T-4723-77
Michael John Martinoff and John Michael Page
(Applicants)
v.
S/Sgt. L. M. Gossen, Local Registrar of Firearms
for Vancouver, R. H. Simmonds, Commissioner of
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police, and Garde
B. Gardom, Attorney-General for the Province of
British Columbia (Respondents)
Trial Division, Collier J.—Vancouver, December
13, 1977 and January 9, 1978.
Prerogative writs — Mandamus — Application for registra
tion of firearms — One application to RCMP Commissioner
inordinately delayed — Applications made to local registrar
of firearms not approved — Local registrar permitted au
thority only with respect to certain weapons due to restrictions
imposed on appointm nt by provincial attorney general —
Whether or not man'arnus will lie to (1) direct the local
registrar to deal with the ,,plication (2) to require the Attor-
ney-General of Britisl Columbia and the RCMP Commission
er to appoint local registrars without restrictions (3) to order
the RCMP Commissioru r to consider an application to him for
registration before new legislation came into effect — Crimi
nal Code, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, ss. 82(1), 91, 93, 97, 98, 99
Federal Court Act, R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10, s. 18.
Applicant applied to register three firearms. One application
made to the RCMP Commissioner, by way of the local detach
ment, however, had not been considered until some months
after it was first made, and no decision had been reached.
Applications, made to a local registrar of firearms with respect
to two other weapons, were not approved ostensibly because the
appointment of local registrars had been restricted by the
provincial Attorney-General to the registration of two of four
types of restricted weapons permitted by the Code. Later,
although the application was not considered, the local registrar
sent a report to the RCMP Commissioner pursuant to section
98. Applicant seeks (1) a writ of mandamus directing respond
ent Gossen, a local registrar, to process applicant's application;
(2) a writ of mandamus requiring the RCMP Commissioner
and the Attorney-General of British Columbia to appoint local
registrars and issuers of permits without restrictions; and (3) an
order in the nature of mandamus ordering the RCMP Commis
sioner to consider the application to register the first weapon.
Held, the relief sought is allowed in part. The delay in the
first application reaching the Commissioner is unsatisfactorily
explained. It is desirable and equitable that the Commissioner
come to a decision before the new legislation comes into force.
The Court does not have jurisdiction to grant mandamus with
respect to a provincial attorney general, and although this
remedy would lie against the Commissioner, since the appoint
ment of local registrars has been traditionally a field of attor
neys general, it would not be proper to ask the Commissioner to
exercise those powers. In appointing local registrars of firearms,
attorneys general, despite the provincial legislative power to
administer justice, cannot pick and choose what restricted
weapons they will let the appointees deal with. They cannot
subvert or render ineffective the law of Canada in such a way.
No such arbitrary power has been given them by Parliament.
Lastly, a local registrar, as in the instant case, cannot refuse to
process a particular application and at the same time report on
it; one function is co-extensive with the other.
Walker v. Gagnon [1976] 2 F.C. 155, distinguished.
APPLICATIONS.
COUNSEL:
The applicants in person.
W. D. Stewart for the respondents S/Sgt. L.
M. Gossen and Garde B. Gardom, Attorney-
General of British Columbia.
B. Purdy for R. H. Simmonds, Commissioner
of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
SOLICITORS:
Attorney-General of British Columbia, Vic-
toria, for respondents S/Sgt. L. M. Gossen
and Garde B. Gardom, Attorney-General of
British Columbia.
Deputy Attorney General of Canada for
defendant R. H. Simmonds, Commissioner of
the Royal Canadian Mounted Police.
The following are the reasons for judgment
rendered in English by
COLLIER J.: The applicants, on December 5,
1977, launched a motion, returnable December 13,
1977, for certain relief of the type contemplated by
section 18 of the Federal Court Act.' At the end of
argument, I entered formal pronouncements in
respect of certain portions of the motion. Other
parts of it were adjourned for hearing to a later
date.
R.S.C. 1970 (2nd Supp.), c. 10.
I indicated I might or might not give written
reasons for my decisions to date. For a number of
considerations, not necessary to detail, I feel it
desirable to now set out my conclusions.
The applicant Martinoff is in person. He han
dles his cause well. He attempted to act as counsel
for his co-applicant, Page. I refused to permit that.
The hearing of Page's portion of the motion was
postponed.
In this Court (and Martinoff has sought allied
relief in others) his claim for assistance stems from
his latest encounter, as a taxpayer and citizen,
with bureaucracy and officialdom in respect of the
interpretation and administration of the so-called
"gun control laws" found in the Criminal Code. 2
The whole history, including the forays in other
courts, is not pretty.' I shall not recount it.
That history indicates a number of applications
by Martinoff for permits and registration certifi
cates in respect of restricted weapons. The plaintiff
is obviously persistent and stubborn. He has
undoubtedly become a prickly thorn to those
charged with administering the gun control laws.
Equally, and undoubtedly, he has become an
annoyance to those in government and bureaucra
cy who disagree with his position and views, par
ticularly in respect of possession, as a collector, of
firearms, including machine guns.
I cannot be concerned with the morality of
ownership or possession, as permitted by the
Criminal Code, of machine guns. My duty is to
2 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as enacted by S.C. 1968-69, c. 38, s.
6, and amended by S.C. 1972, c. 17, s. 2. The Criminal Law
Amendment Act, 1977, S.C. 1976-77, c. 53 repeals sections
82-106 of what I shall term the pre-January 1, 1978 gun
control legislation. New, and as I understand it, more stringent
control legislation was, at the same time, enacted. The new
legislation is to come into force on a day or days to be fixed by
proclamation. Some of the new provisions have been pro
claimed effective January 1, 1978.
3 See: (a) The correspondence exhibited to Martinoff's
affidavit. (b) The decision and reasons of His Honour Judge J.
L. Davies, given June 29, 1977. The earlier history of applica
tions and court proceedings is set out. (c) The reasons for
judgment of Wetmore C.C.J., dated October 5, 1977.
sublimate any personal views I may have, to inter
pret (if necessary) the law, and then apply it. If
the law, as the Court sees it, is in favour of the
applicant, then he is entitled to its application, and
any consequent protection, privileges, or benefits.
For these reasons for judgment, and for any
future supplementary reasons dealing with the
postponed portions of this motion, it is convenient
to set out the whole of the relief sought:
... an Order that such Writs of Certiorari, Mandamus, Prohi
bition, and/or Injunction as this Honourable Court may see fit
do issue to such persons as this Honourable Court may see fit in
order to ensure:
1. that a permit be issued to the Applicant Michael John
Martinoff to enable him to transport his Uzi firearm #104 and
his G3A4 firearm #G3 12 C 692 from the Vancouver City
Police Station, 312 Main Street, to his residence, at 5038
Granville Street, Vancouver;
2. that the Local Registrar of Firearms for Vancouver, S/Sgt.
L. M. Gossen, does process the application of the Applicant
Michael John Martinoff to register his restricted weapons
MAC-10 #2-3007383 and PMC M-2 #791A and does issue to
the said Applicant a permit to enable him to transport those
said firearms from the dealer, Douglas Hough, Gunsmith, 3626
West 4th Avenue, Vancouver, to (S/Sgt. Gossen's office for
examination should he so desire and thence to) the Applicant's
residence, 5038 Granville Street, Vancouver;
and that the said Local Registrar of Firearms does process
the application of the Applicant John Michael Page to register
his restricted weapon Winchester M-2 #1133659 and does issue
to the said Applicant a permit to enable him to transport the
said firearm from the aforementioned residence of Michael
John Martinoff to (S/Sgt. Gossen's office for examination
should he so desire and thence to) the Applicant's residence,
#409-1445 Marpole Avenue, Vancouver;
in the alternative, that there be appointed (by the Attorney-
General of B.C. or by the Commissioner of the R.C.M.P.) a
Local Registrar of Firearms and Issuer of Permits willing and
able to serve the Applicants in accordance with the provisions
of the Criminal Code;
3. that the Respondent R. H. Simmonds, Commissioner of the
R.C.M.P., does adjudicate the Application of the Applicant
Michael John Martinoff to Register his Schmeisser firearm
#9981-D;
4. that the Respondent R. H. Simmonds, Commissioner of the
R.C.M.P., does issue to the Applicant Michael John Martinoff
a permit authorizing him to have in his possession a restricted
weapon elsewhere than in his dwelling-house or place of busi
ness to protect life or property and for use in target practice.
At the hearing on December 13, 1977, the pro
ceedings were confined to
(a) the request, in the first subparagraph of
paragraph 2 above, for an order in the nature of
mandamus requiring the respondent Gossen to
process Martinoff's application to register his
restricted weapons MAC-10 and PMC M-2.
Those weapons are of the automatic or machine
gun type.
(b) the alternative request, in the third subpara-
graph of paragraph 2 above, that the Attorney-
General of B.C. or the Commissioner of the
RCMP be directed, by an order in the nature of
mandamus, to appoint a Local Registrar of
Firearms and Issuer of Permits, without any
restriction on the authority or powers given, by
the Criminal Code, to those officials.
(c) the request, in paragraph 3 above, for an
order in the nature of mandamus, directing the
respondent Simmonds to adjudicate on Martin-
off's application to register his Schmeisser fire
arm. This again was an automatic weapon.
Before outlining the facts and issues, I shall set
out some technical points and decisions which
arose at the outset of the hearing, and during it.
Relief is sought against the Attorney-General of
B.C. On his behalf it was objected this Court had,
in the circumstances, no jurisdiction. I gave effect
to the objection and directed dismissal of the
proceedings against the Attorney-General. As I see
it there is no existing and applicable federal law
(statutory or common) which can be invoked to
support the proceedings asserted, in this Court,
against the Attorney-General 4 .
On behalf of S/Sgt. Gossen it was argued that
any relief sought by way of certiorari could not, on
the facts here, be granted by the Trial Division;
recourse must be had to the Appeal Division and
4 I my view, the principles set out in: Union Oil of Canada
Ltd. v. The Queen [1976] 1 F.C. 74 (F.C.A.), appeal to the
Supreme Court of Canada dismissed, [1976] 2 S.C.R. V;
Canadian Javelin Ltd. v. The Queen (Nfld.) [1978] 1 F.C. 408;
Quebec North Shore Paper Co. v. Canadian Pacific Ltd.
[1977] 2 S.C.R. 1054 and McNamara Construction (Western)
Ltd. v. The Queen [1977] 2 S.C.R. 654 at pages 658-659,
apply.
the section 28 procedure. In my opinion, when the
motion as a whole is fairly and reasonably read,
and bearing in mind the documents were not
drawn by someone legally trained, the essence of
the relief asked for is in the nature of mandamus,
or mandatory injunction. I so ruled at the hearing,
and dismissed that jurisdictional objection.
There are two other matters which require com
ment. On behalf of the respondents Gossen and the
Attorney-General of B.C., an affidavit, deposed to
by Mr. W. D. Stewart, was filed. Mr. Stewart
appeared, at the hearing, as counsel for those two
respondents. The affidavit contained some poten
tially controversial material. I ruled, in accordance
with long standing practice, the affidavit could not
be relied on, unless other counsel appeared to
argue the case. Other counsel were not instructed.
I have therefore, in reaching my decision, put aside
that particular material.
The respondent Simmonds filed his own affida
vit. It is seriously defective in form.' It is a fairly
lengthy affidavit based, not on personal knowl
edge, but on information and belief. Throughout,
the following phrase appears:
I am informed and believe ....
Nowhere, as required by the rules, are the sources
and grounds of his information and belief set out. 6
I might add it is not sufficient in my view, to state
merely (for example): I am informed by John
Jones and verily believe. There must be sufficient
identification of John Jones and disclosure of other
facts from which the Court can conclude John
Jones probably has first-hand knowledge of the
facts asserted by the deponent, and that in those
circumstances, the deponent's grounds for belief in
their truth are reasonable.
In the final analysis of the issues I have heard to
date, I did not have to rely on the Commissioner's
affidavit.
5 I make no criticism of the Commissioner personally.
Unaoubtedly the affidavit was prepared by others on his behalf.
6 See Rule 332(1).
I turn now to the basic facts and the dispute
among the parties. It is first necessary to summa
rize the applicable provisions of the Code.
Sections 83 to 96 set out a variety of offences in
respect of the use of, possession of, dealing in, etc.
of weapons, prohibited weapons, and restricted
weapons. The prohibitions and offences most rele
vant to this proceeding are found in sections 91
and 93. By section 91, everyone who has in his
possession a restricted weapon "for which he does
not have a registration certificate issued to him" is
guilty of an offence.
Restricted weapons are defined in subsection
82(1) as follows:
82....
"restricted weapon" means
(a) any firearm designed, altered or intended to be aimed
and fired by the action of one hand,
(b) any firearm that is capable of firing bullets in rapid
succession during one pressure of the trigger,
(c) any firearm that is less than twenty-six inches in length
or that is designed or adapted to be fired when reduced to a
length of less than twenty-six inches by folding, telescoping
or otherwise, or
(d) a weapon of any kind, not being a shotgun or rifle of a
kind commonly used in Canada for hunting or sporting
purposes, that is declared by order of the Governor in
Council to be a restricted weapon.
The three weapons earlier here referred to (the
MAC-10, the PMC M-2 and the Schmeisser) all
fall within paragraph (b).
Section 97 provides for the issuance of permits
authorizing a person to have in his possession a
restricted weapon elsewhere than in his dwelling-
house or place of business. Permits, pursuant to
subsection 97(1), are issued only to applicants who
satisfy the issuer that the restricted weapon is
required for a certain limited use or uses (see
subsection 97(2)). Those permits may be issued by
the Commissioner of the RCMP or a person
authorized in writing by him to issue a permit, or
the Attorney-General of a province or a person
authorized by him to issue a permit.
Parliament has obviously said that a person,
holding a permit issued pursuant to section 97,
does not commit an offence against section 93.
Section 98 of the legislation deals with firearm
registration and firearm registration certificates. A
registry of such certificates is kept by the Commis
sioner of the RCMP. Applications for certificates
are made to "a local registrar of firearms." Local
registrar of firearms means (subsection 82(1)):
... a person appointed in writing by the Commissioner or by
the Attorney General as a local registrar of firearms.
What is meant by "local" is unexplained. It is
apparent a person appointed a local registrar need
not be the same person authorized to issue permits
pursuant to section 97. On the other hand there is
nothing preventing such dual appointments.
Upon receipt of a registration application, the
duties of the local registrar and the Commissioner
are specified as follows:
98. (1) The Commissioner shall cause a registry to be main
tained in which shall be kept a record of every firearm registra
tion certificate issued under this section.
(2) An application for a registration certificate shall be in a
form prescribed by the Commissioner and shall be made to a
local registrar of firearms who shall, upon receiving the
application,
(a) issue a permit under section 97 authorizing the applicant
to transport the weapon to him for examination; and
(b) if he is satisfied that the weapon bears a serial number
sufficient to distinguish it from other restricted weapons or,
in the case of a weapon that in his opinion is useful or
valuable primarily as an antique, that the description of the
weapon in the application is accurate, endorse the application
and
(i) send one copy thereof to the Commissioner,
(ii) deliver one copy thereof to applicant, and
(iii) retain one copy thereof.
(3) Where a local registrar of firearms has notice of any
matter that may render it desirable in the interests of the safety
of other persons that the applicant should not possess a restrict
ed weapon, he shall report that matter to the Commissioner.
(4) Upon receiving an endorsed application for a registration
certificate the Commissioner shall, subject to section 99, regis
ter the restricted weapon described in the application and issue
a firearms registration certificate therefor to the applicant, in
such form as the Commissioner may prescribe and subject to
such conditions as he deems necessary to enable the informa-
tion contained in the registry mentioned in subsection (1) to be
maintained on a current basis.
Subsection 99(4) provides that the Commission
er may refuse to issue a registration certificate:
... where he has notice of any matter that may render it
desirable in the interests of the safety of other persons that the
applicant should not possess a restricted weapon'.
Parliament has obviously said that a person,
holding a registration certificate issued pursuant to
section 98, does not commit an offence against
section 91.
In my view, the legislators intended:
(a) that certificates, pursuant to section 98,
could be obtained,
(b) that local registrars of firearms, to look into
and process, applications for registration certifi
cates, would be appointed, and
(c) that such registrars would not be restricted
in, or forbidden to carry out, their duties as set
out in paragraph 98(2)(b), in respect of some or
all of the weapons described in the definition of
restricted weapons in subsection 82(1). To put it
another way, the legislators did not intend to
give to the Commissioner, the Attorneys Gener
al, or their appointees the power to refuse to
process applications for registration of, say,
automatic weapons.
That is really the essence of the controversy
here.
The Commissioner has never appointed local
registrars of firearms. The Attorney-General of
B.C. has, from time to time since 1969, appointed
local registrars of firearms (subsection 82(1)) and
permit issuers (section 97). What restrictions he
imposed on their powers and duties prior to
August 18, 1977 is, on the admissible material
before me, unclear. I suspect that the respondent
7 Those words are identical in substance to subsection 98(3).
Gossen 8 was, however, not empowered to deal with
applications in respect of automatic weapons.
For chronological purposes, I divert here to
Martinoff's attempts to register the three weapons
earlier referred to. On May 20, 1977 he applied on
form C.300 to register the Schmeisser. The
application was taken by Corporal L. C. Malkoski
of the RCMP detachment at Richmond, B.C.
There was considerable unexplained delay in deal
ing with this application and forwarding a copy to
the Commissioner (see subparagraph 98(2)(b)(i)).
The latter began considering this particular
application in September or October, 1977.
On June 29, 1977, Martinoff wrote, in respect of
the MAC-10 and the PMC M-2, as follows: (in
part)
The Local Registrar of Firearms
Vancouver City Police
312 Main Street
Vancouver, B.C.
V6A 2T2
Sir:
TAKE NOTICE THAT I do hereby make application to register
the following restricted weapons:
P.S.: I am aware of your policy regarding registration of
firearms of this type. Please retain this Notice, as it may be
relevant to possible litigation.
On August 18, 1977 the Attorney-General
wrote the Vancouver City Police Force and the
RCMP. He revoked all previous appointments, as
local registrars of firearms and issuers of permits,
of members of those two forces. He appointed all
members of both forces 9 as local registrars of
firearms. All members were, as well, authorized to
issue permits "under Sections 97(3) and 97(4) of
the Criminal Code". 10 Only certain specifically
designated officers of the RCMP were authorized
to issue the more `general permits contemplated by
subsections 97(1) and (2).
8 S/Sgt. Gossen is and was a member of the Vancouver City
Police Force.
9 I the case of the RCMP the appointments apply only to
those members of the force stationed in British Columbia.
10 The permits referred to in those two subsections are quite
limited in the privileges granted.
All of these appointments and authorizations
contained a significant exception or restriction:
These appointments are not valid in respect to any firearm that
is capable of firing bullets in rapid succession during one
pressure of the trigger nor any firearm that is designed or
adapted to be fired when reduced to a length of less than
twenty-six inches by folding, telescoping or otherwise.
The effect of this restriction, if valid, means that in
British Columbia one cannot obtain a section 97
permit or a firearms registration certificate in
respect of two of the four types of restricted
weapons dealt with in the Code. Citizens of other
provinces, where no such "exceptions" have been
specified by other Attorneys General, can (if they
meet the requirements of the legislation) obtain
such permits and certificates. They then commit
no criminal offences, as described in section 91 or
93, by possessing (in their dwelling-house or else
where) restricted weapons such as automatic
firearms.
The respondent Gossen, to whom the applica
tions in respect of the MAC-10 and PMC M-2
were referred, refused to consider them. His
grounds were he was not authorized to issue per
mits or endorse certificate applications in respect
of that type of restricted weapon. The Commis
sioner refused to take any action until he had
received an "endorsed" copy of the application in
accordance with subsection 98(4).
The result, of course, from Martinoff's point of
view, was no action by anyone. That state of
affairs precipitated this motion, and some of the
other litigation I have referred to.
As I see it, if an Attorney General chooses to
appoint local registrars of firearms, or chooses to
authorize certain persons to issue permits, he
cannot pick and choose what restricted weapon he
will let those appointees deal with. No such arbi
trary power or discretion has been given, by Par
liament, to the Attorneys General. They cannot,
by forbidding appointees to handle applications in
respect of certain types of weapons, subvert or
render ineffective the law of Canada. It matters
not their motives are probably praiseworthy and,
in the eyes of many, in the best interests of the
residents of a particular province. Attorneys Gen-
eral are subject, nevertheless, to the competent and
valid legislation of the federal authority.
It was said that because the provinces have
legislative authority in respect of the administra
tion of justice, an Attorney General, the provincial
cabinet official charged with that responsibility,
can, in administering justice, make the restricted
appointments and authorizations as was done here.
To my mind, that argument overlooks the realities
of a federal state, with divided legislative jurisdic
tion, and the expression, through Parliament, of
the will of the Canadian people as a whole. What
has been attempted here, from a practical point of
view, is to render nugatory validly enacted federal
legislation. As I see it, Attorneys General, if they
elect to appoint firearm registrars or permit issu-
ers, cannot, in the guise of giving effect to the
views of a particular group of persons, take away
privileges, rights, and defences to criminal charges,
which other persons in other areas may enjoy, and
which all persons in Canada may be entitled to
invoke. In my opinion the attempt to restrict a
local registrar's powers and functions is not
permissible.
At the conclusion of argument, I ordered a writ
of mandamus to issue to the respondent Gossen,
directing him to process Martinoff's applications
to register the MAC-10 and the PMC M-2, with
out regard to the purported restriction on his
appointment against dealing with applications in
respect of so-called automatic weapons.
I must comment on one other matter in respect
of the respondent Gossen. These proceedings were
commenced on December 6, 1977. S/Sgt. Gossen
swore an affidavit on December 13, 1977. To it he
exhibited a letter written, on December 12, by him
to the Commissioner. I was told this letter was,
after legal advice, prepared and sent. It purports to
be a report pursuant to subsection 98(3). The
report expresses concern over theft of automatic
and semi-automatic weapons, and the possibility of
their being used by potential criminals. Three
instances since 1972 are referred to. Nowhere in
the report is it specifically stated it is not desirable
that Martinoff ("the applicant") should possess a
restricted weapon.
I find it perplexing why the respondent Gossen
should have been prevailed upon to file, on Decem-
ber 12, 1977, a subsection 98(3) report regarding
automatic weapons in general, when it has been
Gossen's steadfast position he is not empowered to
"endorse" applications of this kind (paragraph
98(2)(b)). A local registrar in B.C. cannot have it
both ways. He must process the particular applica
tion and, if has notice "... of any matter [etc.]
..." he must, at the same time, report it. He
cannot refuse to process the particular application,
and yet at the same time report on it. His report
ing function can only be co-extensive with his
endorsing function. That seems to me the only
logical conclusion when subsections 98(3), 98(4),
99(4) and 99(5) are read together. Counsel for the
respondent Gossen contended that authority for
the step taken by the respondent Gossen can be
found in Walker v. Gagnon". I disagree. That case
merely decided an applicant for a firearm registra
tion certificate cannot be required to submit to
fingerprinting.
Finally, on this point, I suggest it was indiscreet
to have S/Sgt. Gossen write such a letter to the
Commissioner, when the whole issue as to the
extent of his (Gossen's) functions and powers was
before the Court.
I turn now to that part of the motion dealing
with the Schmeisser. Counsel for the Commission
er very candidly agreed it was open to the Court, if
it saw fit, to make an order in the nature of
mandamus against the Commissioner. 12 But it was
said the Commissioner had not yet had sufficient
time to consider Martinoff's application. I could
not concur. The application was made on May 20,
1977. The delay in its reaching the Commissioner
11 [1976] 2 F.C. 155 at 159 and 160, per Walsh J.
12 It was common ground before me that S/Sgt. Gossen and
the Commissioner fell within the expression "federal board,
commission or other tribunal" found in section 18 of the
Federal Court Act.
was not satisfactorily explained. It was, to my
mind, desirable and equitable the Commissioner
came to a decision before some of the new legisla
tion became applicable. I therefore directed man-
damus issue requiring the Commissioner to
adjudicate and decide, on or before December 22,
1977, this particular application.
There remains the alternative relief sought: that
the Attorney-General of B.C. or the Commissioner
appoint a local registrar and "issuer of permits,"
without any restriction as to the kind of applica
tions they can entertain. My ruling in respect of
lack of jurisdiction over the Attorney-General of
B.C. left only the claim in respect of the
Commissioner.
I dismissed the motion as against the Commis
sioner. I am not convinced the mandatory relief
requested would, in the circumstances, lie against
him. In any event, mandamus is a discretionary
remedy. Here, the Attorney-General of B.C. has,
for several years, appointed local registrars and
authorized certain persons to issue permits, albeit
with restrictions on both. It would not be proper,
to my mind, to ask the Commissioner to exercise
powers in what has traditionally been a field of the
Attorneys General.
As I said early in these reasons, the remaining
matters set out in the notice of motion have been
adjourned sine die.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.