A-7-87
In the Matter of the Canadian Human Rights Act
And in the Matter of a complaint by Subhaschan
Singh dated November 27, 1986, filed pursuant to
section 32(1) of the Canadian Human Rights Act
against Department of External Affairs
And in the Matter of the jurisdiction of the
Canadian Human Rights Commission to conduct
an investigation into the said complaint pursuant
to section 35 of the Canadian Human Rights Act
INDEXED As: SINGH (RE) (C.A.)
Court of Appeal, Mahoney, Hugessen and Desjar-
dins JJ.—Ottawa, April 20, 21, and May 9, 1988.
Human rights — References from Canadian Human Rights
Commission as to whether it has jurisdiction to investigate
complaints of discrimination in refusal to grant visitors' visas
and to allow close relatives to sponsor family members for
landing — Impossible to say Departments concerned not
engaged in provision of services customarily available to gen
eral public, within meaning of Act, s. 5 Cannot be said
person who, on prohibited grounds, is denied opportunity to
sponsor application for landing is not victim within Act, and if
Canadian citizen or permanent resident within meaning of s.
32(5)(6), Commission can hear complaint.
Immigration Whether Department of External Affairs
and Canada Employment and Immigration Commission are
engaged in provision of services customarily available to gen
eral public, within meaning of s. 5 Canadian Human Rights
Act — Person denied opportunity, on prohibited grounds, to
sponsor application for landing may be victim within Act, and
Canadian Human Rights Commission has jurisdiction to
investigate complaint.
These are ten references to the Court by the Canadian
Human Rights Commission for a determination as to whether
it has jurisdiction to investigate complaints concerning refusals
by the Department of External Affairs and the Canada
Employment and Immigration Commission to grant visitors'
visas to close family relatives and to allow close relatives to
sponsor members of the family class for immigration to
Canada. It was argued that the Commission lacked jurisdiction
because the Departments concerned are not engaged in the
provision of services customarily available to the general public
within the meaning of section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights
Act, and that the victims of the alleged discriminatory practices
are not Canadian citizens or permanent residents of Canada so
as to bring the cases within the provisions of paragraph
32(5)(b) of the Canadian Human Rights Act.
Held, the questions in the references should be answered in
the affirmative.
The Commission has the right to investigate a complaint
which may turn out to be beyond the Commission's jurisdiction.
Subparagraph 36(3)(b)(ii) clearly envisages that the Commis
sion will determine whether or not a complaint is within its
jurisdiction. The Court should prohibit it from acting only
where it is clear that the tribunal is without jurisdiction. The
questions raised are whether the complaints cannot possibly
relate to discriminatory practices in the provision of services
customarily available to the general public and whether com
plainants could not possibly be described as victims of the
alleged discriminatory practices. It is not clear that services
rendered, both in Canada and abroad, by the officers charged
with the administration of the Immigration Act, 1976, are not
services customarily available to the general public. The spon
sor's interest is expressly recognized in the Act and consistent
with the objective of paragraph 3(c) which is to facilitate the
reunion of close relatives. A person who, on prohibited grounds,
is denied the opportunity to sponsor an application for landing
is a "victim" within the meaning of the Act. That being so, it
cannot be said that the victim in any of the subject references
was not a Canadian citizen or permanent resident within the
meaning of paragraph 32(5)(b) of the Act.
STATUTES AND REGULATIONS JUDICIALLY
CONSIDERED
Canadian Human Rights Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, ss. 2,
5, 32(5)(b), 33(b)(ii), 36(3)(b)(ii) (as am. by S.C.
1985, c. 26, s. 69).
Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s.
28(4).
Immigration Act, /976, S.C. 1976-77, c. 52, ss.
3(c),(e), 79.
Immigration Regulations, 1978, SOR/78-172, ss. 4, 5, 6.
Sex Discrimination Act 1975 (U.K.), 1975, c. 65, s. 29.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
Lodge v. Minister of Employment and Immigration,
[ 1979] 1 F.C. 775 (C.A.); Attorney General of Canada v.
Cumming, [1980] 2 F.C. 122 (T.D.); Gomez v. City of
Edmonton (1982), 3 C.H.R.R. 882.
CONSIDERED:
Amin v. Entry Clearance Officer, Bombay, [ 1983] 2 All
E.R. 864 (H.L.); Kassam v. Immigration Appeal Tri
bunal, [1980] 2 All E.R. 330 (C.A.); Canadian National
Railway Co. v. Canada (Canadian Human Rights Com
mission), [1987] I S.C.R. 1114; Ontario Human Rights
Commission and O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Limited et
a/., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536.
COUNSEL:
Russell G. Juriansz for the Canadian Human
Rights Commission.
J. Grant Sinclair, Q.C. for the Department of
External Affairs, Canada Employment and
Immigration Commission and the Attorney
General of Canada.
SOLICITORS:
Blake, Cassels & Graydon, Toronto, for the
Canadian Human Rights Commission.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for the
Department of External Affairs, Canada
Employment and Immigration Commission
and the Attorney General of Canada.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
HUGESSEN J.: These are ten references by the
Canadian Human Rights Commission pursuant to
subsection 28(4) of the Federal Court Act.' The
resolutions authorizing the references are as
follows:
[Court File No. A-7-87]
Subhaschan Singh v. Department of External Affairs
The Commission resolved to refer the following question to the
Federal Court of Canada:
"Can the Canadian Human Rights Commission authorize an
investigator under subsection 35(2) of the Canadian Human
Rights Act to carry out or continue an investigation in respect
of a complaint made by Subhaschan Singh, a person lawfully
present in Canada, that the Department of External Affairs is
engaging or has engaged in a discriminatory practice because
of family status, marital status and age by refusing to issue a
visitors' visa to Subhaschan Singh's sister, Ousha Davi Singh?"
'Court File No. A-8-87j
Subhaschan Singh v. Canada Employment and Immigration
Commission
The Commission resolved to refer the following question to the
Federal Court of Canada:
"Can the Canadian Human Rights Commission authorize an
investigator under subsection 35(2) of the Canadian Human
Rights Act to carry out or continue an investigation in respect
of a complaint made by Subhaschan Singh, a person lawfully
present in Canada, that the Canada Employment and Immigra
tion Commission is engaging or has engaged in a discriminatory
practice because of family status, marital status and age by
refusing to issue a visitors' visa to Subhaschan Singh's sister,
Ousha Davi Singh?"
' R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10.
[Court File No. A-9-87]
Gabriela Rebeca Miralles Etcheverry v. Department of Exter
nal Affairs
The Commission resolved to refer the following question to the
Federal Court of Canada:
"Can the Canadian Human Rights Commission authorize an
investigator under subsection 35(2) of the Canadian Human
Rights Act to carry out or continue an investigation in respect
of a complaint made by Gabriela Rebeca Miralles Etcheverry
lawfully present in Canada, that the Department of External
Affairs is engaging or has engaged in a discriminatory practice
because of national or ethnic origin, by refusing to issue a
visitors' visa to Mrs. Etcheverry's sister and nephews?"
[Court File No. A-10-87]
Gabriela Rebeca Miralles Etcheverry v. Canada Employment
and Immigration Commission
The Commission resolved to refer the following question to the
Federal Court of Canada:
"Can the Canadian Human Rights Commission authorize an
investigator under subsection 35(2) of the Canadian Human
Rights Act to carry out or continue an investigation in respect
of a complaint made by Gabriela Rebeca Miralles Etcheverry
lawfully present in Canada, that the Canada Employment and
Immigration Commission is engaging or has engaged in a
discriminatory practice because of national or ethnic origin by
refusing to issue a visitors' visa to Mrs. Etcheverry's sister and
nephews?"
[Court File No. A-11-87]
Hameed and Massarat Naqvi v. Canada Employment and
Immigration Commission
The Commission resolved to refer the following question to the
Federal Court of Canada:
"Can the Canadian Human Rights Commission authorize an
investigator under subsection 35(2) of the Canadian Human
Rights Act to carry out or continue an investigation in respect
of a complaint made by Hameed and Massarat Naqvi, persons
lawfully present in Canada, that the Canada Employment and
Immigration Commission is engaging or has engaged in a
discriminatory practice because of race, colour, national or
ethnic origin, or marital status, by refusing to issue a visitors'
visa to Massarat Naqvi's sister—Hameed Naqvi's sister-in-law,
Naz Sultan?"
[Court File No. A-12-87]
Jawaharlal Menghani v. Canada Employment and Immigration
Commission and Department of External Affairs
The Commission resolved to refer the following question to the
Federal Court of Canada:
"Can the Canadian Human Rights Commission appoint a
person for the purpose of attempting to bring about a settle-
ment in respect of a complaint made by Jawaharlal Menghani,
a person lawfully present in Canada, alleging that the Canada
Employment and Immigration Commission and the Depart
ment of External Affairs are engaging or have engaged in a
discriminatory practice because of national or ethnic origin, by
refusing to allow the Complainant, Jawaharlal Menghani, to
sponsor his brother, Nandlal Menghani, and refusing to issue
an immigrant visa to the Complainant's brother?"
[Court File No. A-13-87]
Kashmir Kaur Uppal v. Canada Employment and Immigration
Commisison and Department of External Affairs
The Commission resolved to refer the following question to the
Federal Court of Canada:
"Can the Canadian Human Rights Commission authorize an
investigator under subsection 35(2) of the Canadian Human
Rights Act to carry out or continue an investigation in respect
of a complaint made by Kashmir Kaur Uppal, a person lawful
ly present in Canada, that the Canada Employment and Immi
gration Commission and the Department of External Affairs
are engaging or have engaged in a discriminatory practice
because of national or ethnic origin by having refused to allow
the Complainant to sponsor her spouse, Makhan Singh Uppal,
and having refused to issue an immigrant visa to the Com
plainant's spouse?"
[Court File No. A-14-87]
Tarsem Singh Bains v. Canada Employment and Immigration
Commission and Department of External Affairs
The Commission resolved to refer the following question to the
Federal Court of Canada:
"Can the Canadian Human Rights Commission authorize an
investigator under subsection 35(2) of the Canadian Human
Rights Act to carry out or continue an investigation in respect
of a complaint made by Tarsem Singh Bains, a person lawfully
present in Canada, that the Canada Employment and Immigra
tion Commission and the Department of External Affairs are
engaging or have engaged in a discriminatory practice because
of race and national or ethnic origin by not accepting the
legality of the Complainant's adoption of the Complainant's
brother's son in India?"
[Court File No. A-15-87]
Saeeda Mansoory v. Canada Employment and Immigration
Commission
The Commission resolved to refer the following question to the
Federal Court of Canada:
"Can the Canadian Human Rights Commission authorize an
investigator under subsection 35(2) of the Canadian Human
Rights Act to carry out or continue an investigation in respect
of a complaint made by Saeeda Mansoory, a person lawfully
present in Canada, that the Canada Employment and Immigra
tion Commission is engaging or has engaged in a discriminatory
practice because of national or ethnic origin, by refusing to
allow the Complainant to sponsor her father, Yasin Mansoory,
and refusing to issue an immigrant visa to Saeeda Mansoory's
father?"
[Court File No. A-16-87]
Saeeda Mansoory v. Department of External Affairs
The Commission resolved to refer the following question to the
Federal Court of Canada:
"Can the Canadian Human Rights Commission authorize an
investigator under subsection 35(2) of the Canadian Human
Rights Act to carry out or continue an investigation in respect
of a complaint made by Saeeda Mansoory, a person lawfully
present in Canada, that the Department of External Affairs is
engaging or has engaged in a discriminatory practice because
of national or ethnic origin, by refusing to issue an immigrant
visa to the Complainant's father, Yasin Mansoory, thus deny
ing Saeeda Mansoory the right to sponsor her father?"
The factual background to the references is, of
course, not in dispute and may be shortly stated.
Each of the complaints referred to has been made
to the Commission pursuant to section 32 of the
Canadian Human Rights Act 2 and the complain
ants are all either Canadian citizens or permanent
residents of Canada. In the first five cases (Court
files A-7-87 to A-11-87), the complainants claim
to have suffered discrimination on prohibited
grounds in the refusal by the Government of visi
tors' visas to close family relatives. In the second
group of five cases (Court files A-12-87 to A-16-
87), the complainants claim to have suffered dis
crimination on prohibited grounds in the refusal by
the Government to recognize their right to sponsor
a close relative as a member of the family class
and in the attendant refusal to issue an immigrant
visa to such relative. The details of the alleged
discriminatory practices in each case are not
necessary for an understanding of the argument; it
is enough to say that, in the visitors' cases, visas
are said to have been refused because, for example,
the proposed visitor, for reasons related to prohib
ited grounds, is thought not to be a genuine visitor
and, in the sponsorship cases, the right to sponsor
has been refused because, for example, for reasons
related to prohibited grounds, the Government has
imposed unreasonable requirements as to proof of
the required relationship.
2 S.C. 1976-77, c. 33.
requirements as to proof of the required relation
ship.
In respect of all the complaints, the Commission
has attempted to carry out an investigation, but
has been unable to do so by reason of the refusal of
the Government to recognize that it has the juris
diction to investigate the matters complained of.
That refusal, in its turn, is based on two grounds:
first, that the government departments concerned
are not engaged
5.... in the provision of ... services ... customarily avail
able to the general public ...
within the meaning of section 5 of the Canadian
Human Rights Act and, second, that, in any event,
the victims of the alleged discriminatory practices
were not Canadian citizens or permanent residents
of Canada so as to bring the cases within the
provisions of paragraph 32(5)(b) of the Canadian
Human Rights Act.
A preliminary question arises with regard to the
reach of the decision which this Court is called
upon to render on the references. The latter, in
their terms, refer to the jurisdiction or power of
the Commission to investigate the various com
plaints. It is the Commission's position that such
investigation, at this stage, necessarily includes the
right to investigate,a complaint which may, in due
course, turn out to be beyond the Commission's
jurisdiction. The Government, on the other hand,
takes the position that the references having been
made the question of the Commission's jurisdiction
to deal with the complaints in limine is now before
the Court and must be responded to.
An examination of the Canadian Human Rights
Act makes it clear that the Commission is a body
whose jurisdiction to inquire includes the jurisdic
tion to inquire into the limits of its own jurisdic
tion. The initial jurisdiction of the Commission is
triggered by the filing of a complaint; once that
happens, the Commission is required by the man
datory words of section 33 to deal with it ("the
Commission shall deal"). The question of jurisdic
tion is specifically dealt with in subparagraph
33(b)(ii), in a manner that makes evident Parlia-
ment's intent that the Commission itself should in
the first instance decide if a matter is within its
jurisdiction.
The same is true after the Commission has
concluded an investigation: subparagraph
36(3)(b)(ii) [as am. by S.C. 1985, c. 26, s. 69]
clearly envisages that the Commission should
decide as to whether or not a complaint is within
its jurisdiction.
This Court's posture with regard to the Com
mission's powers has been consistent with this
reading of the statute. In Lodge v. Minister of
Employment and Immigration, [1979] 1 F.C. 775
(C.A.), Le Dain J., speaking for the Court, said
[at pages 785-786]:
Having concluded for these reasons that an injunction will
not lie for a purpose such as that invoked in the present case, I
do not find it necessary to express an opinion as to whether the
application of the inquiry and deportation provisions of the
Immigration Act is a service customarily available to the
general public within the meaning of section 5 of the Canadian
Human Rights Act. The question as to the extent, if any, to
which the administration and application of federal statutes,
whether regulatory in purpose or not, fall under the Canadian
Human Rights Act is, of course, a serious one. There may be
important distinctions to be drawn between different aspects of
the public service, based on the facts established in each case. It
is preferable, I think, that these questions should be determined
in the first instance by the Commission, as section 33 would
appear to intend, before a court is called upon to pronounce
upon them .... [Emphasis added.]
Likewise, in Attorney General of Canada v.
Cumming, [1980] 2 F.C. 122 (T.D.), Thurlow
A.C.J., as he then was, said [at pages 131-133]:
With respect to the first of these questions, which appears to
me to be one that goes to the jurisdiction of the Tribunal, I am
not prepared to accept the broad proposition that in assessing
taxes under the Income Tax Act the Department of National
Revenue is not engaged in the provision of services within the
meaning of section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act. The
statute is cast in wide terms and both its subject-matter and its
stated purpose suggest that it is not to be interpreted narrowly
or restrictively. Nor do I think that discrimination on any of the
bases prohibited by the Act cannot conceivably occur in the
provision of such services to the public.
The preferable course for the Court is to leave the Tribunal
free to carry out its inquiries and not to prohibit it save in a
case where it is clear and beyond doubt that the Tribunal is
without jurisdiction to deal with the matter before it. In my
opinion, the present is not such a case. [Emphasis added.]
While those cases were concerned with proceed
ings launched in the Trial Division putting in issue
the Commission's jurisdiction, I do not think that
the fact that the present matter comes to us as a
reference under subsection 28(4) of the Federal
Court Act should make any difference. The Com
mission has received complaints. The statute
requires that it investigate them. The Government
has taken the position that the complaints are
clearly outside the Commission's jurisdiction and
has refused to allow it to pursue its investigation.
By doing so, it has itself put in issue the Commis
sion's right to investigate for the purposes of deter
mining whether or not a matter is within its
jurisdiction.
Some question was raised at the hearing as to
the proper standard to be applied. Counsel for the
Government urged that the test of "clear and
beyond doubt" used by Thurlow A.C.J. in the
passage quoted in Cumming, supra, was too high.
I confess that the point escapes me. Counsel con
cedes that the Court should only interfere at this
stage where it is clear that the tribunal is without
jurisdiction. Once that is granted, it seems to me
that whether one also requires that the point be
beyond doubt is nothing more than an exercise in
semantics. What is important is that the Court
should not intervene to prevent a body such as the
Commission from carrying out its statutorily man
dated duty to enquire into matters which may
arguably be within its jurisdiction unless the Court
can say with confidence that those matters are not
within the Commission's jurisdiction.
Looked at in that light, the questions raised on
the present references become very simply whether
the complaints cannot possibly relate to -dis
criminatory practices in the provision of services
customarily available to the general public and
whether the complainants could not possibly be
described as victims of the alleged discriminatory
practices. For the reasons which follow, I am
unable to say that either question must be
answered in such a way as to deny jurisdiction to
the Commission at this stage.
Section 5 of the Canadian Human Rights Act
reads as follows:
5. It is a discriminatory practice in the provision of goods,
services, facilities or accommodation customarily available to
the general public
(a) to deny, or to deny access to, any such good, service,
facility or accommodation Lo any individual, or
(b) to differentiate adversely in relation to any individual,
on a prohibited ground of discrimination.
This provision differs markedly from the terms
of section 29 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975
(U.K.) [1975, c. 65] which provides as follows:
29.—(1) It is unlawful for any person concerned with the
provision (for payment or not) of goods, facilities or services to
the public or a section of the public to discriminate against a
woman who seeks to obtain or use those goods, facilities or
services—
(a) by refusing or deliberately omitting to provide her with
any of them, or
(b) by refusing or deliberately omitting to provide her with
goods, facilities or services of the like quality, in the like
manner and on the like terms as are normal in his case in
relation to male members of the public or (where she belongs
to a section of the public) to male members of that section.
(2) The following are examples of the facilities and services
mentioned in subsection (I )—
(a) access to and use of any place which members of the
public or a section of the public are permitted to enter;
(b) accommodation in a hotel, boarding house or other
similar establishment;
(e) facilities by way of banking or insurance or for grants,
loans, credit or finance;
(d) facilities for education;
(e) facilities for entertainment, recreation or refreshment;
(f) facilities for transport or travel;
(g) the services of any profession or trade, or any local or
other public authority.
Both the Court of Appeal and the House of
Lords in England have interpreted this provision
restrictively so as to limit it to "marketplace"
activities and to exclude the services rendered by a
public officer carrying out his duties in controlling
the inflow of immigrants into the country.'
Without in any way putting in doubt the cor
rectness of those decisions, I note that they rely
very heavily on the enumeration of examples in
subsection 29(2) of the U.K. statute, a feature
3 See Amin v. Entry Clearance Officer, Bombay, [1983] 2
All E.R. 864 (H.L.); Kassam v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal,
[1980] 2 All ER. 330 (C.A.).
notably absent in our Act. The U.K. courts also do
not appear to be working under the rule of con
struction now well established in this country, that
human rights legislation is to receive a large,
liberal and purposive interpretation.'
The wording of our section 5 is also instructive.
While paragraph (a) makes it a discriminatory
practice to deny services, etc. to an individual on
prohibited grounds, paragraph (b) seems to
approach matters from the opposite direction, as it
were, and without regard to the person to whom
the services are or might be rendered. Thus it is a
discriminatory practice
5.... in the provision of ... services ... customarily avail
able to the general public
(b) to differentiate adversely in relation to any individual,
on a prohibited ground of discrimination.
Restated in algebraic terms, it is a discriminato
ry practice for A, in providing services to B, to
differentiate on prohibited grounds in relation to
C. Or, in concrete terms, it would b.e a discrimina
tory practice for a policeman who, in providing
traffic control services to the general public, treat
ed one violator more harshly than another because
of his national or racial origins. 5
It is indeed arguable that the qualifying words
of section 5
5. ... provision of ... services ... customarily available to
the general public ....
can only serve a limiting role in the context of
services rendered by private persons or bodies;
that, by definition, services rendered by public
servants at public expense are services to the
public and therefore fall within the ambit of sec
tion 5. It is not, however, necessary to make any
final determination on the point at this stage and it
is enough to state that it is not by any means clear
to me that the services rendered, both in Canada
and abroad, by the officers charged with the
4 See, for example, Canadian National Railway Co. v.
Canada (Canadian Human Rights Commission), [1987] 1
S.C.R. 1114.
5 See Gomez v. City of Edmonton (1982), 3 C.H.R.R. 882.
administration of the Immigration Act, 1976' are
not services customarily available to the general
public.
Turning next to the Government's second objec
tion to the Commission's jurisdiction, it is ground
ed in the fact that, since all the applicants, both
for visitors' visas and for sponsored applications
for landing, were necessarily outside Canada at the
time of their application, the Commission is pro
hibited from dealing with the matter by the terms
of paragraph 32(5)(b):
32....
(5) No complaint in relation to a discriminatory practice
may be dealt with by the Commission under this Part unless the
act or omission that constitutes the practice
(b) occurred outside Canada and the victim of the practice
was at the time of such act or omission a Canadian citizen or
an individual admitted to Canada for permanent resi
dence....
In my view, this argument is wholly untenable
with regard to the complaints arising out of the
refusal to accept sponsored applications for land
ing. Whatever may be the nature of a sponsor's
interest, it is one which is expressly recognized in
section 79 of the Immigration Act, 1976 and sec
tions 4, 5 and 6 of the Immigration Regulations,
1978.' It is furthermore an interest consistent with
the objective stated in paragraph 3(c) of the Act:
3....
(c) to facilitate the reunion in Canada of Canadian citizens
and permanent residents with their close relatives from
abroad;
The complaints allege a denial, on prohibited
grounds, of the right of Canadian citizens and
permanent residents of Canada to sponsor their
relatives from abroad. The express principle
underlying the Canadian Human Rights Act is
stated in section 2 to be
2....
(a) every individual should have an equal opportunity with
other individuals to make for himself or herself the life that
he or she is able and wishes to have ....
6 S.C. 1976-77, c. 52.
SOR/78-1 72.
In my view, a person who, on prohibited grounds,
is denied the opportunity to sponsor an application
for landing is a "victim" within the meaning of the
Act whether or not others may also be such
victims.
I would, however, go a great deal further. The
question as to who is the "victim" of an alleged
discriminatory practice is almost wholly one of
fact. Human rights legislation does not look so
much to the intent of discriminatory practices as
to their effect.' That effect is by no means limited
to the alleged "target" of the discrimination and it
is entirely conceivable that a discriminatory prac
tice may have consequences which are sufficiently
direct and immediate to justify qualifying as a
"victim" thereof persons who were never within
the contemplation or intent of its author. Thus,
even in the case of the denial of visitors' visas, it is
by no means impossible that the complainants in
Canada who were seeking to be visited by relatives
from abroad should not themselves be victims of
discriminatory practices directed against such rela
tives. A simple example will illustrate the point:
could it seriously be argued that a Canadian citi
zen who required a visit from a sibling for the
purposes of obtaining a lifesaving organ transplant
was not victimized by the refusal, on prohibited
grounds, of a visitors' visa to that sibling?
It is not, of course, necessary to go so far as to
postulate life-threatening situations. I have already
referred to paragraph 3(c) of the Immigration Act,
1976. 1 do not see the purpose there stated as
being limited to the facilitating of applications for
permanent residence and thereby excluding an
application for a simple visit. But family reunifica
tion is not the only purpose of the Immigration
Act, 1976: paragraph 3(e) is expressly directed to
visitors and states, as one of the Act's objectives:
3....
(e) to facilitate the entry of visitors into Canada for the
purpose of fostering trade and commerce, tourism, cultural
and scientific activities and international understanding;
"See Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v.
Simpsons-Sears Limited et al., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 536.
If a visitors' visa were denied on prohibited
grounds in such a way as to deprive a Canadian
citizen or permanent resident of Canada of signifi
cant commercial or cultural opportunities, it would
certainly be arguable that he or she was one of the
victims of the discriminatory practice.
That being so, it is impossible for me at this
stage to affirm that in any of the subject refer
ences the victim was not a Canadian citizen or a
permanent resident within the meaning of para
graph 32(5)(b) of the Canadian Human Rights
Act.
For all the foregoing reasons, I would answer
the questions posed in the various references in the
affirmative.
MAHONEY J.: I agree.
DESJARDINS J.: I agree.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.