A-24-81
The Queen in right of Canada represented by the
Treasury Board (Applicant)
v.
L. Thoral and M. Ross, grievors, represented by
the Canadian Union of Postal Workers (Respond-
ents)
Court of Appeal, Pratte and Marceau JJ. and
Hyde D.J.—Montreal, May 14, 1981.
Judicial review — Labour relations — Application to set
aside decision of Adjudicator entitling respondents, who
worked their usual shift on a day of rest, to a paid meal period
— Article 17 of collective agreement silent as to entitlement to
a meal period in such cases — Adjudicator's decision based on
art. 15 of collective agreement respecting overtime — Whether
Adjudicator misinterpreted arts. 15 and 17 — Application
allowed — Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
P-35, s. 91 — Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c.
10, s. 28.
APPLICATION for judicial review.
COUNSEL:
Robert Lee for applicant.
Paul Lesage for respondents.
SOLICITORS:
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
applicant.
Trudel, Nadeau, Lesage, Cleary & Ménard,
Montreal, for respondents.
The following is the English version of the
reasons for judgment of the Court delivered orally
by
PRATTE J.: Applicant is asking the Court to set
aside a decision by an Adjudicator pursuant to the
Public Service Staff Relations Act, R.S.C. 1970,
c. P-35. That decision allowed two grievances filed
by respondents.
Respondents were employed by the Post Office
Department at Rivière -du-Loup. Saturday, June
21, 1980, was a day of rest for them. They never
theless worked their usual shift on that day: each
of them worked seven and a half hours, and took a
half-hour meal period. They were paid at double
time for the seven and a half hours, as required by
subparagraph 17.01(a)(ii) of the collective agree
ment, which states:
(ii) A full-time employee shall be paid at the rate of double
(2) time for all hours worked on a day of rest.
Respondents also claimed to be entitled to pay
ment for the half-hour meal period taken by them.
This is the claim that was allowed by the decision
a quo.
Article 17.01 contains no provision other than
that cited above regarding the remuneration of an
employee who works on a day of rest. It does not
even provide that such an employee is entitled to a
meal period. The fact that the Adjudicator
nonetheless allowed the respondents' grievances is
the result of paragraph (c) of article 17.01 of the
agreement. That paragraph reads as follows:
(c) Where full-time employees are required to work on a day
of rest, the principles contained in Article 15 will apply.
The Adjudicator considered that article 15,
which relates to overtime, lays down the principle
that a full-time employee who works more than
three hours at a time when he is not ordinarily
required to do so is entitled to a paid meal period
of half an hour. He concluded that, as respondents
worked more than three hours on Saturday, June
21, 1980, they benefited from this entitlement.
This conclusion of the Adjudicator appears to
the Court to be based on a misinterpretation of
articles 17 and 15 of the collective agreement.
Article 17 makes "the principles contained in
Article 15" applicable: but the principle cited by
the Adjudicator is not contained in article 15. The
only provisions of that article relating to meal
periods are contained in paragraphs 15.02(d) and
(e), which provide that an employee who works a
certain number of hours of overtime in a single day
in addition to his regular workload is entitled to a
paid meal period. If this principle were contained
in article 15 it would follow that, after working
more than six hours on a day of rest, respondents
would be entitled to not one but two paid meal
periods.
The decision a quo is thus based on a misinter
pretation of the collective agreement: because of
this, it must be quashed and the matter referred
back to the Adjudicator to be decided by him on
the assumption that, under articles 17 and 15 of
the collective agreement, a full-time employee who
works on a day of rest is not entitled to a paid meal
period.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.