Judgments

Decision Information

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A-742-85
Denise Headley and Local 613, Canada Employ ment and Immigration Union (of the Public Ser vice Alliance of Canada) (Applicants)
v.
Public Service Commission Appeal Board (Respondent)
INDEXED AS: HEADLEY v. CANADA (PUBLIC SERVICE COM MISSION APPEAL BOARD)
Court of Appeal, Pratte, Urie and MacGuigan JJ.—Toronto, December 10 and 12, 1986; Ottawa, January 26, 1987.
Public service Selection process Competitions Applicant screened out as not proficient in any of languages specified as basic qualification No denial of equal treat ment Incumbents and applicants not constituting similarly situated groups Imposition of new qualification neither unreasonable nor unfair Inherent right of management to establish qualifications Application to set aside respond ent's decision, dismissed Public Service Employment Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-32, s. 10 Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28.
Constitutional law Charter of Rights Equality rights
Applicant not meeting language requirement specified as basic qualification Whether denied equal treatment in that incumbents not subject to requirement Analysis of s. 15 Enumerated and non-enumerated grounds of discrimination
Burden of proving discrimination based on language not discharged Prima facie case of unreasonableness not estab lished No unequal treatment Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), ss. 1, 15 Canadian Bill of Rights, R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III, s. 1.
The applicant, who sought a CR-4 position at the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission, was screened out on the ground that she did not possess proficiency in any of the six languages specified as a basic qualification. The applicant contends that the Public Service Commission Appeal Board erred in law in dismissing her appeal based on section 15 of the Charter. She alleges having been denied equal treatment on the ground that the incumbents of that position were not subject to such a language requirement.
Held, the section 28 application should be dismissed.
Per MacGuigan J.: The necessity for a complainant to prove a more than "trivial or insubstantial" violation of rights, as
those words were used in the Supreme Court of Canada decision in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd. extends to all the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter. By enumerat ing specific grounds in section 15, the legislator has made the fundamental determination that pejorative distinctions based on those grounds constitute discrimination whereas in other cases the complainant has to prove that discrimination results. Non-trivial pejorative distinctions based on section 15 grounds are intended to be justified by governments under section 1 of the Charter rather than to be proved as infringements by complainants under section 15.
The applicant's burden of proving discrimination on the basis of language, without the benefit of an enumerated ground, has not been met. Management's right to establish qualifications for public service positions has been regarded as "inherent" at least since the decision of this Court in Bauer v. Public Service Appeal Board, [1973] F.C. 626 (C.A.). The only limitation section 15 imposes on management is that it must not discrimi nate in carrying out its responsibilities. The best criterion of discrimination was that stated by McIntyre J. in MacKay v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370. On the basis of that test, the complainant was required to establish a prima facie case of unreasonableness. The facts of the case, as found by the Board, demonstrate that she was unable to do so. Moreover, the applicant has failed to establish her case on her own proposed test—which was substantially that of McIntyre J.
Per Pratte J. (concurring in the result): For section 15 to apply, there must be an inequality; there must also be discrimi nation. There is inequality when persons who are similarly situated are treated differently; there is discrimination when that difference of treatment is neither fair nor reasonable. Both those elements are absent in the present case. Persons appoint ed to similar positions in the past and those in the applicant's situation cannot be said to be similarly situated. Section 15 guarantees equality only to those who, at a given moment, are in the same situation. Moreover, it is impossible, in view of the findings of the Board, to conclude that the imposition of a new qualification was both unreasonable and unfair.
Per Urie J. (concurring in the result): It is not necessary, for the purposes of this application, to decide which interpretation of section 15 is preferable. The facts clearly indicate that there was no inequality in treatment. Job qualifications must be flexible to meet changing operational requirements. Persons applying for a position and incumbents do not constitute simi larly situated groups, which is a prerequisite for a finding of inequality.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713; MacKay v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370; Bauer v. Public Service Appeal Board, [1973] F.C. 626 (C.A.);
The Queen v. Ricketts, judgment dated October 31, 1983, Federal Court, Appeal Division, A-807-82, not reported.
REFERRED TO:
Shewchuk v. Ricard, [1986] 4 W.W.R. 289; 28 D.L.R. (4th) 429 (B.C.C.A.); Rebic v. Coliver Prov. J., [1986] 4 W.W.R. 401 (B.C.C.A.); Andrews v. Law Soc. of B.C., [1986] 4 W.W.R. 242 (B.C.C.A.); Cromer v. B.C. Teachers' Fed., [1986] 5 W.W.R. 638 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. LeGallant, [1986] 6 W.W.R. 372 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103; Re McDonald and the Queen (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 745; 21 C.C.C. (3d) 330 (C.A.); Bregman et al. v. Attorney-General of Canada (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 596 (H.C.); D & H Holdings Ltd. v. Vancouver (1985), 15 Admin. L.R. 209 (B.C.S.C.); Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association et al. (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.); Reference re an Act to Amend the Education Act (1986), 53 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.); Re Aluminum Co. of Canada, Ltd. and The Queen in right of Ontario; Dofasco Inc., Intervenor (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 522 (Div. Ct.); R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295; Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), judgment dated December 9, 1986, Federal Court, Appeal Division, A-909-85, not yet reported; affirming [1986] 1 F.C. 274 (T.D.).
COUNSEL:
Barbara L. Jackman for applicants. M. Thomas for respondent.
SOLICITORS:
Chiasson, Jackman, Toronto, for applicants.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent.
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
PRATTE J.: As indicated by my brother Mac- Guigan J., the only question raised by this applica tion is whether the Board that rendered the deci sion under attack erred in law in rejecting the applicant's argument that section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms [being Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, Schedule B, Canada Act 1982, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.)] had been violated by the decision of the Department of Manpower and Immigration to require, as a basic qualification for the position coveted by the appli cant, Denise Headley, a new qualification that had not been required and was still not required from
the incumbents of similar positions that had been appointed in the past.
In answering that question, my brother Mac- Guigan finds it necessary to express his views on the interpretation to be given to section 15 and, as I understand his reasons, his interpretation of that section differs both from the interpretation adopt ed by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the cases of Shewchuk, Rebic, Andrews, Cromer and LeGallant' and from that proposed by my brother Hugessen J. in Smith, Kline & French Laborato ries Ltd.' If it were necessary, in order to decide this case, to choose between those various interpre tations, I confess that I would have to express my agreement with the interpretation adopted by the British Columbia Court of Appeal and, more par ticularly, with the reasons of McLachlin J.A. in Andrews v. Law Soc. of B.C., supra. True, that interpretation, as was observed by my brother Hugessen, leaves little room for the operation of section 1. However, I do not see that result as contrary to the teachings of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Oakes' since it flows from an analysis of the words used in section 15 rather than from a confusion or combination of that section with section 1.
This, however, does not lead me to a conclusion different from the one proposed by my brother MacGuigan. There are, in my opinion, two main reasons why the applicant cannot successfully invoke section 15. In order for that section to apply, there must be an inequality; there must also be discrimination. There is inequality within the meaning of section 15 when persons who are simi larly situated are treated differently; there is dis crimination when that difference of treatment is neither fair nor reasonable. In my view, both these elements are absent in this case.
' Shewchuk v. Ricard, [1986] 4 W.W.R. 289 (B.C.C.A.); Rebic v. Collver Prov. J., [1986] 4 W.W.R. 401 (B.C.C.A.); Andrews v. Law Soc. of B.C., [1986] 4 W.W.R. 242 (B.C.C.A.); Cromer v. B.C. Teachers' Fed., [1986] 5 W.W.R. 638 (B.C.C.A.); R. v. LeGallant, [1986] 6 W.W.R. 372 (B.C.C.A.).
2 Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), not yet reported, December 9, 1986 (F.C.A.), Court No. A-909-85.
3 [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, at p. 134.
The decision to require an additional qualifica tion for the position here in question did not, in my view, create an inequality within the meaning of section 15 because the persons who were appointed to similar positions in the past and those who, like the applicant, wish to be appointed to such a position in the future cannot be said to be similarly situated. It is obvious that if the law is changed, those who are governed by it will no longer be treated in the same manner. That does not offend section 15 because that section guarantees equality only to those who, at a given moment, are in the same situation.
The decision to require an additional qualifica tion did not, either, cause any discrimination. As my brother MacGuigan indicates, it is impossible, in view of the findings of the Board, to conclude that the imposition of a new qualification was both unreasonable and unfair.
I would dismiss the application.
* * *
The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by
URIE J.: I have had the advantage of reading the reasons for judgment of my brothers Pratte and MacGuigan and agree with their proposed disposition of the section 28 application.
However, I do not believe it either necessary or desirable to express my views upon the niceties involved in the interpretation of section 15 of the Charter. Nor do I wish to decide, for purposes of this application, whether the approach to the inter pretation thereof adopted by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the Andrews' case or that expressed by this Court in the Smith, Kline & French 5 case, is preferable.
On the facts of this case, a detailed analysis of the principles is unnecessary because it is easy to find first, that there was no inequality in treatment between the applicant and others like her and the incumbents of similar positions by reason of the
4 Andrews v. Law Soc. of B.C., [1986] 4 W.W.R. 242 (B.C.C.A.).
5 Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Ltd. v. Canada (Attorney General), not yet reported, December 9, 1986, No. A-909-85.
change in the qualifications required of applicants for new positions. Simply put, the two groups are not similarly situated, which is a prerequisite for a finding of inequality. Job qualifications cannot be etched in stone but must be flexible to meet chang ing operational requirements. Changes occasioned thereby do not, at least in the circumstances here present, create inequality because, obviously, the old groups and the new groups are not similarly situated.
Secondly, as has been observed by both Pratte and MacGuigan JJ., in view of the clear and supportable findings of the Board, it is not possible to conclude that the applicant has been the victim of discrimination by her employer, the imposition of the new job qualifications not being unreason able or unfair in the circumstances.
I would dismiss the section 28 application.
* * *
The following are the reasons for judgent ren dered in English by
MACGUIGAN J.: This section 28 application is brought to review and set aside a decision of the Public Service Commission Appeal Board ("the Board") dated September 6, 1985, dismissing the applicant's appeal to the Board.
The applicant, an employee of the Canada Employment and Immigration Commission ("the employer"), alleges that the Board erred in law in not upholding her appeal on the basis of section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
The facts are simple. The employer advertised a closed competition for the position of "CR-4, Reception Information Clerk" for the Toronto West Canada Immigration Centre. The applicant was screened out because she did not have profi ciency in the use of one of the six languages (Vietnamese, Chinese, Polish, Portuguese, Italian, Spanish) the employer had specified as a basic requirement in the statement of qualifications for the position.
It is common ground that the merit principle enshrined in section 10 of to Public Service Employment Act [R.S.C. 1970, c. P-32] ("the Act") was fully observed by the selection board in its actual assessment of candidates and that the applicant has no complaint vis-à-vis the treatment of the other candidates. Her allegation of unequal treatment is essentially in relation to the two other incumbents of CR-4, Reception Information Clerk positions in the Toronto West Canada Immigra tion Centre, neither of whom is required to possess proficiency in any of the six languages. In fact, one speaks German in addition to English; the other, in a designated bilingual imperative position, speaks Vietnamese and Chinese in addition to English and French. However, the Board determined that neither was required to speak any language beyond English in the first instance or English and French in the second.
Subsection 15 (1) of the Charter reads as follows:
15. (1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination and, in particular, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
The applicant alleges that she has been deprived of equality before and under the law and that she has been deprived for her right to the equal protec tion and equal benefit of the law under section 15 by being subject to a language requirement in her application for the CR-4 position where the two incumbents presently holding that position were not subject to that requirement and are not now subject to it. 6
6 It would of course be possible to distinguish among the various protections of subsection 15(1) since judicial interpreta tion under the Canadian Bill of Rights [R.S.C. 1970, Appendix III] limited "equality before the law" to equality in judicial proceedings and in the administration of the law, whereas the other three protections clearly refer to the content of the law. But the applicant argued subsection 15(1) as a whole, without attempting to separate its protections. I therefore treat it on the same basis.
In studying the application of subsection 15(1), I have been greatly aided by the reasons of Strayer J. at trial and Hugessen J. in this Court in Smith, Kline & French Laboratories Limited v. Attorney General of Canada, [1986] 1 F.C. 274 (T.D.), on appeal no. A-909-85, decided December 9, 1986 (F.C.A.). I have also perused: Andrews v. Law Soc. of B.C., [1986] 4 W.W.R. 242 (B.C.C.A.); Re Shewchuk and Ricard; Attorney-General of British Columbia et al., Intervenors (1986), 28 D.L.R. (4th) 429 (B.C.C.A.); Rebic v. Collver Prov. J., [1986] 4 W.W.R. 401 (B.C.C.A.); Her Majesty the Queen v. Le Gallant, no. V000092 (Victoria Registry), decided September 4, 1986 (B.C.C.A.); Re McDonald and the Queen (1985), 51 O.R. (2d) 745; 21 C.C.C. (3d) 330 (C.A.); Bregman et al. v. Attorney-General of Canada (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 596 (H.C.), and on appeal, decided October 29, 1986 (Ont. C.A.); D & H Holdings Ltd. v. Vancouver (1985), 15 Admin. L.R. 209 (B.C.S.C.); Re Blainey and Ontario Hockey Association et al. (1986), 54 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.); Reference re an Act to Amend the Education Act (1986), 53 O.R. (2d) 513 (C.A.); Re Aluminum Co. of Canada, Ltd. and The Queen in right of Ontario; Dofasco Inc., Intervenor (1986), 55 O.R. (2d) 522 (Div. Ct.).
To my mind the most fundamental feature of section 15 is that it is one provision of a Charter in which, despite all their differences, there are many common characteristics among the provisions.
One such characteristic, common to the majori ty of the rights and freedoms protected, is the presence (or absence) of what Professor Dale Gibson has called "internal limits" or "internal modifiers", as opposed to the external limits con tained in section 1. As Professor Gibson writes, The Law of the Charter: General Principles, Car- swell, 1986, at page 135:
Several of the rights and freedoms protected by the Charter are expressed in absolute terms. This is true of the fundamental freedoms, most of the democratic and mobility rights, and some of the language rights and legal rights. In many cases, however, especially in the area of legal rights, qualifying words are used to describe the substantive rights themselves.
It should not surprise us therefore to find an apparent internal modifier in subsection 15(1): I refer to the word "discrimination", which for the four reasons cogently set forth by McLachlin J.A. in the Andrews case, supra, at pages 249-251, must be deemed to mean not just any distinction, but rather a pejorative distinction.
Even before Supreme Court of Canada decisions directly on section 15, I believe we can profit from the Court's approach to other provisions in the Charter, for instance its treatment of the "freedom of conscience and religion" in paragraph 2(a) in R. v. Edwards Books and Art Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, decided December 18, 1986. Dickson C.J.C.,' at page 752, first restated the R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd. case, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295:
The Court held, in the Big M Drug Mart Ltd. case, at pp. 331-34, that both the purposes and effects of legislation are relevant to determining its constitutionality. Even if a law has a valid purpose, it is still open to a litigant to argue that it interferes by its effects with a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter.
The Chief Justice therefore proceeds to consider the impact of the Ontario legislation in question, at pages 758-759:
The first question is whether indirect burdens on religious practice are prohibited by the constitutional guarantee of free dom of religion. In my opinion indirect coercion by the state is comprehended within the evils from which s. 2(a) may afford protection. The Court said as much in the Big M Drug Mart Ltd. case .... It matters not, I believe, whether a coercive burden is direct or indirect, intentional or unintentional, fore seeable or unforeseeable. All coercive burdens on the exercise of religious beliefs are potentially within the ambit of s. 2(a).
This does not mean, however, that every burden on religious practices is offensive to the constitutional guarantee of freedom of religion. It means only that indirect or unintentional burdens will not be held to be outside the scope of Charter protection on that account alone. Section 2(a) does not require the legisla tures to eliminate every miniscule state-imposed cost associated with the practice of religion. Otherwise the Charter would offer protection from innocuous secular legislation such as a taxation act that imposed a modest sales tax extending to all products, including those used in the course of religious worship. In my opinion, it is unnecessary to turn to s. 1 in order to justify
' Although the Chief Justice is explicitly speaking for only three of the seven Judges who sat on the case, his reasons in the passages I quote were endorsed also by La Forest J.
legislation of that sort. The purpose of s. 2(a) is to ensure that society does not interfere with profoundly personal beliefs that govern one's perception of oneself, humankind, nature, and, in some cases, a higher or different order of being. These beliefs, in turn, govern one's conduct and practices. The Constitution shelters individuals and groups only to the extent that religious beliefs or conduct might reasonably or actually be threatened. For a state-imposed cost or burden to be proscribed by s. 2(a) it must be capable of interfering with religious belief or practice. In short, legislative or administrative action which increases the cost of practising or otherwise manifesting religious beliefs is not prohibited if the burden is trivial or insubstantial: see, on this point, R. v. Jones, [1986] 2 S.C.R. 284, per Wilson J. at p. 314.
If such a necessity for the complainant to prove a more than trivial or insubstantial violation of rights applies to an unqualified freedom like that of conscience and religion, I believe it must run through all the guarantees in the Charter.
Professor Gibson, it seems to me, reflects this understanding of the Charter, supra, at page 141:
[T]he Charter's pattern with respect to the balancing of social values appears, in general, to be as follows. The alleged victim of a Charter violation must always establish a prima facie case before the alleged violator is called upon to respond. Where the right or freedom in question is expressed in absolute terms, with no explicit modifier, the prima facie case involves proving the facts of the incident in question, and establishing to the court's satisfaction that these facts involved a significant infringement of the asserted Charter right. At that point the onus shifts to the alleged violator to establish that the infringement was authorized by a law that satisfies the requirements of section 1. If the right or freedom asserted is explicitly modified by an internal standard like "reasonable" or "arbitrary", the alleged victim's prima facie responsibility extends to showing that the violation is one which, in ordinary circumstances, would exceed that standard. The victim having established that much, the violator's responsibility to establish a section 1 limit comes into operation.
As I see it, subsection 15(1) falls into both of Professor Gibson's categories, depending upon whether or not the discrimination is alleged to be in relation to one of the enumerated grounds: "race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability".
To put it more exactly, I find the internal limit "discrimination" to be required in all cases, but in some cases, viz. those based on the enumerated grounds, the drafters have already made the fun damental determination that pejorative distinc tions based on those grounds constitute discrimina tion, whereas in other cases the complainant has to prove that discrimination results. In all cases, how ever, the discrimination has to be more than trivi al. In result, then, though not in concept, this analysis resembles the distinction drawn by Ameri- can courts between strict scrutiny and minimal scrutiny. 8 In Canada I believe the distinction is not made on the authority of the courts but on that of the Constitution itself.
The Constitution itself, I believe, compels this distinction between enumerated and non- enumerated grounds. In particular, the fact that the drafters spelled out as grounds the principal natural and unalterable facts about human beings—race, national or ethnic origin, colour, religion (admittedly, not wholly a natural and unalterable fact), and sex—can only mean, I believe, that non-trivial pejorative distinctions based on such categories are intended to be justi fied by governments under section 1 rather than to be proved as infringements by complainants under section 15. In sum, some grounds of distinction are so presumptively pejorative that they are deemed to be inherently discriminatory.
* * *
In the instant case the applicant initially pro posed a blood theory of language and ethnicity which would have equated the preferential lan guage requirement here with preferential treat ment for the national or ethnic groups which nor mally spoke the six languages in question. This
s On this see Professor Anne F. Bayefsky, "Defining Equality Rights" in Equality Rights and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, ed. Bayefsky and Eberts, Carswell, 1985, at pp. 52-59. Professor Walter Tarnopolsky (as he then was) proposed strict scrutiny for most of the enumerated grounds, intermediate scrutiny for age and disability, and mini mal scrutiny for non-enumerated grounds: "Equality Rights" in The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Commentary, ed. Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin, Carswell, 1982, p. 422.
unhappy argument was not proceeded with in oral argument.
The applicant was therefore left with the neces sity of proving discrimination on the basis of lan guage without the benefit of an enumerated ground of discrimination. This was a burden she was not able to meet. Management's right to establish qualifications for public service positions has been regarded as "inherent", at least since the decision of this Court in Bauer v. Public Service Appeal Board, [1973] F.C. 626 (C.A.), at page 630, per Jackett C.J. The same view was reiterated by this Court in The Queen v. Ricketts, No. A-807-82, decided October 31, 1983, at pages 3-5, per Thurlow C.J.:
The applicant's position is that the determination of the essential and other requirements for a position in the public service is not a function of the Public Service Commission under the Public Service Employment Act, that it is a function of management falling within the authority of a minister to manage his department under the statute establishing the department ....
I agree with the applicant's submission. In my view it is in accord with the legal position as explained in the judgments of this Court .... It is unnecessary to repeat what was said in these cases. The point is sufficiently expressed by Jackett C.J. in the Bauer decision when in discussing the effects of the 1966-67 legislation he said:
Nothing specific is to be found in the legislation concern ing the defining, in respect of any particular position, of "standards of duties, responsibilities and qualifications"; but a power to do so would seem to be inherent in management. The employer must be able to define the qualifications and duties of a position before he seeks for a person to fill that position.
Given this legal basis, the Board here found on the facts, (Appeal Book, pages 40-41):
[T]he duties and responsibilities of the position clearly require conducting interviews, providing information to the public over the telephone and interpreting during the course of client interviews in at least two languages. Bearing this in mind, one cannot conclude other than that the basic requirement at issue here was warranted. I think such a conclusion cannot be tainted by the undisputed fact that interpreters were "on tap" as available covering all six of the languages listed. If the opera tional objective is more effective and efficient service to clients approaching the centre, it is difficult to argue with manage- ments' insistence upon this linguistic qualification.
This conclusion is not undermined, either, by the fact that members of the centre's staff filled the instant position in an acting capacity for varying periods without the requisite lin-
guistic facility. Acting appointments made for operational or career development objectives are just that, and it is not at all unusual that a person acting in such a capacity may not meet the full range of requirements for a position if that position was to be filled via competitive process. Indeed career development placements can and do serve to provide incumbents with the opportunity to gain the experience and requirements called for when the position is to be staffed on an indeterminate basis. I can see no impropriety in the fact that the requirement in focus here, implicitly waived for the several acting appointments, became insisted upon when the position was staffed through the instant competition.
The position occupied by supervisor Hogan clearly entailed a different range of duties and responsibilities than those of his subordinate reception and information clerks, and there is nothing untoward in the fact that a language requirement for the latter did not obtain for the former. It appears as though the language facility now in place was not called for when the two incumbents of similar positions at the centre were appoint ed. However, in my view that does not invalidate in any way the department's present insistence on what (on all counts) seems to be a defensible requirement.
The applicant nevertheless argued that these factual findings are vitiated by a mistake of law in that section 15, like the equal-benefit-of-the-law provision in American law, makes it necessary for management's requirement of an additional lan guage for the new position to be established as an objective necessity, not merely as an operational preference. However, the effect of section 1 as an ultimate criterion of constitutionality in our Chart er forces Canadian courts to allow for a two-stage analysis where U.S. courts must be content with an all-embracing single stage. In the Canadian context, necessity would be a section 1 consider ation, rather than a matter to be taken into account under section 15. The only limitation sec tion 15 imposes on management is that it must not discriminate in carrying out its responsibilities.
If the criterion of discrimination is whether or not management has some rational basis for its action, as is urged by the applicant herself, also on the authority of the U.S. cases (although she might equally well have based it on the language of McIntyre J. in MacKay v. The Queen, [1980] 2 S.C.R. 370, at page 406), that criterion has been met, as the Board decision shows.
I am myself inclined to the view that the best criterion is that of McIntyre J.,—taken as a prima facie test, in order not to foreclose the final weigh ing of interests under section 1. Mr. Justice McIn- tyre's test in the MacKay case is as follows [at page 406]:
The question which must be resolved in each case is whether such inequality as may be created by legislation affecting a special class—here the military—is arbitrary, capricious or unnecessary, or whether it is rationally based and acceptable as a necessary variation from the general principle of universal application of law to meet special conditions and to attain a necessary and desirable social objective.
In the instant case, on this test the complainant would have to establish a prima facie case of unreasonableness, which on the facts, as found by the Board, she was not able to do. Moreover, whatever the test ultimately adopted by the courts, the applicant has failed to establish her case on her own proposed test (which is substantially that of McIntyre J.).
The section 28 application must therefore be dismissed, and the Board's decision affirmed.
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