independant Chairper son and Attorney General of Canada (Defendants)
INDEXED AS: JACKSON V. JOYCEVILLE PENITENTIARY (T.D.)
Trial Division, MacKay J.—Ottawa, March 13, 14, 15, 17, 1989 and February 16, 1990.
Penitentiaries — Mandatory urine sampling for intoxicant detection under Penitentiary Service Regulations, s. 41.1 Purpose to reduce prison violence — Violating Charter, s. 7 right to liberty and security and s. 8 protection against unrea sonable search or seizure as s. 41.1, without criteria for application, permitting custodial staff to require inmate sus pected of having ingested intoxicant to provide urine sample.
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Life, liberty and security — Penitentiaries — Mandatory urine sampling for intoxicant detection under Penitentiary Service Regulations, s. 41.1 — Coupled with disciplinary proceedings in case of refusal, s. 41.1 violating Charter, s. 7 by depriving inmate of right to liberty and security of person in manner not in accordance with principles of natural justice.
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Criminal process — Search or seizure — Penitentiaries — Mandatory urine sampling procedure for intoxicant detection under Penitentiary Service Regulations, s. 41.1 — In violation of Charter, s. 8 protection against unreasonable search or seizure as regulation not providing criteria for application.
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Limitation clause — Penitentiaries — Mandatory urine sampling for intoxicant detection under Penitentiary Service Regulations, s. 41.1 — Purpose of program to reduce prison violence Limitations, in s. 41.1, on Charter, ss. 7 and 8 rights, in absence of criteria for application, not reasonable limitation prescribed by law within Charter, s. I.
Constitutional law — Charter of Rights — Equality rights — Penitentiaries — Mandatory urine sampling for intoxicant detection under Penitentiary Service Regulations, s. 41.1 —
No discrimination contrary to Charter, s. 15 as different treatment due to past crimes, not personal characteristics.
The Penitentiary Service Regulations were amended in 1985 to authorize mandatory urine sampling for the detection and deterrence of drug and intoxicant use in federal penitentiaries (section 41.1) and to provide for consequences of positive tests (paragraph 39(i.1)). The program was to include random test ing of 10 percent of all inmates every two months. Initially, the urinalysis surveillance program was to be introduced by stand ing orders at two institutions: Joyceville, Ontario and Cowans- ville, Quebec. But in August, 1986, the Quebec Superior Court declared that the regulations violated Charter section 7 and were not saved by section 1. That decision is under appeal.
In April, 1987, the plaintiff, an inmate at the Joyceville Penitentiary, was suspected of being under the influence of an intoxicant. He was ordered, under section 41.1 of the Regula tions, to provide a urine sample. He refused on the ground that this was a violation of his constitutional rights. He was charged with and convicted of disobeying a lawful order, contrary to paragraph 39(a) of the Regulations.
This was an action for a declaration that section 41.1 of the Penitentiary Service Regulations contravenes sections 7, 8 and 15 of the Charter.
Held, the action should be allowed. Charter Section 8
The requirement to give a sample was a search within the meaning of Charter section 8. The inmate could not be said to have been free to refuse where the punishment for refusing was the same as for having consumed intoxicants. The search here authorized was unreasonable within the meaning of section 8.
The facts pleaded and established restricted the issue to those circumstances clearly described within a narrow construction of section 41.1 of the Regulations as it related to the situation where a staff member believed or suspected that the plaintiff had consumed an intoxicant "other than brew". The Commis sioner's directives do not have the force of law and could not qualify the words of the regulation in question nor prescribe a limit within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter. Neverthe less, in the world of government operations today a variety of initiatives are taken as outlined by a variety of documents and instruments purporting to be under general statutes and regula tions, as the Government of Canada's Regulatory Reform Program itself implicitly acknowledges. There is therefore much to be said for a broad judicial conception of what constitutes law or legal action if the Charter of Rights is to be given full scope in its application to governmental action. However, in this case, section 41.1 of the Regulations was to be read without modification or qualification derived from the directives and standing orders that dealt with its application. And as enacted, without any express criteria, other than consid ering it necessary, section 41.1 did not meet the qualification
that the law providing for the search be reasonable in order to meet the standards of section 8 of the Charter.
Charter Section 7
Section 41.1, coupled with disciplinary action for failure to provide a specimen when ordered to do so, constituted a deprivation of fundamental rights of inmates to liberty and security of the person. That deprivation, in the absence of criteria for requiring a specimen, was not in accordance with the principles of natural justice.
Charter Section 1
The evidence established that the presence of intoxicants in the prison setting created serious problems including a greater risk and level of violence that affected institutional security for both convicts and staff. But while the ultimate objective of controlling drugs to improve safety and security within institu tions presented societal concerns that were pressing and sub stantial in a free and democratic society, and while the meas ures planned to deter and detect the unauthorized consumption of drugs and intoxicants were not unusual in other free and democratic societies, the means selected, given the lack of standards or criteria limiting the authority to search, were unreasonable. Section 41.1 was therefore not a reasonable limitation within section 1 of the Charter.
Charter Section 15
The allegation was that the plaintiff was within the only class of persons in Canada, namely prison inmates, required by law to submit urine samples or face penal consequences for failing to do so. Even if this were so, this differentiation was not discriminatory within the meaning of section 15. It was not related to any of the enumerated and prohibited grounds, or analogous grounds, which concern personal characteristics. The difference in treatment of convicts as a group arose not from personal characteristics but from past conduct in the nature of criminal activities. Differences of this sort are not prohibited by the Charter.
The plaintiff was also entitled to a declaration that his conviction by the disciplinary tribunal was unlawful and of no force and effect.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44], ss. 1, 7, 8, 15, 24(1).
Code of Civil Procedure, R.S.Q., c. C-25, art. 497. Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982,
1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No.
44], s. 52(1).
Federal Court Rules, C.R.C., c. 663, R. 420.
Penitentiary Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-5, ss. 35(4), 37. Penitentiary Service Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1251, ss. 2 (as am. by SOR/85-412, s. 1), 39(a),(i),(i.1) (as enact ed idem, s. 2),U), 41(2)(c) (as am. by SOR/80-462, s. 1), 41.1 (as enacted by SOR/85-412, s. 3).
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
Dion c. Procureur general du Canada, [1986] R.J.Q. 2196; 30 C.C.C. (3d) 108; [1986] D.L.Q. 353 (S.C.); R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265; (1987), 38 D.L.R. (4th) 508; [1987] 3 W.W.R. 699; 13 B.C.L.R. (2d) 1; 33 C.C.C. (3d) 1; 56 C.A. (3d) 193; 28 C.R.R. 122; 74 N.R. 276; Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 F.C. 18; (1988), 65 C.R. (3d) 27; 19 F.T.R. 160; 86 N.R. 168 (C.A.); revg in part [1988] 1 F.C. 369; (1987), 59 C.R. (3d) 247; 11 F.T.R. 279 (T.D.); Martineau et al. v. Matsqui Institution Inmate Disciplinary Board, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 118; (1977), 74 D.L.R. (3d) 1; 33 C.C.C. (2d) 366; 14 N.R. 285; Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145; (1984), 55 A.R. 291; 11 D.L.R. (4th) 641; [1984] 6 W.W.R. 577; 33 Alta. L.R. (2d) 193; 27 B.L.R. 297; 14 C.C.C. (3d) 97; 2 C.P.R. (3d) 1; 41 C.R. (3d) 97; 9 C.R.R. 355; 84 DTC 6467; 55 N.R. 241; Singh et al. v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177; (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 422; 12 Admin. L.R. 137; 14 C.R.R. 13; 58 N.R. 1; Operation Dismantle Inc. et al. v. The Queen et al., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441; (1985), 18 D.L.R. (4th) 481; 12 Admin. L.R. 16; 13 C.R.R. 287; 59 N.R. 1; Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; (1985), 24 D.L.R. (4th) 536; [1986] 1 W.W.R. 481; 69 B.C.L.R. 145; 23 C.C.C. (3d) 289; 48 C.R. (3d) 289; 18 C.R.R. 30; 36 M.V.R. 240; 63 N.R. 266; R. v. Morgentaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30; (1988), 63 O.R. (2d) 281; 44 D.L.R. (4th) 385; 37 C.C.C. (3d) 449; 62 C.R. (3d) 1; 31 C.R.R. 1; 82 N.R. 1; 26 O.A.C. 1; Re Ontario Film & Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Board of Censors (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 80; 5 D.L.R. (4th) 766; 38 C.R. (3d) 271; 2 O.A.C. 388 (C.A.); Luscher v. Deputy Minister, Revenue Canada, Customs and Excise, [1985] 1 F.C. 85; (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 503; 9 C.E.R. 229; 45 C.A. (3d) 81; 15 C.R.R. 167; [1985] 1 C.T.C. 246; 57 N.R. 386 (C.A.); Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143; (1989), 56 D.L.R. (4th) 1; [1989] 2 W.W.R. 289; 34 B.C.L.R. (2d) 273; 36 C.R.R. 193; 91 N.R. 255.
DISTINGUISHED:
R. v. Katsigiorgis (1987), 62 O.R. (2d) 441; 39 C.C.0 (3d) 256; 4 M.V.R. (2d) 102; 23 O.A.C. 27 (C.A.); R. v. L.A.R. (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 268; [1985] 3 W.W.R. 289; 32 Man. R. (2d) 291; 18 C.C.C. (3d) 104; 45 C.R. (3d) 209; 14 C.R.R. 328; 32 M.V.R. 61 (C.A.); R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387; (1988), 55 D.L.R. (4th) 481;
[1989] 1 W.W.R. 97; 71 Sask. R. 1; 45 C.C.C. (3d) 57; 66 C.R. (3d) 97; 36 C.R.R. 90; 88 N.R. 205.
CONSIDERED:
R. v. Noble (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 643; 14 D.L.R. (4th) 216; 16 C.C.C. (3d) 146; 42 C.R. (3d) 209; 12 C.R.R. 138; 6 O.A.C. 11 (C.A.).
REFERRED TO:
Mills v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863; (1986), 29 D.L.R. (4th) 161; 26 C.C.C. (3d) 481; 52 C.R. (3d) 1; 67 N.R. 241; Law v. Solicitor General of Canada, [1985] 1 F.C. 62; (1984), 11 D.L.R. (4th) 608; 57 N.R. 45 (C.A.); Zwarich v. Canada (Attorney General), [1987] 3 F.C. 253; (1987), 26 Admin. L.R. 295; 87 C.L.L.C. 14,053; 31 C.R.R. 244; 82 N.R. 341 (C.A.); Tetreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Canada Employment and Immigration Com mission), [1989] 2 F.C. 245; (1988), 53 D.L.R. (4th) 384; 33 Admin. L.R. 244; 23 C.C.E.L. 103; 88 CLLC 14,050; 88 N.R. 6 (C.A.); leave to appeal granted [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1110; Canada (Attorney General) v. Vincer, [1988] 1 F.C. 714; (1987), 46 D.L.R. (4th) 165; 82 N.R. 352 (C.A.); Alli v. Canada (Attorney General) (1988), 88 N.R. 1 (F.C.A.); Canada (Procureur general) v. Sirois (1988), 90 N.R. 39 (F.C.A.); R. v. Racette (1988), 48 D.L.R. (4th) 412; [1988] 2 W.W.R. 318; 61 Sask. R. 248; 39 C.C.C. (3d) 289; 6 M.V.R. (2d) 55 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Dyment (1986), 57 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 210; 26 D.L.R. (4th) 399; 170 A.P.R. 210; 25 C.C.C. (3d) 120; 49 C.R. (3d) 338; 38 M.V.R. 222 (P.E.I.C.A.); R. v. Enns (1987), 85 A.R. 7; 3 W.C.B. (2d) 186 (Prov. Ct.); R. v. Holman (1982), 28 C.R. (3d) 378; 16 M.V.R. 225 (B.C. Prov. Ct.); Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35 (Dist. Ct. 1984); Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1986); Peranzo v. Coughlin, 675 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1987); Nation al Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987) upheld on appeal 103 L.Ed. 2d 685 (1989); McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d 1302 (8th Cir. 1987); R. v. Simmons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495; (1988), 67 O.R. (2d) 63; 55 D.L.R. (4th) 673; 45 C.C.C. (3d) 296; 66 C.R. (3d) 297; 89 N.R. 1; 30 O.A.C. 241; Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1962); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (2nd Cir. 1979); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (4th Cir. 1984); R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; (1986), 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200; 24 C.C.C. (3d) 321; 50 C.R. (3d) 1; 19 C.R.R. 308; 65 N.R. 87; 14 O.A.C. 335; Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 103 L.Ed 2d 639 (1989); Mack v. U.S., F.B.I., 653 F.Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); appeal dismissed 814 F.2d 120 (2nd Cir. 1987); Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986).
COUNSEL:
Fergus J. O'Connor and Donald A. Bailey for plaintiff.
J. Grant Sinclair, Q.C. and Brian J. Saunders for defendants.
SOLICITORS:
O'Connor, Ecclestone and Kaiser, Kingston, Ontario, for plaintiff.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for defendants.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
MACKAY J.:
Introduction: The Issues
The plaintiff, an inmate of Joyceville Penitentia ry, seeks relief in the form of declarations that would protect his right, as he claims it under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44]], to decline to provide a urine sample when ordered to do so by custodial staff in the institution. His refusal to provide a sample when ordered to do so became the subject of disciplinary proceedings before the defendant tribunal.
When charged with failure to obey a lawful order under paragraph 39(a) of the Penitentiary Service Regulations, C.R.C., c. 1251 as amended, the plaintiff submitted written defence that the order in question was not lawful because section 41.1 [as enacted by SOR/85-412, s. 3] of the Regulations, under which the order was made, authorized a mandatory urine sampling procedure that was unconstitutional and inconsistent with the Charter of Rights and Freedoms and therefore unconstitutional. At the time of the disciplinary proceedings that section of the Regulations had already been declared by the Quebec Superior Court to be contrary to section 7 of the Charter, and not to constitute a reasonable limitation jus tifiable in a free and democratic society within the meaning of section 1 of the Charter: see Dion c. Procureur general du Canada, [1986] R.J.Q. 2196 (S.C.), per Galipeau J. In Jackson's case the tri bunal ruled that it did not have jurisdiction to deal with the constitutional validity of the Penitentiary Service Regulations in issue, and that failure to provide a sample when ordered to do so constituted a refusal to obey a lawful order. Sentence was
withheld pending disposition of proceedings which by then had been initiated in this Court.
In this Court the plaintiff initially sought an order of prohibition against the tribunal continu ing to deal with the matter on the grounds that by declining to consider whether the order in question was lawful in light of the Charter the tribunal had failed to properly exercise its jurisdiction, and that section 41.1 of the Penitentiary Service Regula tions authorizing mandatory urine samples violates one or more of sections 7, 8 and 15 of the Charter.
On motion of the Attorney General of Canada, approved by order of my colleague Mr. Justice Dube, the issues arising from the plaintiff's application which involve the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms were directed to be resolved by an action between the parties. The plaintiff's original application for an order of prohibition was simultaneously adjourned. A statement of claim was filed commencing this action, and subsequent ly it was amended to include the Attorney General of Canada as a party defendant.
Preparations were made for trial including agreement between counsel that this action should be concerned only with issues involving the Chart er as set out in the statement of claim. Other relief therein claimed in relation to other aspects of the Disciplinary Tribunal's proceedings would not be pursued at this time, without prejudice to possible subsequent pursuit of these claims by the plaintiff.
After commencement of the trial counsel for the plaintiff discovered that the statement of claim, amended and relied upon throughout pre-trial dis covery and discussions, omitted reference to sec tion 15 of the Charter as being contravened by the Penitentiary Service Regulations here in issue. He sought leave at that late juncture to amend the statement of claim. That motion was opposed by counsel for the defendants in light of the prior agreement of counsel, the lateness of the timing of the motion when there had been adequate opportu nity before trial to seek amendment, and because
he was not at that stage prepared to deal in argument with section 15 of the Charter. After hearing counsel, with their cooperation assured and time available to prepare argument on the added ground, I allowed the plaintiff's motion. The statement of claim was amended pursuant to Rule 420 of the Federal Court Rules [C.R.C., c. 663], for reasons then set out separately and filed in the Court file.
In the result the issues to be resolved in this trial include those underlying the relief claimed by the plaintiff in paragraphs 7(a) and 7(b) of the state ment of claim as finally amended. That relief included
(a) a Declaration that the Defendants (tribunal) unlawfully declined jurisdiction in failing to rule on whether or not section 41.1 of the Penitentiary Service Regulations contravened the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; and
(b) a Declaration that section 41.1 of the Penitentiary Service Regulations does contravene the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and in particular section 7 and section 8 and section 15 thereof.
Facts of the Case
The facts of this case are essentially quite simple. The plaintiff, Thomas Jackson, was an inmate at Joyceville, a medium security institu tion, from December 1986. He had previously been there in the years from 1978 to 1982 and he had earlier also been an inmate at Collins Bay and at Millhaven institutions. In his experience before his current sentence there had been no requirement for mandatory urine samples and testing.
On April 29, 1987 at about noon Mr. Jack Izatt, a living unit officer employed with the Correction al Service of Canada at Joyceville, with respon sibilities in relation to the living unit range which contained Jackson's cell, completed a regular count of inmates then present in the living range. He noticed the plaintiff Jackson in his cell, lying on his bed presumably asleep. Some ten minutes later, after verification of the count, Izatt again walked down the range to check with inmates then present whether they were soon leaving to return to work or to go elsewhere, or whether they would remain in the range unit and thus be under his general supervision. At that time he called out to
Jackson who appeared to be asleep and who responded only after two or three calls, and who indicated then that he was not going to work but was staying where he was.
About an hour later Izatt and others working under Mr. Alexander Lubimiv, a living unit super visor at Joyceville, were directed by the latter that a search would be conducted of range 1-D, the range containing Jackson's cell. Lubimiv and another officer remained at the head of the range to direct inmates to the range common room and to block the barrier providing access to the rest of the cell block building. Izatt proceeded to the far end of the range to direct any inmates there present to go to the range common room while the search of the range was completed. Again, as he had done earlier, Izatt had to call two or three times to waken Jackson whose cell was at the far end of the range. When he had awakened him he directed Jackson to the common room since staff were going to conduct a search. Jackson got up, put on his jacket, left his cell and proceeded down the range toward Lubimiv. Izatt says he noticed Jackson swaying from side to side, saw him bounce against projecting handles of some of the doors but then he noticed that Jackson seemed to straighten up. Izatt followed Jackson, checking on other cells. He observed Jackson gesticulating with his hands and talking loudly to Lubimiv who appeared to be directing Jackson into the common room.
Lubimiv, who had remained at the head of the range, testified that he observed Jackson walking from his cell. When he got near the head of the range, instead of turning into the common room as expected, he continued moving the short distance towards Lubimiv as though to push past him but he stopped just before reaching Lubimiv. When asked where he was going, Jackson said he was going to the committee room, that he was a com mittee man and that he had a meeting which was to have started at 12:30. He was told by Lubimiv there was a search underway, that he could not then go to the committee room which was outside the range unit, and he would have to go to the common room. Jackson complied, though only
after they had discussed the matter briefly and in loud voices.
Apparently Izatt and Lubimiv discussed this incident and Izatt, then or earlier, mentioned his experience in having to waken Jackson about an hour earlier. Izatt then completed a SITREP, a situation report, on the later incident in the follow ing terms:
Subject: (number) Incident Jackson
At 13:20 hours on the 29th April, 1987 I had cause to waken the above inmate in his cell and told him to go to the 1D common room. Jackson got out of bed and he looked very unstable, which I attributed to him being half asleep. How ever as time went on this [sic] became quite belligerent and indignent [sic] and just as unsteady on his feet, which leads me to believe that he was under the influence of an intoxicant "other than brew".
This report was signed by Izatt, the originator, as completed at 13:40 on 29 April 1987. Opposite the printed instruction at the bottom "Note: Forward to Chief Correctional Operations" appears a hand written notation. In a copy of this report typed from the original handwritten report this notation is reproduced as "Jackson Required to be tested". In the original handwritten report that notation may be "Jackson Refused to be tested" and an initial is added which appears to be "J".
Izatt, in direct and cross-examination, testified that Jackson's unsteady walk from his cell, part of the conduct leading to the SITREP of April 29, was consistent with Jackson being half asleep or -just waking up, and he was not aware that Jackson had been scheduled for an appointment on com mittee matters at 12:30. However, Izatt had com pleted another SITREP the previous evening reporting another inmate he had then believed to be under the influence of a behaviour altering substance other than "brew" and he had included in that report the names of four other inmates reported to him by another living unit officer as apparently in the same condition. While Jackson was not among those noted the previous evening and it is not clear that any of those named were from his living unit, Izatt had suspicions that drugs or other intoxicants were being consumed by inmates and it seemed to him that Jackson's bellig-
erence on April 29 was different from his more usual brusque, but not objectionable, mannerisms.
When the inmates including Jackson were secured in the common room Lubimiv telephoned to the Chief of Correctional Operations, J. Finu- can. Lubimiv had received the previous day Izatt's SITREP about five inmates, not including Jack- son, who appeared to be under the influence of intoxicants. He had also received on April 28 a SITREP from another officer reporting the latter's observations at 20:10 hours on April 25 of persons present in the committee room at or near range 1—D. That report named those identified including Jackson, acknowledged that it was not known what- they were talking about, and it noted "several are suspected to be runners" and that the same inmates had been observed in the committee room on several occasions.
In his call to Finucan, Lubimiv reported the two situations of Izatt's interactions with Jackson on April 29, in both of which Jackson had seemed hostile and aggressive. Lubimiv believed that Jack- son's desire to get to the committee room, which was accessible from outside the living range, was a response to the search. He asked that the commit tee room be searched, advised that a report would be completed about the incidents with Jackson and that he would recommend Jackson for urinalysis testing. Lubimiv testified at trial that it was his impression that Jackson had been "overly aggres sive", and loud, that he was in an ugly mood "his reactions were inappropriate . . . especially so since somebody that knows within our institution, inter actions with staff, that is not the appropriate way to deal with things".
Thereafter, the committee room was searched and nothing was there found. It was also con firmed that Jackson had indeed been late for a meeting which, as he had earlier claimed to Lubi- miv, was to have started at 12:30. Jackson was then given a pass and permitted to go to the committee room.
Shortly before 15:45 hours that same afternoon Jackson was directed to report to the institution's hospital for urinalysis. On arrival he was ordered by officer Campbell to provide a urine sample. He declined and was given until 17:50 hours to report again to provide a urine sample. He was apparent ly cautioned by officer Campbell that failure to do so would result in possible disciplinary or adminis trative proceedings. At that time Jackson was given a document, a "Requirement to Provide a Urine Sample and Notification of Test Results". This included information that it was from J. Finucan (the Chief of Correctional Operations) to Jackson, directing the latter to report to the hospi tal to provide a urine sample for urinalysis in accord with the Commissioner's Directive, and advising on the form that "failure to comply with this order will result in disciplinary and/or administrative action". That form also indicates that it was delivered to Jackson at 15:46 hours by officer Campbell, that Campbell granted an exten sion to 17:50 hours and that after the extension the inmate failed to provide the urine sample. Officer Campbell's signature was entered for each step in the process in which he was involved. In accord with standing orders of the institution Campbell then completed an Inmate Offence Report and Notification of Charge, reporting Jackson's failure to provide a urine sample, after a two hour exten sion. Those responsible for considering that report charged Jackson under paragraph 39(a) of the Regulations, that he "disobeys or fails to obey a lawful order of a penitentiary officer". This led to the proceedings before the Disciplinary Tribunal and ultimately to the trial of this matter.
Jackson refused to provide a sample when ordered to do so because in his view it was con trary to his constitutional rights to order him to provide one, a position he maintained by written submission to the Disciplinary Tribunal and the basis of his action in this Court.
Drugs in the Prison Setting: The Legislative Regime and its Application
The Penitentiary Service Regulations, enacted pursuant to the Penitentiary Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. P-5, section 37, provide in part:
39. Every inmate is guilty of a disciplinary offence who
(a) disobeys or fails to obey a lawful order of a penitentiary officer,
. . .
(i.1) consumes, absorbs, swallows, smokes, inhales, injects or
otherwise uses an intoxicant,
. . .
41.1 (1) Where a member considers the requirement of a urine sample necessary to detect the presence of an intoxicant in the body of an inmate, he may require that inmate to provide, as soon as possible, such a sample as is necessary to enable a technician to make a proper analysis of the inmate's urine using an approved instrument.
(2) In any hearing in relation to a contravention of para graph 39(i.1), evidence that a sample of urine taken and analyzed in the manner referred to in subsection (1) contains an intoxicant establishes, in the absence of evidence to the contrary or in the absence of a reasonable explanation of the presence of the intoxicant, that the inmate who provided the sample has contravened paragraph 39(i.1).
(3) In this section,
(a) "approved instrument" means an instrument that is designed to make an analysis of a sample of urine and is approved by a directive; and
(b) "technician" means a person designated by the Commis sioner to operate an approved instrument.
Paragraph 39(i.1) and the whole of section 41.1 were adopted in 1985 as was the following defini tion under section 2 (see SOR/85-412):
"intoxicant" includes alcohol, a drug, a narcotic or any other substance that causes an hallucination, but does not include any authorized medication used in accordance with direc tions given by a member or a health care professional.
The Penitentiary Act and the Regulations have dealt with "contraband" in the prison setting under arrangements which antedate the 1985 regulatory changes to deal specifically with drugs. The provisions concerning contraband, it seems to me, are useful to bear in mind. The Act provides for forfeiture of contraband which is defined as "anything that is in an inmate's possession in circumstances in which possession thereof is for bidden by any Act, regulation or Commissioner's
directive, or by an order of general or specific application within the penitentiary in which the inmate is imprisoned" (R.S.C., 1985, c. P-5, sub section 35(4)). The Regulations in turn define contraband as anything an inmate is not permitted to have in his possession, and under paragraphs 39(i) and (j) disciplinary offenses include having contraband in one's possession, and dealing in contraband with any other person. Directives and standing orders provide for those effects an inmate is entitled to have in his possession, including clothing and personal effects. In the result, any thing not expressly authorized to be in an inmate's possession when found there is considered contra band, and that finding may lead to disciplinary proceedings, in addition to forfeiture.
The regulations authorizing mandatory urine sampling for testing purposes and providing for consequences of positive tests were adopted in 1985 after considerable study. Through Commis sioner's Directives and institutional standing orders, the program as originally conceived and its subsequent evolution can be traced. The objectives of the program as originally conceived' were to detect the presence and deter the use of drugs and any other form of intoxicants, excluding author ized medication, to enhance the capability of pro viding a safe and secure environment for staff and inmates, and to afford inmates the opportunity for self-improvement and to objectively identify, define and institute appropriate treatment oriented programs. As the program was developed, plans were to include provision for testing a random selection of 10 percent of all inmates every two months as a key element for detection and deter rence of the use of intoxicants, for testing of inmates with a history of drug abuse either outside or inside the institution, or for testing where a staff member had reason to believe that an inmate was under the influence of an intoxicant. From the beginning it was contemplated that inmates who
' See Administrative Guidelines for the Urinalysis Program, (Correctional Service of Canada) Operational Security June 1985, and Appendix "A" Commissioner's Directive 800-.
tested positive for the presence of intoxicants in a urine sample would be charged with a disciplinary offence (under paragraph 39(1.1)). Anyone refus ing to provide a sample of urine within two hours of a request to do so would be charged with refusal to comply with a direct order under paragraph 39(a) and standing orders at Joyceville authorizing the urinalysis program there have so provided from the time it was initiated. Those orders have also provided that failure to provide a requested urine specimen shall be treated, I assume for purposes of penalty upon conviction, "in a manner identical to a positive test result". In addition to penalties arising from conviction of disciplinary offenses, the Director was to have authority to impose adminis trative sanctions, including denial or deferral of individual or group temporary absence privileges, or of family or other visits, or the inmate's involve ment in social-cultural program activities. These arrangements for penalties upon conviction have continued in place.
Initially it was planned that the program for urinalysis surveillance would be introduced by standing orders at two institutions in the fall of 1985, Joyceville in Ontario and Cowansville in Quebec, with a view to using these for pilot pro grams that might then be adapted to other institu tions. Before arrangements were completed to do so at Cowansville, inmates there initiated action in the Quebec Superior Court to contest the constitu tional validity of paragraph 39(i.1) and section 41.1 of the Regulations in light of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Correction al Service of Canada apparently agreed not to implement the program in the Quebec region pending the outcome of that action. As noted earlier, in Dion c. Procureur general du Canada, supra, Mr. Justice Galipeau, by decision rendered August 14, 1986 granted the relief sought and declared the regulations in question were null and
of no force and effect since in his judgment they violated section 7 of the Charter and were not saved by section 1.
I understand that the Dion decision has been appealed but the appeal has not yet been heard. In defending this action initiated by Jackson counsel for the Attorney General of Canada seeks to ensure that evidence be fully considered, including sociological evidence, important in his view in assessing the constitutional issues. Counsel sug gests such evidence was not submitted to Mr. Justice Galipeau in Dion.
Yet from his decision it appears that Galipeau J. considered some evidence of this sort, intended apparently to support the same purposes of the Regulations as are urged here by counsel, though evidence in that case may have been more directly related to the situation then prevailing at Cowans- ville. In the translation of the decision (at 30 C.C.C. (3d) pages 118-119)
The evidence is to the effect that in the Cowansville Peniten tiary, the consumption of intoxicants, in particular drugs, is very widespread. Its consequences are disastrous—the life, security, and the property of users are in danger as well as those of their fellow inmates, the guards, and the penitentiary authorities.
Experience has shown that serious breaches of discipline, which are generally translated into assaults, brawls, thefts, refusals to obey orders, misconduct, blackmail, threats against inmates, or on the outside, against family or friends of inmates with a view to forcing them to traffic in drugs.
The defendant has the right and the duty to intervene by means of his laws and regulations in order to check this scourge. The most convenient means presently available to detect the presence of intoxicants in a user, is by means of an analysis of a sample of his urine. This measure, in addition to fulfilling its principal function, has a solid dissuasive effect.
Undoubtedly, the excessive consumption of drugs and the disastrous consequences that it leads to, constitute a growing problem in our society.
One of the Regulations, section 41.1, was con sidered in Dion. In this case the issues arise from the application of that regulation and from application of standing orders applicable in the case of an inmate who failed to obey an order, a requirement under section 41.1. That factual basis
was absent in Dion where a declaration was sought before the regulation was applied. Here the issue of constitutionality of section 41.1 is directly raised by the plaintiff Jackson's defence before the Disciplinary Tribunal, that he declined to provide a sample of urine when ordered to do so because the order, and section 41.1 under which it was given, were unlawful.
Additional facts clarifying the application of the Regulations in this case were provided by evidence of Mr. R. P. Harvey, Director of Custody and Control, Correctional Service of Canada. In his current and previous senior responsibilities within the Service he had major responsibility for de velopment and introduction of the urinalysis pro gram. His evidence indicates that it was decided, despite legal action initiated by inmates at Cowansville, to proceed with implementation of the planned pilot program at Joyceville. It was initiated in November 1985 with certain modifica tions from original plans. No provision was made for random sampling on a regular or any other basis, a key element of the original plan, pending resolution of uncertainties arising from the action initiated in the Quebec Superior Court and because it was not considered economically viable to proceed with that aspect of the program in only one institution. Notification in advance of intro duction of the program was provided in writing by the Warden to staff and inmates at Joyceville, a practice followed on subsequent occasions when major modifications were planned. Thus, for example, they were advised in advance that testing would be done initially for only two substances, cocaine and heroin, and later advice gave notice of the dates on which additional substance testing would be added for cannabis, methaqualone (speed), phencyclidine (PCP), benzodiazepine (tranquillizers), alcohol and methadone. As the tests were introduced notice was given that evi dence of positive tests would not be admissible in disciplinary proceedings for the first four months, though administrative sanctions might be applied, and from the beginning refusal to provide a sample within two hours when ordered to do so was sub ject to disciplinary proceedings under paragraph
39(a), with penalties similar to cases where tests were positive.
Inmate selection for testing was initially notified in terms similar to section 41.1, that is
When a staff member considers the requirement of a urine sample necessary to detect the presence of an intoxicant in the body of an inmate, he may require that inmate to provide, as soon as possible, such a sample as is necessary to enable a technician to make a proper analysis of the inmate's urine.'
Examples of inmates who may be tested were listed as inmates suspected to be under the influ ence, those convicted in disciplinary court on charges of possession, trafficking and/or consump tion of intoxicants, and those involved at any stage in a pre-release program, visiting or similar pro gram where intoxicants had played a role in their criminal offence or any period of their incarcera tion. In a later Standing Order (No. 572 of 87-08- 04) inmate selection for testing was modified for those considered to be under the influence, to provide that where a staff member considers the requirement of a urine sample necessary to detect the presence of an intoxicant he submits a report which is to be reviewed at a daily meeting of living unit supervisors and security staff, and the Chief, Correctional Operations then decides whether uri nalysis is appropriate. If so, the urinalysis techni cian advises the inmate of the requirement to provide a sample to enable a proper analysis. While it is not clear that the latter provision was formally in place in April 1987 when Jackson was directed to provide a sample of urine for testing, Harvey indicated that the same or a similar pro cess prevailed in Jackson's case. Thus the decision was made by officer Finucan, the Chief of Correc tional Operations on duty, to require a sample for
2 Memorandum, 1985-11-12 from Warden (R. Gobeil) to All Staff, Inmate Population, p. 1, para. 1.b.
testing after completion of the written SITREP by Izatt and the oral report of Lubimiv.
Perhaps one other detail, one that concerned Jackson, is of note here. While standing orders at Joyceville provided for collection of the sample under direct or indirect observation, Harvey indicated that at Joyceville the hospital facilities, to which most inmates including Jackson, were directed to provide a sample, did not readily permit anything but direct observation in voiding of urine when a sample was required. In these circumstances the standing order did provide that only staff of the same sex as the inmate providing the sample shall supervise the voiding of that urine sample.
At the time of the trial of this matter, in March 1989, Joyceville was the only institution in which the urinalysis program had been introduced on a regular continuing basis. It had trained and quali fied staff with "approved instruments" for testing. It has also served to provide analysis of samples for testing from inmates of some neighbouring institu tions in the Kingston area, apparently on a demand or request basis without fully developed programs for testing inmates of those institutions on a scale comparable to that introduced at Joyceville.
Drugs in the Prison Setting: The Sociological Background
Evidence was introduced in the trial of this matter relating to perceptions of the impact of compulsory urinalysis, to violence in the prison setting, to the relationship of drugs to violence, to living conditions and supervision arrangements within the penitentiary system, and also about the testing arrangements including technical aspects of testing which were introduced at Joyceville and about comparable conditions, arrangements and experience within the federal penal system in the United States. This was intended to assist in reso lution of the constitutional issues raised in this
matter by putting into full context the system of testing adopted, the reasons for it and comparable arrangements and experience in other jurisdic- tions.
An important aspect of the background of this case, from the perspective of Jackson, arises from his perceptions of the system of testing and his concerns about it. In his view the system of testing, requiring a urine sample when ordered to do so, or failing that being liable to disciplinary or adminis trative punishments, was unfair. On its face the regulation made inmates subject to the whim of any officer whether the latter had any special training or not and whether or not the officer had any reason to believe the inmate was under the influence of an intoxicant. In his own case, he believed he was ordered to provide a sample of urine for testing because he had recently become chairperson of the inmate committee and had made known his objective of making the commit tee more responsive to inmates' concerns than it had previously been. He considered that he had been "set up", "to slow me down, slow the com mittee down", as he expressed it in cross-examina tion. The process was unfair because the officer who suspected an inmate of being under the influ ence did not himself speak to the inmate to make any inquiry; rather he filed a report and someone else ordered the inmate, for reasons the inmate was not informed about, to provide a sample of urine.
As instituted at Joyceville, the program in Jack- son's view was unfair to those who refused to provide samples when ordered to do so as a condi tion of participation in pre-release or visiting or other social programs. He suggested that the insti tution required a urine sample before and after participating in such program with threatened loss or postponement of opportunity to participate unless consent were given and a sample provided for testing. In the result more inmates were spend ing more time within the institution with less access to pre-release and visiting programs.
Finally, Jackson's view was that it simply was not right that inmates be required to provide a sample of urine under observation when ordered to do so. He considered it "degrading". The program in his view worked against the objective of restor ing an inmate to a position where he could adjust to responsibilities in the world outside the prison. At least one of the witnesses for the defendants, present throughout Jackson's brief testimony, indicated some surprise at this reaction for his experience was that generally within the living ranges of prison institutions inmates paid little attention to standards of privacy, and there was considerable nudity evident in relation to dressing, showering, washing and even in relation to use of toilet facilities. I note only that there may be a considerable difference in a psychological sense between a situation where the individual by choice or his own neglect shows little concern for privacy and a situation where he is directed to provide a urine sample before another person, at risk of punishment if he fails to do so.
Dr. James Vantour gave evidence as an expert witness for the defendants. He is a sociologist with a doctor's degree in criminology and substantial background in teaching and research. He had been a consultant to the Correctional Service of Canada on a number of occasions before his appointment in 1987 as Advisor to the Commissioner and Deputy Commissioner of the Service. On the basis of research and studies he had completed or which were known to him he provided opinion about violence as a continuing and significant aspect of life within the prison system. While there are a variety of causal factors, violence tends to be greater in maximum security institutions than in medium institutions and greater in the latter than in minimum security institutions mainly because of the backgrounds of the inmate population in each of these levels. According to his testimony, in 1988 more than 75% of those in maximum institu tions, 60% of those in medium institutions and just under 50% of those in minimum security institu tions had been admitted for crimes of violence. This accounted for nearly 62% of all inmates in federal institutions whose latest crimes leading to incarceration were crimes of violence. The higher levels of security, reflecting the level of general tendencies to violence of the inmates, provide more
intensive surveillance and less inmate freedom within the institution and in relation to contacts with the outside world.
In Dr. Vantour's opinion the risk of violence has increased in recent years, with more frequent and more serious incidents of violence inside the prison system, and more frequent resort by inmates to weapons. The risk of violence appears greater par ticularly between inmates. While supervised, they have to depend in the main upon their own resources for their safety and security within the penitentiary society. It is often difficult for staff or other inmates to intervene when conflict occurs.
The prison society is now much more open to contacts, than was once the case, both between inmates and between inmates and their families or friends from outside. Programs facilitating this are designed to equip inmates to return with responsi bility to supportive family and friends when their sentence is served. According to Dr. Vantour one aspect of these changes is that there are special pressures on inmates, particularly in relation to carrying, use and distribution of contraband, mainly drugs of various kinds, that can be moved in small quantities at a time. He testified about the drug related "market place" within the institution al setting and the pressures this creates from those who seek to control the market or those involved with it, whether by their own choice or under pressure. A recent Service study suggests that as many as 20 to 33% of inmates in protective cus tody are now there at their own request because of drug related problems.
As another example of the relationship between drugs and violence, Dr. Vantour referred to a 1984 report by Dr. Robert M. MacMillan, Regional Coroner, Kingston to the Chief Coroner for Ontario, and to a study Vantour himself had directed for the Correctional Service of Canada. Both studies were concerned with circumstances surrounding nearly a dozen homicides in Kingston
area institutions from late 1982 to early 1984. In both studies drugs were regarded as having had a significant role. MacMillan's report emphasized that drugs were evident in the victims or were involved in the homicides in a majority of the cases examined and Vantour's study was concerned with the adverse effects of the institutional market place for drugs. In a later study related to contra band, staff of the Service included information that of 181 major incidents of violence in 1985 and 1986 contraband drugs were demonstrated to have played a role in precipitating 106, or 58% of the incidents reported.
It is Dr. Vantour's opinion that institutional control of drugs within the prison setting would contribute to reduction of the risks and levels of violence and would facilitate and encourage pro grams to assist inmates to avoid continuing involvement with drugs. He did not profess to be an expert on urinalysis testing but he does believe that an appropriate program, not limited to cir cumstances where staff has a reason to believe an inmate is under the influence of an intoxicant, probably a program including random testing, would improve institutional control of drugs, lead to lessening of the oppressive nature of the institu tions and to reduction of the risks of violence.
In addition to evidence about the testing pro gram at Joyceville, Harvey testified about the evolution of programs generally and the arrange ments for surveillance and life in federal penitenti aries in Canada. He described in a general way the differences between institutions by security level in the system. The higher the security level, the higher the staff to inmate ratio, the greater the surveillance, the lesser freedom of movement for inmates within the institution, and the more regu lar are the searches of inmates by metal detectors, pat down or frisk searching and nude or skin searching. Institutions with lower security classifi cations tend to have a wider range of programs for internal activities and contacts with the world outside the institution. Trades training and educa tional programs are offered, activities program-
ming has been established, a range of visiting programs now exists, and in lower security institu tions particularly, pre-release programs are avail able for those considered to be qualified for escort ed or unescorted temporary absence or for day parole.
With the expansion of programs especially for greater contacts within the prison setting among inmates and between them and the outside world, the Correctional Service of Canada had also experienced an increasing volume of contraband within institutions, much of it drugs. The risk of violence has also increased with expanding drug related activities in the prison market and drug induced individual indifference to usual prison norms and discipline requirements. Through reports referred to by Harvey, estimates of the dollar volume of the internal drug market were suggested which seemed inordinately high, and estimates of success in seizing contraband, seemed very low. Despite internal intelligence, searches by detectors, frisking and even skin or nude searches especially related to pre-release programs and major visitor occasions, it seems little contraband is actually found and forfeited. Harvey indicated that those responsible for safety and security in the institutions believe that most drugs are transported by inmates themselves, and by family members and other outsiders, in body cavities, principally the anus and vagina, hidden so as not to be detected by visual search. Apparently medical per sonnel of the Service decline to participate in security searches of any bodily cavities.
It was against this background of increasing opportunities for bringing contraband, particularly drugs, into the institutions, together with the per ceived experience of increasing contraband and increasing risks of violence, and the relationship of drugs to violence, that led to the development of the urine testing program for the Service. After a voluntary program run at Leclerc institution in Quebec in the early 1980's had been tested under
Harvey's supervision there, considerable study of similar programs in the United States and else where had led to the program introduced at Joyce- ville and originally intended also for Cowansville. Its primary long term objectives were to support the Service's responsibilities for safety and security of staff and inmates, to detect and deter unauthor ized drug usage and to develop programs to assist inmates with a history of drug abuse. In seeking those objectives Harvey seemed to consider random testing a particularly valuable part of the planned program, not yet implemented.
Dr. R. E. Willette, a consultant and president of his own company in the United States, providing advice on testing of drugs and related matters, testified at the trial about the quality of the testing instruments, the analyzing processes and the com parative ease in training for their application, which were adopted for the program of the Cor rectional Service introduced at Joyceville. A medicinal chemist, with extensive experience in the development of testing processes and instrumenta tion, his evidence was not seriously contested and the validity of the urine testing system adopted by the Correctional Service was not seriously ques tioned in these proceedings.
His evidence was helpful in confirming the validity of results of the EMIT-ST test (the Enzyme Multiple Immunoassay Technique— Single Test), the only test in place at the time Jackson was here directed, and declined, to provide a sample. The GC/MS (Gas Chromatography/ Mass Spectrometer) test which confirms results of a positive EMIT-ST test, has since been intro duced, following long standing practice in the United States. While it has no significance for this case, Harvey's evidence was that when Jackson was ordered to provide a sample, with only the EMIT-ST equipment and process in place, a por tion of any urine sample provided by an inmate was retained in the event the inmate should request independent testing by outside experts. Since then the confirmatory testing using the
GC/MS process is conducted at Joyceville by the Service itself.
William L. Davis also testified as an expert witness. Now a consultant on correctional matters, he recently retired as Administrator of Correction al Services, the chief executive officer of the feder al penitentiary system in the United States. He had served for 25 years in the U.S. penitentiary service, with increasing responsibilities over the years at the institutional, regional and national levels. From 1978 when a program of urinalysis surveillance was initiated in federal prisons in the United States he had been directly involved in its application and administration.
On the relationship of drugs and violence Mr. Davis' evidence was that, coincidental with increasing drug use in society generally, experience in U.S. federal prisons had earlier indicated an increasing use of drugs among inmates and that this had a noticeable direct bearing upon the level of violence. In the 1960's and 70's the number of incidents involving violence between inmates and between inmates and staff increased and upon investigation it appeared clear that the use of and trade in drugs in institutions was playing a signifi cant role in incidents of violence. This was so even though hard core drug addicts were a relatively small portion of total inmates and most users of drugs in the institutions were so-called recreational users not addicts. Before introduction of the pro gram in the United States inmates and staff were fully informed about what was planned and in the first year statistical reports indicated substantially fewer cases of positive drug tests than had been anticipated. Davis said that it was believed that this clearly indicated that the prison population knew the program was to be treated seriously for in that first year the number of incidents of vio lence declined significantly as did the number of those incidents which appeared to be drug-related. While it was difficult to comment on the level of violence generally, Davis did indicate that since the program was introduced in 1978, the number
of incidents of violence related to drugs has been reduced and has generally continued to decline.
From the beginning the system introduced in U.S. federal prisons had involved three categories of inmates. Random sampling of 5% of all inmates in each institution was conducted each month based upon computer-generated lists, a process that required a sample from each inmate present in the institution whose name was included on the list in order from the top of the list until 5% of those present were tested. The second group, who are each required to be tested monthly, were those considered a high risk group, including all those with a history of drug addiction, previous positive tests in the institution, or those whom a staff member believes may be under the influence of a drug and who then may be required to provide a sample if ordered to do so by a staff supervisor who has discretion to so order. The third group tested are those engaged in community activities, including the equivalent of pre-release programs in Canadian institutions, that is, those on escorted or unescorted leave from an institution, or those par ticipating in other group activities outside the institution. Among this third group at least 50% are to be tested on their return to the institution and the Warden of each institution may require that all of them be tested on every return to the institution. It is of some interest to note an inmate may be subject to urinalysis testing on the basis of a mandatory sample more frequently than once a month if he happens to be included within more than one of these groups.
The program introduced in U.S. federal prisons has utilized the EMIT test and the GC/MS test for confirmation of positive tests. The U.S. service has not done any of its own testing but has the tests conducted by outside laboratories. A positive test or refusal to provide a sample when ordered to do so is subject to disciplinary action with penal ties related to the offence. Thus if the offence does
not involve a visiting program, penalties in relation to such program are not imposed.
From his experience Mr. Davis offered a number of opinions. He has no doubt that violent incidents arising from drug use or marketing within institutions have continued to decline in number over the years, particularly since testing for marijuana, once the most used drug in institu tions, was incorporated into the program in 1984. He believes that the perceived benefits of the system adopted in U.S. institutions depend upon regular testing of the three groups identified for this provides a program which is clearly to be taken seriously and thus deters use and trafficking of drugs in institutions. In his view, if testing were only possible where staff had reasonable grounds to believe that an inmate was under the influence of drugs, that would hardly be worth pursuing. I assume he meant by this that it would do little to deter use and trafficking. Finally it was his opinion that Jackson's sense that an order to provide a urine sample for testing was degrading and that overall the program as introduced at Joyceville had a negative impact on life in the prison, would not be shared by most inmates. In his view and from his experience in U.S. institutions, the majority of inmates prefer a system which ulti mately deters drug use and trafficking and con tributes to a more safe and secure environment within the institutions.
Resolving the Issues
Having summarized significant evidence in this action, my conclusions on the issues raised may now be summarized as follows, in the order in which these were discussed by counsel for the plaintiff. The reasons for these conclusions are then set out in turn in relation to each of the issues.
1) After brief comment I decline to determine the issue concerning the jurisdiction of the Dis ciplinary Tribunal to deal with Charter issues
since a determination of that matter is not essential for disposition of this case.
2) Section 41.1 in so far as it permits a member to require an inmate, who is considered to have ingested an intoxicant, to provide a specimen of the inmate's urine for analysis to detect the presence of an intoxicant in the body of the inmate contravenes section 8 of the Charter by providing for an unreasonable search.
3) Section 41.1 in so far as it permits a member to require an inmate, who is considered to have ingested an intoxicant, to provide a specimen of the inmate's urine for analysis to detect the presence of an intoxicant in the body of the inmate, when coupled with disciplinary proceed ings for failure to obey a lawful order if the requirement not be met, contravenes section 7 of the Charter by depriving the inmate of the right to liberty and security of the person in a manner that does not accord with the principles of fun damental justice.
4) Section 41.1 is not a reasonable limitation on rights and liberty set out in sections 7 and 8 that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society and thus is not supportable under section 1 of the Charter.
5) Section 41.1 does not discriminate in the manner set out in section 15 of the Charter and it does not infringe upon or detract from equal ity rights as established by that section.
Jurisdiction of the Independent Disciplinary Tri bunal to deal with Constitutional Issues
The plaintiff seeks a declaration that the Disci plinary Tribunal unlawfully declined to exercise its jurisdiction in this case. On this issue the Independent Chairperson of the Tribunal, in his decision rendered in November, 1987, concluded:
3. Counsel for the inmate in written arguments submits that section 41.1 of the Regulations is "ultra vires" the Constitution of Canada as it is an [sic] inconsistent with section 7 and section 8 of the Charter. Counsel goes further and submits that since section 41.1 is "ultra vires" and there being no other statutory or common law authority for the order in question, the order itself was illegal and need not have been obeyed.
4. Before dealing with Counsel's argument it must first be determined if an Independent Chairperson, such as myself, has the jurisdiction to determine the validity of this or any other Regulation contained in the Penitentiary Service Regulations.
5. In the case of Ouimet v. The Queen reported in 1978, 1 F.C.R. at 627 [sic at 672], given October, 1977, it was held that the question "whether or not Regulations are ultra vires is for the Courts to determine and not the Tribunal itself".
6. Again, the Supreme Court of Canada, in the Martineau Case, held that a prison tribunal is not a Court. This case was cited and followed in the case of Joyce Bull v. Helen King MaLeod [sic] reported 1986 F.C.R. a decision of the Federal Court Trial Division in [sic] December 5, 1986.
7. Having regard to these cases, I find that this tribunal is not a Court and I therefore do not have any jurisdiction to deal with the question of whether or not section 41.1 is "ultra vires".
In my view the judicial precedents relied upon by the Chairperson are not conclusive on the ques tion of jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Tribunal to deal with defences, here raised on behalf of Jack- son, based on the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. It is surprising that no reference was made to the one precedent dealing directly with the issue here raised, the lawfulness of an order under section 41.1 of the Regulations, that is Dion. That decision was issued by Mr. Justice Galipeau in August 1986, and was probably published in the report series prior to the decision of the tribunal some 15 months later in November 1987. The decision in Dion must have been known to the Commissioner and other senior officers of the Correctional Service, as it apparently was to the witness Harvey, before disciplinary proceedings were initiated against Jackson in May 1987.
While appeal of the decision in Dion would have the effect of staying any order of Mr. Justice Galipeau (see: article 497 of the Quebec Code of Civil Procedure [R.S.Q., c. C-25]), I have some question about the fairness of the process of disci plinary proceedings in which Jackson was involved if Correctional Service officers did not bring the decision in Dion to the attention of the Chair person during those proceedings. My question remains but I do not propose to pursue it for no evidence on the matter was presented and that question was not argued at trial.
What was argued at trial was the jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Tribunal in light of evolving juris-
prudence concerning jurisdiction of tribunals other than superior courts to deal with Charter issues raised before them. That general matter has now been dealt with in a number of cases arising in the provincial courts and in this Court, often in rela tion to one or both of subsections 24(1) and 52(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 [Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44]] which includes the Charter. Those sections provide:
24. (1) Anyone whose rights or freedoms, as guaranteed by this Charter, have been infringed or denied may apply to a court of competent jurisdiction to obtain such remedy as the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.
• • •
52. (1) The Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of Canada, and any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is, to the extent of the inconsistency, of no force or effect.
Subsection 24(1) does not confer any remedial jurisdiction, at least so far as tribunals other than superior courts are concerned: Mills v. The Queen, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 863. Whether subsection 52(1) is ultimately to be accepted as the basis for some, or all, or none of the many tribunals other than superior courts to decline to apply laws which are said to be contrary to the Charter, awaits clarifica tion by the Supreme Court of Canada. Decisions of the Federal Court of Appeal on this matter have recognized the authority of certain bodies to refuse to apply legislation or regulations found to be in conflict with the Charter. Deemed competent to do so have been the Immigration Appeal Board (Law v. Solicitor General of Canada, [1985] 1 F.C. 62 (C.A.)) and Boards of Referees and Umpires under the Unemployment Insurance Act, 1971 [S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48] (Zwarich v. Canada (Attorney General), [1987] 3 F.C. 253 (C.A.)) and Tetreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Canada Employ ment and Immigration Commission), [1989] 2 F.C. 245 (C.A.). In other cases the same Court has declined to recognize that a review committee dealing with appeals under the Family Allowances Act, 1973 [S.C. 1973-74, c. 44] has any capacity to deal with the issue, at least in cases where it has purported to provide remedies beyond the scope of its statutory powers: (Canada (Attorney General) v. Vincer, [1988] 1 F.C. 714 (C.A.); Alli v.
Canada (Attorney General) (1988), 88 N.R. 1 (F.C.A.); Canada (Procureur general) v. Sirois (1988), 90 N.R. 39 (F.C.A.)). The matter may be clarified by the Supreme Court of Canada when it deals with an appeal in Tetreault-Gadoury v. Canada (Canada Employment and Immigration Commission), supra, leave to appeal granted [ [1989] 2 S.C.R. 1110].
If it were necessary for decision in this case to determine the issue concerning jurisdiction of the Disciplinary Tribunal, an argument of the plaintiff would have to be considered. That is, if the tri bunal has no jurisdiction to deal with a defence based on Charter issues, so that an accused can only raise that defence effectively by resorting to judicial review, the inmate would be denied rights assured by section 7 of the Charter. It is submitted that failure to consider defences based on the Charter, when an accused inmate is charged before a Disciplinary Tribunal, would deprive the inmate of his liberty and security contrary to principles of fundamental justice. In the circum stances of this case that deprivation might also be said to arise from failure of the independant chairperson of the tribunal to apply the law as determined in the superior court, if that were known, as it ought to have been.
I would be inclined to accept the plaintiff's submission if it were necessary to determine this issue, at least in a case where the matter raised before the Disciplinary Tribunal is not one of first impression but has already been determined by a superior court, here the Quebec Superior Court in Dion, before the disciplinary proceedings were ini tiated in relation to Jackson. I note that at trial the plaintiff's submission was not fully developed or argued. Since its determination is not essential for disposition of this case I leave this issue unresolved.
Section 8
Section 8 of the Charter provides that:
8. Everyone has the right to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure.
The plaintiff submits that section 41.1 of the Regulations provides for a search that is prohib ited by section 8 because it authorizes a urine specimen to be required of an inmate by a staff member without reference to any standard or cir cumstance except necessity as considered by the staff member, and upon risk of punishment if convicted at disciplinary proceedings for testing positive or for failing to provide the required speci men. A "compulsory" urinalysis testing procedure of this sort is said to constitute a search within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter. In the absence of consent by an inmate it is submitted that the taking of a urine sample would constitute a search and seizure. The plaintiff relies by analo gy upon cases concerning non-consensual blood samples (R. v. Racette (1988), 48 D.L.R. (4th) 412 (Sask. C.A.); R. v. Katsigiorgis (1987), 62 O.R. (2d) 441 (C.A.); R. v. Dyment (1986), 57 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 210 (P.E.I.C.A.)) and breath samples (see: R. v. Enns (1987), 85 A.R. 7 (Prov. Ct.)); and contra R. v. Holman (1982), 28 C.R. (3d) 378 (B.C. Prov. Ct.).
In the amended statement of defence filed in this action it is pleaded on behalf of the defendants that "the requirement to give a urine sample does not constitute a search within the meaning of section 8 of the Charter, and in any event such a requirement is not unreasonable". At trial little argument was made about the regulation not pro viding for a search, except that under the Regula tions an inmate could decline to provide a sample, and thus avoid any search or implications, of a search. While that may be accurate in a technical sense, such action exposes an inmate to discipli nary proceedings and punishment upon conviction for failure to provide a sample when ordered to do so. In these circumstances it can hardly be said that an inmate is free to refuse to provide a sample. Indeed, should he do so he is then subject to penalties similar to those that may apply in the
case of an inmate who tests positive for the pres ence of unauthorized intoxicants in his body. Ulti mately, the effect of refusing is to be treated as though one has consumed unauthorized intoxi cants, at least so far as punishment may be con cerned. In these circumstances any suggestion that the Regulations do not provide for a search seems to me unwarranted.
Is the search as here authorized one that is unreasonable within the meaning of that qualify ing term as used in section 8 of the Charter? In R. v. Collins, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 265, at page 278, Mr. Justice Lamer, speaking for a majority of the Court in regard to section 8, said:
A search will be reasonable if it is authorized by law, if the law itself is reasonable and if the manner in which the search was carried out is reasonable.
Matters raised in argument in Jackson's case con cern all three aspects of these criteria of reasonableness.
The defendants raised two considerations relat ing to the manner in which the search provided for by the Regulations would be carried out. They submitted that no serious question was here raised about the validity of the testing processes, first by using the EMIT-ST test and later by use of that test and the GC/MS test for confirming positive test results. The defendants referred to American jurisprudence upholding the technical validity of these testing processes in relation to urinalysis testing programs for prison inmates (see: Jensen v. Lick, 589 F. Supp. 35 (Dist. Ct. 1984); Spence v. Farrier, 807 F.2d 753 (8th Cir. 1986); Peranzo v. Coughlin, 675 F. Supp. 102 (S.D.N.Y. 1987)) or for employees of a federal agency (see: National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F. 2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987) upheld on appeal 103 L.Ed. 2d 685 (1989)). I conclude that the technical testing processes here developed would not consti tute an unreasonable manner of search violating section 8 of the Charter if the regulations were otherwise not unreasonable.
The defendants also submitted that little weight should be given to the plaintiff's concern that, as administered, the test was degrading, for in fact
the plaintiff had declined to provide a sample, and could hardly complain of feeling degraded by pro viding one. Moreover, it was submitted the requirement was less intrusive of privacy than a strip search implicitly authorized, with exceptions, by the Weatherall decisions, cited below. (See also McDonell v. Hunter, 809 F.2d. 1302 (8th Cir. 1987) upholding the validity of urinalysis testing applied to employees of State department of Cor rections at state prison institutions.) Urine sam pling and testing was not a process unknown to those who had been medically examined, for exam ple, and was not generally considered intrusive. Comparing the relative measure of intrusiveness, in relation to privacy expectations, of strip searches compared to providing urine samples on order under direct surveillance of another does not, in my view, assist greatly.
The process here to be followed in providing a required specimen does interfere with privacy expectations of an individual. The significance of that is perhaps best assessed in considering the reasonable nature of the law in question and not as a separate matter relating to the manner in which the law is applied. That is particularly the case where, as here, the facts established do not really put in issue the manner in which the search under section 41.1 of the Regulations was carried out, for Jackson declined to provide a sample and there was no search.
In assessing whether the law here authorizing a search was reasonable it is necessary first to deter mine what constitutes the law that is in issue. The plaintiff submits that section 41.1 of the Regula tions must be considered apart from Commission er's directives, institutional standing orders or other policy memoranda or plans of the Correc tional Service. Only the Act and Regulations are said to have the force of law and these include no standards or criteria for staff or inmates about the application of section 41.1. It is said to be too broadly drafted and to be open to abuse by staff members who may act upon whim or mere suspi cion without any reasonable ground for belief that an inmate has consumed unauthorized intoxicants.
Moreover, when a urine sample is ordered to be provided no explanation need be given to the inmate and the order may be made, as it was by Finucan in this case, by a staff member who has had no recent direct contact with the inmate. For the defendants it is urged that the whole of the urinalysis program as originally planned and now amplified by Commissioner's directives and insti tutional standing orders is in issue here, implicitly inviting construction of the general regulation in light of the later directives and orders.
Each party, it seems, looks to possible extremes in outcome if the regulation were to be held valid or invalid. In my view, it is not the whole of the planned program that is here in issue for the facts as here pleaded and established by evidence relate to one aspect of the program that was implement ed. Here a staff member required a urine specimen to be provided for testing because it was con sidered necessary to detect the presence of an intoxicant in the body of the plaintiff Jackson, a presence which another staff member believed to be the case. We are not here concerned with random testing which was never implemented, or with testing of one who had a known history of involvement with drugs, or with one who was involved at the relevant time with any contact visiting or community activities. Nor is this a situation where there is any evidence that the required specimen was requested on a mere whim or with any intent to abuse Jackson, aside from Jackson's own suspicions about the motives of the officers concerned. Thus the facts here pleaded and established narrow the issue to those circum stances clearly described within a narrow construc tion of section 41.1 as it relates to the situation where a staff member believed or suspected that Jackson had consumed an intoxicant "other than brew".
It seems clear from the decision of Mr. Justice Strayer at trial in Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General), [1988] 1 F.C. 369 (T.D.) at pages 413- 414 and of Mr. Justice Stone for the Court of
Appeal when that same case was considered on appeal (Weatherall v. Canada (Attorney General), [1989] 1 F.C. 18 (C.A.), at pages 30-36) that Commissioner's directives do not have the force of law and could not qualify the words of the regula tion there in question nor prescribe a limit within section 1 of the Charter. The same reasoning, derived from the decision of Pigeon J. for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in Martineau et al. v. Matsqui Institution Inmate Disciplinary Board, [1978] 1 S.C.R. 118, at page 129, would be equally applicable to institutional standing orders.
It may be that upon reflection the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeal itself will qualify this application of Martineau, which was primarily concerned with the meaning to be given to section 28 of the Federal Court Act [R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10] and not with review of issues arising in relation to the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As I read Weatherall, supra, the Court of Appeal was invited to adopt this approach but declined to do so. Nevertheless, in the world of government operations today a variety of initia tives are taken as outlined by a variety of docu ments and instruments purporting to be under general statutes and regulations, as the Govern ment of Canada's Regulatory Reform Program itself implicitly acknowledges. There is much to be said for a broad judicial conception of what consti tutes law or legal action if the Charter of Rights is to be given full scope in its application to govern mental action. Until that is recognized the decision of the Court of Appeal in Weatherall precludes review of the question in the Trial Division of this Court.
In the result, I conclude that section 41.1 of the Regulations is to be read without modification or qualification derived from the directives and standing orders that here dealt with its application.
If one examines the text of section 41.1 the key elements provide, in both official languages:
41.1 (1) Where a member considers the requirement of a urine sample necessary to detect the presence of an intoxicant
in the body of an inmate, he may require that inmate to provide ... a sample ... to make a proper analysis of the inmate's urine
• • • •
The text of the regulations in both official lan guages indicates a single standard or criterion or circumstance for its application, where a staff member "considers the requirement of a urine sample necessary to detect the presence of an intoxicant in the body of an inmate", or "un membre [le] considere . . . necessaire pour deceler la presence d'une substance hallucinogene dans l'organisme d'un detenu", that is, a circumstance of necessity as determined by a staff member. In the case of paragraph 41(2)(c), considered in Weatherall, supra, search was authorized where (in the French text) "un membre [le] considere . raisonnable et necessaire", or (in the English text) "a member considers [it] reasonable". There the two official texts appeared to differ but both refer to considerations of reasonableness and the regula tion was treated on that basis.
In this case the defendants urged that a stand ard of "necessity" was higher than a standard of "reasonable" action. Moreover, it was argued that the question of necessity in any case could be argued before a disciplinary tribunal, assuming proceedings were initiated against an inmate for testing positive or refusing to provide a specimen. I am not persuaded to agree. Indeed "reasonable" implies a reason related to the purpose of the regulation, a rational connection between purpose and action and, in my view it also implies a qualification on the nature of the action taken, that it be reasonable in the circumstances. These are qualifications that, for me, require something more than a conclusion that it is considered neces sary to conduct a search. If the question of necessi ty were raised in defence in disciplinary proceed ings, the regulation contains no guidance for the tribunal except reference to the belief of the staff member.
I am prepared to accept as an implied term of section 41.1 that a standard or qualification for its application is that its application must be con sistent with its purpose or purposes. The words of Stone J.A. in Weatherall, (supra, [1989] 1 F.C.
18, at pages 42-43), in relation to the latter regu lation, are equally applicable to section 41.1 here.
This is not to suggest that the authorities and staff should have a completely freehand in these matters and so abuse their powers. The authority contained in paragraph 41(2)(c) is lim ited to situations where a member considers that the action is "reasonable" either to detect contraband or to maintain the good order of the institution. In my opinion, such searches must always be bona fide. They cannot be used with the intent of intimidating, humiliating or harassing inmates or of inflicting punishment.
Aside from an implied term that the regulation here be applied consistently with its purposes, I am not prepared to imply other specific terms, or to "read in" or "read down" section 41.1 to conform with constitutional requirements. To do so would be inconsistent with the approach approved by Dickson J. [as he then was] in Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at pages 168-169, and followed by Strayer J. in Weatherall, supra, at page 397, and by others.
It is true that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Weatherall qualified that of Mr. Justice Strayer at trial, by limiting the order and reason ing applied to paragraph 41(2)(c) to the facts revealed by the case and the pleadings of the parties. In effect the regulation was held to be invalid only in so far as it provided for a skin search of male inmates in the presence of a female guard officer, not in a more general application. Nevertheless, the decision of Strayer J. in relation to the absence of criteria, standards or outline of circumstances for application of the regulation there in question is persuasive when considered in relation to the application of section 41.1 here in issue. It is persuasive in its drawing by analogy from the reasoning of Dickson J., as he then was, in Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., supra, and of Lamer J. in R. v. Collins, supra, and from some leading American jurisprudence, that paragraph 41(2)(c) there in question, without any express qualification or criteria other than the adjective "reasonable" in the English version and "raison-
nable et necessaire" in the French text, did not adequately provide standards that would ensure that a search would be reasonable within section 8 of the Charter. Thus it was invalid. That invalidity clearly underlies the decision of the Court of Appeal, though it limited the application of that decision to "cross-gender" strip searches of male inmates.
What sort of criteria might have been included in section 41.1? Is this a situation for prior approv al by independent authority of the appropriateness of requesting a specimen? Prior authorization in circumstances where that is possible would appear to be a requirement of a valid search (per Dickson J. in Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., supra, at page 161), at least in a situation of search of an office. The same necessity, for prior authorization, was not considered appropriate by Strayer J. in Wea- therall in relation to strip searches intended to detect contraband, for the evidence was clear that contraband could be disposed of fairly readily even in a prison setting if time were to be required for prior authorization. An alternative suggested was post search review by higher authority to minimize possibilities of abuse (per Stone J.A., in Wea- therall, supra, [1989] 1 F.C. 18, at page 43). In Jackson's case, even though no provision was made in the regulation itself for prior authorization, on the evidence presented, prior authorization of the required test was sought and obtained from a senior officer, a procedure that may have been designed to eliminate possibilities of abuse. That process would also take account of facts estab lished in evidence that trace elements of drugs for which testing was done do not disappear from the body until some hours or even days following ingestion. Thus the pressures of time to acquire a sample would seem to be less than in the case of seeking to detect contraband carried by inmates. Indeed, in the case of an inmate like Jackson, whom it was decided should be tested for the presence of drugs as a result of his conduct, or that of others with whom he was considered to be associated, procedures might well provide not only for prior approval but also for an explanation of
the grounds upon which a required specimen is contemplated and an opportunity to permit response from the inmate affected before a deci sion is finally made that a test is to be required.
Whether these requirements would be appropri ate must ultimately be left to the Commissioner and possibly the courts on a future occasion. They would not seem too far reaching in dealing with regulations to detect the presence of drugs in a urine specimen, in circumstances where there is reason to believe the inmate to be tested has ingested intoxicants, assuming my understanding of the technical aspects of testing is accurate. Other criteria or standards or applicable circum stances might be expressly included in regulations to provide for random testing or testing of known high risk groups, for the guidance of staff and inmates. Perhaps, as suggested by Strayer J. in Weatherall, some of the qualifications set out in directives, standing orders or policy documents of the Service might be included in regulations. As enacted, without any express criteria, other than considering it necessary, section 41.1 of the Regu lations in my view does not meet the qualification that the law providing for the search be reasonable in order to meet the standards of section 8 of the Charter.
I emphasize that this conclusion deals with sec tion 41.1 as it relates to the facts here raised in pleadings and in evidence where the required urine specimen is ordered for analysis because the inmate affected is considered to have ingested an intoxicant. The situation was referred to during the course of trial as one of reasonable cause. My conclusion does not relate directly to the other situations that would have been included in the overall plan of the Correctional Service for urinal ysis testing if that plan were implemented, i.e.,
random testing, testing of those with a history of involvement with drugs, and testing of those involved in community programs that provide sig nificant contact opportunities with outsiders. None of those aspects of the planned program are direct ly before the Court in this case. They have been discussed but only by implication in light of the overall plans of the Service and its apparent deter mination that those be undertaken entirely under the authority of a reasonably brief, general regula tion without standards, criteria or circumstances spelled out in any detail, leaving the Service free to vary or withdraw the program or aspects of it at will. A decision in relation to the regulation enact ed as far as it relates to situations of reasonable cause to believe an inmate has ingested an intoxi cant is not intended to reflect on the capacity of the Service to accomplish all the goals of its planned program. It does deal with the manner by which that program is implemented under one or more regulations properly drafted to include those circumstances, criteria or standards applicable to those goals which will provide some objective basis for all concerned to know the basis on which required specimens are to be ordered for urinalysis.
In considering the regulation here, or any others under which the Correctional Service might seek to pursue the goals of its urinalysis program, one must consider an assessment of the public interest in being left alone by government, that is, privacy, and the government's interest in intruding on individual privacy in order to advance its legiti mate goals. The expectations of privacy may vary from one circumstance to another. They are less in dealing with customs requirements on entry to a country than in a home or an office (R. v. Sim- mons, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 495) and even less in a prison setting where surveillance is the order of the day (Weatherall, supra, and see also Lanza v. New York, 370 U.S. 139 (Ct. App. N.Y. 1962); Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520 (2nd Cir. 1979); Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (4th Cir. 1984)). In the circumstances of prison life the public interest of concern to government is the promotion of safety and security within penal institutions for the ben efit of staff and inmates.
American jurisprudence, here cited, illustrates how mandatory urinalysis testing in another coun try has generally been viewed. The state's interest in promoting safety and security in penal institu tions has generally been recognized as paramount over the limited expectation of privacy of individu als in the prison setting even with constitutional guarantees against certain forms of search and seizure, under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, a provision somewhat comparable to section 8 of the Charter in Canada, though different in its historic background and perceived purposes.
The appropriate balance between the public in terest in safety and security in penal institutions and the public interest in recognizing expectations of privacy for inmates of institutions may differ in relation to various purposes of urinalysis programs. Thus constitutional requirements may differ where the purpose is to obtain evidence in the case of an inmate believed to have ingested intoxicants from those applicable where the purpose is random test ing, the screening of high risk groups or those with significant community contacts.
For the defendants it was urged that in a given case, such as this, there may well be judicial deference for administrative decisions about the appropriate balance, a factor recognized by Stone J.A. in Weatherall, supra, ([1989] 1 F.C. 18, at page 42). Yet that deference cannot preclude judi cial assessment, when the issue is raised, of wheth er the regulations under which the administrator acts are consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
To reiterate, my conclusion in relation to issues raised concerning section 8 of the Charter is that section 41.1 of the Penitentiary Service Regula tions, in so far as it provides for the requirement of a urine specimen for analysis from an inmate who is believed to have ingested an intoxicant, provides for an unreasonable search. It is thus contrary to section 8 of the Charter in this respect. This is because the regulation itself contains no standards, criteria, or circumstances relating to its applica tion, for the guidance of staff or inmates, which would ensure that application is not unreasonable within the meaning of section 8.
Section 7
The plaintiff submits that a requirement that a urine specimen be provided is unlawful because section 41.1 of the Regulations violates section 7 of the Charter and is not saved by section 1. That conclusion was reached by Galipeau J. in Dion, supra.
Section 7 of the Charter provides:
7. Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
Dion, supra, as noted earlier, deals with the same section of the Regulations as is questioned again in this case. In two other Canadian cases, the admission of evidence in criminal prosecutions from urine sample tests was in issue and in both the evidence was held admissible because the taking of the urine sample was held not to be unreasonable. In both cases it was taken from hospital vessels after collection from the accused. It was taken with consent of the accused in R. v. Katsigiorgis (1987), 62 O.R. (2d) 441 (C.A.), and without consent but after urine had been voided as a result of medical procedures in R. v. L.A.R. (1985), 17 D.L.R. (4th) 268 (Man. C.A.). Neither of those cases directly assists resolution of the issues here.
In Dion, Galipeau J. dealt with argument relat ed to sections 7 and 1 of the Charter. As I read his
decision (as translated, 30 C.C.C. (3d) 108) the following are key elements in his conclusions.
1. The mandatory urine testing program pro vided by section 41.1 restricted the constitution al rights of inmates to liberty and to security of the person. (See: 30 C.C.C. (3d), at pages 115, 116, 118)
2. Considering the purposes of the regulations there would appear to be opportunity for legisla tive intervention consistent with principles of fundamental justice (30 C.C.C. (3d), at pages 118-119).
3. In the case of section 41.1 the restrictions upon liberty and security were not in accord with principles of fundamental justice for the regulation gave penitentiary officers arbitrary powers, without appropriate limitations or cri teria, to require the provision of a sample for testing. Any inmate, whether or not he had ever taken intoxicants and whether or not he present ed any danger of committing discipline breaches or acts linked to the absorption of intoxicants, could be required to provide a specimen for testing without any criteria for when or whether the requirement could be properly imposed; inmates would have no protection from potential abuse by arbitrary exercise of authority under the regulation (30 C.C.C. (3d), at pages 119-120).
4. The deprivation under the regulation was not a reasonable limit that could be justified in a free and democratic society within section 1 of the Charter (30 C.C.C. (3d), at page 125).
With respect I do not share one of the primary assumptions of Galipeau J., (at 30 C.C.C. (3d), pages 115-116) that is that a citizen, even a pris oner, has the right to moderately intoxicate him self and to deny this, subject to an obligation to provide a urine sample to detect the presence of an intoxicant in the body of an inmate at risk of punishment for failing to do so, limits fundamental rights to liberty and security of the person. While that may apply outside prison institutions, the
regime within those institutions is very different. Inside, surveillance and denial of ordinary liberties is the order of the day, privacy is limited and not much is expected, and inmates may possess and may consume only what is authorized or provided and anything else in their possession is considered contraband, subject to forfeiture when found.
The plaintiff here urges that the decision in Dion be respected and followed and further, aside from that decision, section 41.1 when measured by the tests now developed for considering claims in relation to section 7 of the Charter is in breach of that provision.
The defendants urge that the decision of Gali- peau J. in Dion not be followed, that it should now be read in light of the decision of the Court of Appeal in Weatherall, supra, and of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387. Further, it is urged the regulation here does not deprive an inmate of rights to liberty or secu rity of the person in a manner contrary to the principles of fundamental justice, but even if it should be found to do so any limitation on rights of the inmate is consistent with the application of section 1 of the Charter, as a reasonable limit "demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society".
To resolve these differences I propose to consid er the implications of later cases for Dion and to assess section 41.1 of the regulations in light of the process now well established by decisions of the Supreme Court for considering claims relating to section 7 of the Charter. See generally, Singh et al. v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177; Operation Dismantle Inc. et al. v. The Queen et al., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441; Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486; R. v. Beare, [1988] 2 S.C.R. 387; R. v. Morgantaler, [1988] 1 S.C.R. 30.
I first deal with the defendants' suggestion that decisions in Weatherall and Beare, supra, affect the decision in Dion. In Weatherall at trial Strayer
J. held that section 7 of the Charter had no application to the issues before him which he held related clearly to section 8. The defendants submit a similar distinction might be drawn here. That submission I decline to accept because the circum stances here differ. Here there was no actual search of Jackson because he declined to provide a urine specimen. Instead, he was subject to discipli nary proceedings, with the possibility of serious penalties as though the search had proceeded and his urine specimen had tested positive for the presence of an intoxicant. It is true those proceed ings were for failure to obey the order to provide a specimen, but those proceedings were a direct consequence of the requirement of a search. Disci plinary proceedings affect the liberty of the plain tiff, a right to which he is assured, with some qualifications, under section 7. Because of the direct link between disciplinary proceedings for failure to obey an order to provide a specimen, i.e. to permit a search, it seems to me appropriate in this case to consider section 41.1 in relation to section 7, as well as section 8, of the Charter.
On behalf of the defendants counsel also sub mitted that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Weatherall had additional implications for the decision in Dion. The Court of Appeal, it is said, upheld the validity of paragraph 41(2)(c) there in question except in so far as it provided for "cross gender" strip searches of male inmates. It is true that the Court of Appeal limited the declaration of Strayer J. to the facts there pleaded and proved at trial. The basis of the decision at trial in Wea- therall was Strayer J.'s finding that the regulation violated section 8 of the Charter because it includ ed no standards or criteria to which it was to be applied. This reasoning surely underlies the deci sion of the Court of Appeal limiting the decision to the facts and pleadings in the case but which did not differ from the basic reasoning of Strayer J. I do not agree that the decision of the Court of Appeal in Weatherall significantly modifies the effect of the decision in Dion.
In R. v. Beare, supra, the Supreme Court unani mously upheld subsections 453.3(3) and 455.5(5) of the Criminal Code and the Identification of Criminals Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. I-1, which provided for the mandatory taking of fingerprints of a person arrested and charged, but not yet convicted, of certain criminal offences. Mr. Justice La Forest for the Court, acknowledged that the provisions detracted in a comparatively minor way from the security of persons affected, and he noted the importance of a variety of purposes served by the legislation. He found that any deprivation of secu rity was in accord with principles of fundamental justice ([1988] 2 S.C.R. 387, at page 413). R. v. Beare, of course, deals with a situation different in an important respect from that facing Jackson. There the persons required to be fingerprinted were not only believed to have committed a crime, but were actually charged with offences though not yet convicted, while here Jackson was not charged with any offence at the time the require ment of a urine specimen was ordered.
I have earlier pointed to my different view of the background of the prison setting from that assumed by Galipeau J. in his decision. For differ ent reasons, however, I do share his view that the regulation here, coupled with the practice estab lished by standing orders for disciplinary action for failure to provide a specimen when ordered to do so, does constitute a deprivation of fundamental rights of inmates to liberty and security of the person. Further, I agree with Galipeau J. that the deprivation here is not in accord with principles of fundamental justice.
In R. v. Morgentaler, supra, Dickson C.J., dis cussing claims in relation to section 7 said (at page 56):
The case law leads me to the conclusion that state interfer ence with bodily integrity and serious state-imposed psychologi cal stress, at least in the criminal law context, constitute a breach of security of the person. It is not necessary in this case to determine whether the right extends further, to protect either interests central to personal autonomy, such as a right to privacy, or interests unrelated to criminal justice.
To require an inmate to provide a specimen of urine for purposes of testing for trace elements of intoxicants, as section 41.1 provides, is in my view, an interference with bodily integrity. Urinalysis may reveal health or other conditions beyond the indications sought for traces of unauthorized intoxicants. In many cases requiring a specimen for testing aside from health reasons might lead to a measure of psychological stress, particularly where, as here, the procedure for collecting the sample involves direct observation by another. The requirement deprives the inmate concerned of security of his or her person. To require this or risk punishment for failure to comply with an order, as practice under standing orders for disciplinary pro ceedings here provides, is also an interference with the liberty of the person.
While there is but a limited privacy and protec tion of bodily integrity and expectation of those in the prison setting, what remains, including free dom from state examination of bodily wastes with out consent, ought not to be taken away except in accord with principles of fundamental justice. Here the absence of criteria for requiring a speci men, while that may not lead to abuse by reason able staff members, provides no standards for determining when abuse arises, it is not tied to reasonable and probable cause even where that is the basis on which the requirement is ordered, or to any other standard or circumstance that would reasonably support the requirement in light of its explained purposes. No provision is made for advising the inmate why the specimen is required, or for the inmate, in circumstances such as those relied upon here where a staff member believes or suspects the inmate has consumed an intoxicant, to explain his conduct or action before a decision is finally made to require the specimen.
Without reference to any objective criteria, sec tion 41.1 does not permit officers or inmates to know the circumstances in which a urine sample may be required. I conclude that section 41.1 of the Regulations, in so far as it authorizes a requirement for an inmate to provide a urine specimen where it is believed the inmate has ing ested an intoxicant, contravenes section 7 of the Charter. This is because the restrictions on rights to liberty and security of the person are not, in the absence of standards or criteria or applicable cir cumstance, in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.
Section 1
The next issue relating to the Charter concerns the application of section 1. At trial the defendants submitted that if the Court were to find that the plaintiff's rights under section 8 or section 7 had been restricted contrary to the Charter, then any restriction was valid in the circumstances revealed in this case as a reasonable limit prescribed by law demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, as section 1 provides. As is now well established the onus of establishing that is on the defendants.
While conceding that the relationship between section 8 and section 1 of the Charter has not been authoritatively determined, the defendants submit that application of section 1 may, in appropriate cases, support restrictions on rights under sections 8 and 7 that would otherwise be unconstitutional. In Hunter et al. v. Southam Inc., supra, Mr. Justice Dickson, as he was then, speaking for the Supreme Court ([1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, at page 169) left open the question of the relationship between sections 8 and 1 since it had not there been argued. In R. v. Simmons, supra, Dickson C.J., for the majority, found a violation of section 8 arising, not from the terms of the customs law there in issue, but from the manner in which a search had been carried out by action of the customs officers concerned. That sort of infringe ment of section 8 could not be saved by application of section 1 which relates only to those situations
where the limitation on rights declared is one "prescribed by law".
In R. v. Noble (1984), 48 O.R. (2d) 643 (C.A.), Martin J.A., for the Court concluded that provi sions of the Narcotic Control Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. N-1] and of the Food and Drugs Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. F-27] authorizing the search of a dwelling under a writ of assistance violated section 8 of the Charter. Turning then to the question of section 1 of the Charter, which was not argued as a basis for justifying a search in that case, he said, by way of obiter (at pages 667-668):
... since I have already held that the provisions of s. 10(1)(a) of the Narcotic Control Act and s. 37(1)(a) of the Food and Drugs Act are unreasonable and contravene s. 8 in so far as they authorize the search of a dwelling under a writ of assist ance, I would have great difficulty in concluding that the legislation is justifiable under s. 1 as a reasonable limit pre scribed by law that can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
A similar difficulty in principle of reconciling those laws held to be unconstitutional under sec tion 7 because they violate principles of fundamen tal justice with a conclusion that the laws might be justifiable as reasonable under section 1, has been identified by Madame Justice Wilson, speaking for herself in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, at page 523. She said:
Section 7 does not, however, affirm a right to the principles of fundamental justice per se. There must first be found an impairment of the right to life, liberty or security of the person. It must then be determined whether that impairment has been effected in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. If it has, it passes the threshold test in s. 7 itself but the Court must go on to consider whether it can be sustained under s. 1 as a limit prescribed by law on the s. 7 right which is both reasonable and justified in a free and democratic society. If, however, the limit on the s. 7 right has been effected through a violation of the principles of fundamental justice, the enquiry, in my view, ends there and the limit cannot be sustained under s. 1. I say this because I do not believe that a limit on the s. 7 right which has been imposed in violation of the principles of fundamental justice can be either "reasonable" or "demonst- rably justified in a free and democratic society".
The difficulties of reconciling principles referred to by Martin J.A. in R. v. Noble, supra, and by Wilson J. in the Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act case, supra, are presented for resolution in this case when one considers the possible application of section 1 as outlined in R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, per Dickson, C.J. at pages 138-139, and other cases. In applying section 1, two central criteria are essential if a limitation on Charter rights is to be held reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. First, the objective to be served by the limitation must be sufficiently important that it warrants overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom, indeed the objective must relate to societal concerns that are pressing and substantial in a free and demo cratic society. Second, the party invoking section 1 must show the means adopted to be reasonable and demonstrably justified, a proportionality test that requires a balancing of the interests of society with those of individuals and groups. The proportional ity test has three components. The measures adopted must be carefully designed to achieve the objective in question, and rationally connected to the objective. They must impair the right or free dom as little as possible. There must be a propor tionality between the effects of the measures and the objective.
In seeking to assess section 41.1 in light of section 1 of the Charter it is well to recall that it is the text of that regulation itself which constitutes the law, and the limitation on rights and freedoms provided by sections 8 and 7 of the Charter. We have earlier referred to the purposes or objectives of this regulation as identified by evidence at trial from the testimony of Harvey and documents introduced through his examination.
I find that the evidence clearly indicates that unauthorized intoxicants in the prison setting create very serious problems including a greater risk and level of violence that affects the safety and security of prison institutions for both staff
and inmates. I am prepared to accept on the evidence before me that this presents societal con cerns that are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society. I am prepared to accept as well that among the purposes or objectives to be served by section 41.1 as enacted was to control and ultimately reduce these concerns and to improve safety and security within the institutions. I do point out that the purposes of the regulation do not appear, and are not referred to by incor porating words, in the text of the regulation itself.
Counsel for the plaintiff, while prepared to accept that the ultimate objective of the regulation was important, i.e. controlling drugs to improve safety and security within institutions, also sug gested that it might not be more pressing and substantial within institutions than it was in socie ty as a whole. If it were necessary to assess that suggestion I would be prepared to accept, for purposes of determining the applicability of section 1 in this case, that the objective is more pressing within the prison setting because by its nature the population of inmates includes a very high propor tion of persons who have demonstrated tendencies to violence, a special circumstance that may war rant different programs, not merely incarceration and surveillance, than would be introduced for the population at large outside the prison system.
For the record I also note that evidence in this case supports the conclusion that measures similar to those planned for the Correctional Service to deter and detect unauthorized consumption of drugs and intoxicants are not unusual in other free and democratic societies. The evidence of wit nesses Willette and Davis provide both a general background about compulsory urinalysis testing in prison institutions in the United States, and specif ic information including satisfactory results about the programs in place for more than a decade in federal penal institutions in the United States. Counsel for the defendants also submitted pub lished information surveying the status of compul sory urinalysis testing programs in state prison systems in the United States, evidence which I
accept, not necessarily as proof of its detailed references but as evidence of general practice in a range of states which, like the federal country they comprise, constitute free and democratic societies.
That general practice is also shown through reference to judicial precedents upholding compul sory urinalysis testing as not inconsistent with the Fourth Amendment, not only in the prison setting for inmates (see: Jensen v. Lick, Spence v. Farrier, Peranzo v. Coughlin, supra) but also for employees of prison systems (McDonell v. Hunter, supra), customs employees (National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 816 F.2d 170 (5th Cir. 1987), upheld in part (1989) Ct. No. 86-1879 (U.S.S.C.)), railway operating employees (Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assn., 103 L.Ed 2d 639 (1989)), staff of the F.B.I. (Mack v. U.S., F.B.I., 653 F.Supp. 70 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); appeal dismissed 814 F.2d 120 (2nd Cir. 1987)) and for jockeys and others engaged in state controlled horse racing (Shoemaker v. Handel, 795 F.2d. 1136 (3rd Cir. 1986)).
In my view the first of the requirements of section 1 of the Charter are met by section 41.1, that is, that the objectives of the section, its pur poses as adduced in evidence, relate to societal concerns that are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society. Those objectives may war rant overriding constitutionally protected rights or freedoms by appropriate means.
When we come to consider the means here adopted we are in difficulty in light of section 1 of the Charter. The proportionality test is not here readily met. The defendants submit that the means here selected in a general sense, compulsory uri nalysis testing, are appropriate, that they are less intrusive and more effective than other means that might have been adopted, such as blood tests. It is argued that other means, through searching, are demonstrably not effective, and that urinalysis is
less intrusive but much more effective than strip searching. The success experienced through urinal ysis testing programs in United States prisons, in achieving the goals which the Correctional Service here seeks, is a matter of record. Finally, it is submitted that the standard or criterion included in section 41.1, that is a standard of necessity, is a "reasonable" standard within the meaning of sec tion 1 of the Charter.
For the plaintiff counsel submits that the absence of any limitation in the regulation on what is in effect an absolute discretionary power of a correctional officer is not a reasonable limitation within section 1. The regulation is said to be too vague and indefinite to permit assessment in rela tion to section 1, essentially I assume because it is implied that one cannot assess its proportionality to the objective of the regulation. Absent any standard or criteria or circumstance in the regula tion for its application, it is open to arbitrary application and thus cannot qualify as reasonable.
Two cases, each dealing with section 1 and limitations of freedom of expression under para graph 2(b) of the Charter were referred to by counsel for the plaintiff. In Re Ontario Film & Video Appreciation Society and Ontario Board of Censors (1984), 45 O.R. (2d) 80 the Ontario Court of Appeal, per MacKinnon A.C.J.O., dis missing an appeal from the Divisional Court, endorsed the record, in part in these terms (at page 82):
The subsection allows for the complete denial or prohibition of the freedom of expression in this particular area and sets no limits on the Ontario Board of Censors. It clearly sets no limit, reasonable or otherwise, on which an argument can be mounted that it falls within the saving words of s. 1 of the Charter: "subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law".
In Luscher v. Deputy Minister, Revenue Canada, Customs and Excise, [1985] 1 F.C. 85
(C.A.), at pages 89-90, Hugessen J.A., referring to section 1 of the Charter, said:
In my opinion, one of the first characteristics of a reasonable limit prescribed by law is that it should be expressed in terms sufficiently clear to permit a determination of where and what the limit is. A limit which is vague, ambiguous, uncertain, or subject to discretionary determination is, by that fact alone, an unreasonable limit. If a citizen cannot know with tolerable certainty the extent to which the exercise of a guaranteed freedom may be restrained, he is likely to be deterred from conduct which is, in fact, lawful and not prohibited. Uncertain ty and vagueness are constitutional vices when they are used to restrain constitutionally protected rights and freedoms. While there can never be absolute certainty, a limitation of a guaran teed right must be such as to allow a very high degree of predictability of the legal consequences.
While these two cases, Re Ontario Film and Video and Luscher deal with another Charter right than is involved in this case, I find the principle underlying the reasoning of MacKinnon A.C.J.O., and Hugessen J.A. to be persuasive.
In this case I have already concluded that sec tion 41.1 provides for an unreasonable search and is in conflict with section 8 of the Charter because it does not include any standards, criteria or cir cumstances for its application. I conclude, essen tially for the same reason, the lack of standards or criteria limiting the authority to search, that sec tion 41.1 is not a reasonable limitation within section 1.
Having concluded that section 41.1 derogates from the rights to liberty and security of the person contrary to section 7 in a manner not in accord with the principles of fundamental justice because the regulation includes no standards or criteria for its application, I also conclude, for essentially the same reason, that it cannot be a reasonable limitation prescribed by law within sec tion 1 of the Charter.
In sum it is my conclusion that section 1 does not avail to provide support for section 41.1.
Section 15
The final issue relating to the Charter concerns the application of subsection 15(1) of the Charter, said by the plaintiff to be violated by section 41.1 of the Regulations. This section provides:
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
The amended statement of claim, with the change approved at the commencement of trial includes the allegation that "the plaintiff is within a class of persons namely prison inmates being the only class of persons in Canada required by law to submit urine samples or face penal consequences for failing to do so".
No evidence was tendered at trial to support a finding of fact that prison inmates are the only class of persons in Canada required to provide specimens or face consequences as alleged in the statement of claim. Even if that factual basis were assumed I am not persuaded that section 41.1 of the Regulations violates subsection 15(1) of the Charter.
In Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia, [1989] 1 S.C.R. 143, the interpretation of subsec tion 15(1) of the Charter and the approach to dealing with alleged violations of that provision were discussed. Mr. Justice McIntyre, with whom the majority agreed on the manner of construing subsection 15(1), referred to "discrimination" in the following terms (at pages 174-175):
I would say then that discrimination may be described as a distinction, whether intentional or not but based on grounds relating to personal characteristics of the individual or group, which has the effect of imposing burdens, obligations, or disad vantages on such individual or group not imposed upon others, or which withholds or limits access to opportunities, benefits, and advantages available to other members of society. Distinc tions based on personal characteristics attributed to an individual solely on the basis of association with a group will rarely escape the charge of discrimination, while those based on an individual's merits and capacities will rarely be so classed.
Then in discussing the approach to alleged viola tions of subsection 15(1) he said (at page 182):
... in assessing whether a complainant's rights have been infringed under s. 15(1), it is not enough to focus only on the alleged ground of discrimination and decide whether or not it is an enumerated or analogous ground. The effect of the impugned distinction or classification on the complainant must be considered. Once it is accepted that not all distinctions and differentiations created by law are discriminatory, then a role must be assigned to s. 15(1) which goes beyond the mere recognition of a legal distinction. A complainant under s. 15(1) must show not only that he or she is not receiving equal treatment before and under the law or that the law has a differential impact on him or her in the protection or benefit accorded by law but, in addition, must show that the legislative impact of the law is discriminatory.
Where discrimination is found a breach of s. 15(1) has occurred and—where s. 15(2) is not applicable—any justifica tion, any consideration of the reasonableness of the enactment; indeed, any consideration of factors which could justify the discrimination and support the constitutionality of the impugned enactment would take place under s. 1.
In this case section 41.1 of the Regulations does provide for treatment of prison inmates on a basis different from that of most, if not all, other individuals in Canada and thus may be said to derogate from their right to equality before the law. Yet I am not persuaded that this difference or derogation is discriminatory in the sense provided for in subsection 15(1). It does not seem to me to be related to any of the enumerated and prohibited grounds, or analogous grounds, which concern per sonal characteristics. The difference in treatment here for prison inmates as a group, arises not from personal characteristics but from past courses of conduct amounting to criminal activities against society.
I accept the submission of the defendants that differences of this sort are not prohibited by sub section 15(1) of the Charter. There is not, in my view, need for the defendants to establish that the difference in treatment of prison inmates is a reasonable limitation under section 1 of the Charter.
Conclusion
Throughout the trial in this matter counsel for the defendants expressed concern about the signifi cance of any decision in this case for the important program initiated, and not yet fully developed, by the Correctional Service.
Let me reiterate that the whole of that program was not under review in this case. Here, in light of the pleadings and the facts established, what was in issue was the validity of section 41.1, the au thority for the order said to be lawful for which Jackson was subject to disciplinary proceedings for failing to comply, in circumstances where the order was made because Jackson was believed to be under the influence of an intoxicant.
My decision is that section 41.1 of the Peniten tiary Service Regulations in so far as it deals with a circumstance of requiring a urine specimen from an inmate who is believed to have ingested an intoxicant is null and of no effect, as contrary to section 8 and section 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and it is not saved by section 1 of that Charter.
Judgment and a declaration to this effect, sought as part of the relief claimed by the plaintiff will be entered.
The plaintiff is also entitled to a declaration, as claimed, that the order of conviction made by the defendant Disciplinary Tribunal at Joyceville Pen itentiary per Donald Schlichter, Independant Chairperson, in this case is unlawful and of no force and effect.
Finally, the plaintiff will have his costs, as claimed.
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