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A-487-84
Centre d'information et d'animation communau- taire (C.I.A.C.), Yvon Coursol, René Chartrand, Fernand Lapierre, et al. (Appellants)
v.
The Queen, Attorney General of Canada, Minister of Transport, Minister of Public Works, Société Immobilière du Canada (Mirabel) Ltée, Léo Fer - land (Respondents)
and
Attorney General of the Province of Quebec, Registrar of the Registry Divisions of Deux-Mon- tagnes, Argenteuil and Terrebonne, City of Mira - bel, Parish of St -Placide, Parish of St -André, Parish of Ste-Anne des Plaines, Parish of Ste- Sophie, Parish of St-Antoine (Mis -en-cause)
Court of Appeal, Pratte, Ryan and Hugessen JJ.— Montreal, June 21, 22, 28, 29; Ottawa, July 12, 1984.
Crown — Injunction — Lands expropriated to build Mira - bel Airport — Application to prohibit Crown from selling lands pending outcome of action challenging validity of expro priation — Injunction granted if issue between individuals but Court bound by Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec), et al. v. The Queen, et al. 119821 1 F.C. 599 (C.A.) where longstand- ing rule of immunity of Crown from injunctive relief reaffirmed.
Injunctions — Expropriation of lands by Crown to build Mirabel Airport — Application to prohibit Crown from selling expropriated lands pending outcome of action challenging validity of expropriation — Court considering itself bound by own recent decision in Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec), et al. v. The Queen, et al. where long-standing rule of immuni ty of Crown from injunctive relief reaffirmed.
In 1969, the appellants' lands were expropriated by the Crown for the construction and operation of Mirabel Airport. In 1983, the appellants initiated an action challenging the validity of the expropriation and claiming their lands as not needed for airport purposes. Having learned, in March 1984, that Her Majesty proposed to sell those lands, they applied for an interlocutory injunction to prohibit the Crown from proceed ing with the plan until the action had been heard. This is an appeal from the Trial Division's dismissal of the application.
Held (Hugessen J. dissenting), the appeal should be dismissed.
Per Pratte J.: Given the fact that the balance weighs in favour of the appellants with respect to each of the relevant factors in this case, i.e., balance of convenience, adequacy of monetary compensation, appellants' allegedly reprehensible conduct and delay in bringing the action, if this were an issue between individuals, an injunction would be granted. However, the Crown is involved and the Court considers itself bound by its own recent decision in Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec), et al. v. The Queen, et al., [1982] 1 F.C. 599 (C.A.), where it reaffirmed the long-standing rule of immunity of the Crown from injunctive relief.
Per Hugessen J. (dissenting): An injunction should be grant ed. First, because there is a strong possibility that the action will be allowed and at least part of the expropriation will be quashed as having been unnecessary for airport purposes as such. Second, because the balance of convenience is clearly in favour of the appellants: the loss the government would suffer from a suspension of the sale would be negligible whereas the appellants' remedy would be illusory if it became impossible to recover their property.
As for the old notion of royal immunity from interlocutory injunction, it cannot be reconciled with our modern understand ing of democracy and of equality before the law. In any case, Crown immunity has no application in a case where the issue is the division of powers between two levels of government. Although the relevant case law deals with interim relief in actions seeking to quash legislation for being ultra vires, there is no distinction between those cases and those where adminis trative action is challenged for going beyond the constitutional limits of the enabling legislation. And the rules governing applications for interlocutory injunctions do not differ from those mentioned in the case law for the appointment of an interim receiver.
The delay in bringing the action does not mean that the appellants do not have the "clean hands" needed to obtain an injunction. The government suffered no real prejudice and, given the unequal strength of the two parties, it would have been difficult for the appellants to act otherwise.
CASES JUDICIALLY CONSIDERED
APPLIED:
Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec), et al. v. The Queen, et al., [1982] 1 F.C. 599 (C.A.).
CONSIDERED:
B.C. Power Corporation v. B.C. Electric Company, [1962] S.C.R. 642; Amax Potash Ltd. et al. v. Govern ment of Saskatchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576; Société Asbestos Limitée c. Société Nationale de L'amiante et autre, [1979] C.A. 342 (Que.); Attorney General of Canada et al. v. Law Society of British Columbia et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307.
COUNSEL:
Guy Bertrand, Denis Lemieux for appellants.
Michel Robert, Q.C., Yves Bériault, Luc Martineau, Yvan Nantel and Suzanne Racine for respondents.
Joseph Nuss, Q. C., for Clerk of the Privy Council and Attorney General of Canada. Réal A. Forest for mis -en-cause.
SOLICITORS:
Tremblay, Bertrand, Morisset, Bois & Mi- gnault, Ste-Foy, Quebec, for appellants.
Robert, Dansereau, Barré, Marchessault & Lauzon, Montreal, for respondents. Department of Justice of Quebec, Quebec, for mis -en-cause.
Ahern, Nuss & Drymer, Montreal, for Clerk of the Privy Council and Attorney General of Canada.
The following is the English version of the reasons for judgment rendered by
PRATTE J.: Most of the appellants were owners of farms which Her Majesty expropriated in 1969 to build the Mirabel Airport. By an action brought in 1983, they challenged the validity of that expro priation and claimed their lands, which in their opinion, were not needed for either construction or operation of the airport. In March 1984, after learning that Her Majesty proposed to sell the lands at issue, they filed an application for an interlocutory injunction prohibiting Her Majesty from proceeding with this plan until the action had been heard. Rouleau J. of the Trial Division dis missed this application: hence the appeal.
The reasons given by the Trial Judge in support of his decision are difficult to summarize. I will only say that they set forth several propositions which appear to me to be debatable.
The action of the plaintiffs-appellants seems to me to raise difficult and significant points, despite the delay by the appellants in bringing their action. As it stands at present, the record does not support a conclusion that this delay by the appel-
lants amounted to a waiver of their right to chal lenge the expropriation.
I also consider that denying the injunction requested could cause the appellants very serious injury which cannot be compared with the mini mal inconvenience which granting that injunction would cause to Her Majesty. What is called in English the "balance of convenience" is thus clear ly in favour of the appellants.
I would add that while the loss which the appel- - lants are attempting to avoid by seeking an injunc tion can, like any material loss, be compensated for by the payment of a sum of money, this is not a case where the monetary compensation is so ade quate that it rules out the remedy of an injunction.
Further, I do not consider that this is a proper case for applying the rule of equity by which "He who comes into equity must come with clean hands". The appellants' conduct is certainly open to criticism. However, I do not feel that it was so reprehensible and, if reprehensible, so closely related to the remedy they are seeking that it should be denied to them solely on this ground.
Finally, the appellants' delay in bringing their action also does not appear to me to justify deny ing the injunction: first, because, as I said above, this delay cannot be regarded as amounting to a waiver by the appellants of their right to challenge the expropriation, and second, because the delay has caused no loss to the respondents.
It follows from the foregoing that, if this were an issue between individuals, I would grant the injunction requested. However, the interlocutory injunction requested by the appellants is directed against Her Majesty: what the appellants are attempting to prevent is the transfer of the lands at issue by Her Majesty. There is a rule of long standing that the courts cannot issue an injunction against the Crown. This rule may seem archaic, but this Court has recently' held that it still applies and that it was not abolished by the Feder al Court Act [R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10]. In
' Grand Council of the Crees (of Quebec), et al. v. The Queen, et al., [1982] 1 F.C. 599 (C.A.).
these circumstances, I consider that this recent decision must be followed until the legislator or the Supreme Court of Canada decides otherwise.
Accordingly, although this appears to be a case in which the status quo should be maintained while the action is pending, I am obliged to dismiss the appeal with costs.
RYAN J.: I concur.
* * *
The following is the English version of the reasons for judgment rendered by
HUGESSEN J. (dissenting): This is an appeal from a judgment of the Trial Division which refused to grant an interlocutory injunction requested by the appellants. The latter are owners of lands which were expropriated by the federal government in 1969 for the Mirabel Airport. By their action, brought in May 1983, they are asking the Court to quash the expropriation and return their lands to them. In March 1984, they filed an application for an interlocutory injunction to bar the sale which the government was planning of a large part of the expropriated lands. Judgment on this application was rendered on March 30, 1984, and hence the appeal at bar.
In my view, there is no question that the appel lants' action raises significant questions of consti tutional law. Without ruling on the merits of the case, I consider that there is a strong possibility that the action will be allowed and that at least part of the expropriation will be quashed as having been unnecessary for airport purposes as such.
I am also of the view that the balance of conve nience is clearly in favour of the appellants: the loss which the government would suffer by tem porarily suspending sale of the disputed lands is negligible; on the other hand, the appellants' remedy would be illusory if, following the sale of the lands, it becomes impossible for them ever to recover their property.
However, respondents cited the immunity of the Crown against an interlocutory injunction. For my part, and with respect for the contrary view, I
consider that this old notion of royal immunity cannot be reconciled with our modern understand ing of a democratic state and of the right of every citizen to be equal before the law. In any case, Crown immunity has no application in a case where the issue itself is the division of powers between the two levels of government of a federal state: the sovereignty of one cannot be relied on as a justification for encroaching on the equally sov ereign powers of the other. This principle may be derived from the following authorities:
B.C. Power Corporation v. B.C. Electric Com pany, [1962] S.C.R. 642:
In a federal system, where legislative authority is divided, as are also the prerogatives of the Crown, as between the Dominion and the Provinces, it is my view that it is not open to the Crown, either in right of Canada or of a Province, to claim a Crown immunity based upon an interest in certain property, where its very interest in that property depends completely and solely on the validity of the legislation which it has itself passed, if there is a reasonable doubt as to whether such legislation is constitutionally valid. To permit it to do so would be to enable it, by the assertion of rights claimed under legislation which is beyond its powers, to achieve the same results as if the legislation were valid. In a federal system it appears to me that, in such circumstances, the Court has the same jurisdiction to preserve assets whose title is dependent on the validity of the legislation as it has to determine the validity of the legislation itself. [Per Kerwin C.J., at pages 644 and 645.]
Amax Potash Ltd. et al. v. Government of Sas- katchewan, [1977] 2 S.C.R. 576:
... this Court has the discretion to make an order as requested by appellants directing the Province of Saskatche- wan to hold, as stakeholder, such sums as are paid by the appellants pursuant to the impugned legislation but with the rights to use such sums in the interim for Provincial pur poses, and with the obligation to repay them with interest in the event the legislation is ultimately held to be ultra vires. [Per Dickson J., at page 598.]
Société Asbestos Limitée c. Société Nationale de L'amiante et autre, [1979] C.A. 342 (Que.):
[TRANSLATION] If legislation is invalid because it has been or may be declared to be so, the government and the Attorney General should not take refuge behind a claim of absolute immunity which they would confer on themselves to act pursuant to that legislation to suspend the application of the statute, leaving the courts powerless to stop them. The right of the government and the Attorney General to act pursuant to the impugned legislation depends on the validity of the legislation and is bound up with it. I recognize that a competent court has the right, by the provisional measure known as an injunction, to maintain the status quo between
the parties so long as there has not been a final decision on the validity of the statute, if the other conditions for granting an injunction are met. [Per Lajoie J.A., at page 350.]
Attorney General of Canada et al. v. Law Society of British Columbia et al., [1982] 2 S.C.R. 307:
... courts with jurisdiction to undertake a particular lis have had the authority to maintain the status quo in the interim pending disposition of all claims arising even though the preservation order, viewed independently, may be beyond the jurisdiction of the court. [Per Estey J., at page 330.]
For my part, I can see no distinction between an action seeking to quash a statute which exceeds the powers of the legislature that adopted it and one that challenges administrative action because it goes beyond the constitutional limits of the enabling legislation.
I also consider that the rules which must be applied to an application for an interlocutory injunction do not differ in this regard from those mentioned in the authorities cited for the appoint ment of an interim receiver, as the latter remedy is at least as draconian as an injunction.
Actually, it is not the respondents' position but that of the appellants which makes me hesitate before granting the interlocutory injunction requested. The appellants' action was brought over fourteen years after the expropriation and after they had all received sizable compensation and signed releases in favour of the government. Does such action not indicate that the appellants do not have the "clean hands" needed to obtain an inter locutory injunction? On reflection, I conclude that it does not. It is hard to see how the long delay that has elapsed since the expropriation could really injure the government; moreover, the un equal strength of the two parties involved is such that it would have been difficult for the appellants to act otherwise.
For these reasons, I would allow the appeal and make an order directing the respondents not to sell the land owned by the appellants immediately before the expropriation. Ordinarily this order would remain in effect until the final judgment was rendered; however, it appears that the record of the interlocutory injunction was not completed before the Trial Judge, in that he rendered his
decision on a preliminary motion by the respond ents and before the parties had an opportunity to cross-examine on all the affidavits filed by either side. Accordingly, I would make the aforemen tioned order and would allow the parties to com plete the said cross-examinations, and then ask for the injunction order to be reviewed by the Trial Division if they think it advisable.
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