A-114-80
Attorney General of Canada (Applicant)
v.
Dr. Klaus U. Weyer (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Thurlow C.J., Pratte and Heald
JJ.—Ottawa, June 27, 1980.
Judicial review — Public Service — Application to review
and set aside the decision of the Public Service Commission
Appeal Board allowing an appeal brought pursuant to s. 21 of
the Public Service Employment Act — Applicant's only
ground of attack is that the Board erred in law in finding that
the selection process did not meet the requirements of "merit
principle" — Applicant's attack was based on misinterpreta
tion of the Board's decision — Application dismissed —
Public Service Employment Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-32, s. 21 —
Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 28.
APPLICATION for judicial review.
COUNSEL:
L. Holland for applicant.
M. Wexler for respondent and for Profession
al Institute of the Public Service of Canada.
SOLICITORS:
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
applicant.
The Professional Institute of the Public Ser
vice of Canada, Ottawa, for itself and the
respondent.
The Public Service Commission, Ottawa, for
itself.
The following are the reasons for judgment of
the Court delivered orally in English by
PRATTE J.: This section 28 application is direct
ed against a decision of a Public Service Commis
sion Appeal Board allowing an appeal brought
against a proposed appointment in the Public Ser
vice pursuant to section 21 of the Public Service
Employment Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. P-32.
The applicant's only ground of attack is that the
Board erred in law in deciding that the determina
tion that the successful candidate possessed the
necessary qualifications for the job had been made
by persons who did not have the legal authority or
power to make such a determination. If this were,
in fact, the only ground for the decision of the
Board, that decision should certainly be set aside.
Those to whom the Public Service Commission
gives the mandate of determining what persons
possess the essential qualifications for a position
obviously have the authority to make that determi
nation. And, in the case where one of the necessary
qualifications is a specified university degree or its
equivalent, that authority includes the power to
decide whether or not a person who does not have
the required university degree has the equivalent
of that degree.
In our view, however, the applicant's attack
against the decision of the Board is based on a
misinterpretation of that decision which, as we
read it, rests, at least in part, on the finding that,
in this case, the determination that the successful
candidate was qualified had been made by a
person who did not have the capacity to decide
that question in an enlightened manner. From this
finding, which is not reviewable by this Court, the
Board could legally conclude that the selection
process did not meet the requirements of the "mer-
it principle".
The application will, therefore, be dismissed.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.