City of Montreal (Appellant)
v.
Canadian Transport Commission (Respondent)
Court of Appeal, Jackett CJ., Perrier and Cho-
quette D.JJ.—Montreal, November 22 and 23,
1972.
Railways—Cost of grade separation at crossing—New
over-pass constructed to relieve traffic at subway—Whether
work "in respect of reconstruction and improvement"—
Jurisdiction of Canadian Transport Commission to contrib
ute to cost—Railway Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-2, s. 202(1)(b).
The City of Montreal, with the authorization of the
Canadian Transport Commission, constructed a viaduct to
carry an east-west road in Montreal over the C.P.R. tracks
at the intersection of the east-west road with a north-south
road, which was carried under the C.P.R. tracks by a
subway constructed in 1909. The purpose of the new con
struction was to relieve the pressure of the heavy motor
traffic through the subway, which would be very costly as
well as difficult to reconstruct.
Held, reversing the Canadian Transport Commission, the
construction of the viaduct was a "work ... done in respect
of reconstruction and improvement" of an existing grade
separation at a crossing within the meaning of section
202(1)(b) of the Railway Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. R-2, and the
Canadian Transport Commission therefore had jurisdiction
to make a payment toward the cost of the work out of the
Railway Grade Crossing Fund.
In re Railway Grade Crossing Fund [1933] S.C.R. 81;
Minister of Roads v. C.N.R. (1950) 66 C.R.T.C. 1;
A.-G. Que. v. C.P.R. [1965] S.C.R. 729, considered.
APPEAL from and judicial review of deci
sion of Canadian Transport Commission.
E. Jurisic, Q.C., for appellant.
D. J. Murphy and G. W. Nadeau for Canadian
Transport Commission.
JACKETT C.J. (orally)—This proceeding is an
appeal under section 64(2) of the National
Transportation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. N-17 and c.
10 (2nd Supp.) and an application under section
28 of the Federal Court Act, which have been
joined under Rule 1314 of the Federal Court
Rules. The appeal is from a decision of the
Railway Transport Committee of the Canadian
Transport Commission which, by virtue of sec
tion 24(3) of the National Transportation Act,
has effect as though it was made by the Com
mission, and the application is an application to
review and set aside the same decision.
The decision in question is a decision where
by the Committee, in effect, refuses an applica
tion by the City of Montreal for a payment out
of the Railway Grade Crossing Fund under sec
tion 202 of the Railway Act, R.S.C. 1970, c.
R-2 which reads, in part, as follows:
202. (1) The sums heretofore or hereafter appropriated
and set apart to aid actual construction work for the protec
tion, safety and convenience of the public in respect of
crossings shall be placed to the credit of a special account
to be known as "The Railway Grade Crossing Fund", and
shall, in so far as not already applied, be applied by the
Commission in its discretion, subject to the limitations set
forth in this section, solely toward the cost, not including
that of maintenance and operation, of
(a) work actually done for the protection, safety and
convenience of the public in respect of existing crossings
at rail level,
(b) work actually done in respect of reconstruction and
improvement of grade separations that are in existence at
crossings on the 28th day of June 1955 and that, in the
opinion of the Commission, are not adequate, by reason
of their location, design or size, for the highway traffic
using them, and
(c) placing reflective markings on the sides of railway
cars.
The City of Montreal was, by order of the
Commission (Order No. R-8772) dated May 11,
1970, authorized to construct an overhead
bridge or viaduct to carry a connecting road
between Rosemont Boulevard and Van Horne
Avenue across and over the right-of-way and
tracks of the Canadian Pacific.
The application for payment out of the fund
was in respect of the cost of that railway cross
ing. The facts that were, apparently, tentatively
accepted by the Committee for the purpose of
disposing of the application are those referred
to in the following portion of the Committee's
decision:
It was submitted to the Committee that the existing
crossing is at St. Laurent Boulevard, with its subway grade
separation, constructed in 1909 as authorized by Board
Order No. 8839, and permits one lane of traffic in each
direction at normal street speed of 20 to 25 mph. and will
permit the flow of two lanes of traffic in each direction at a
speed of 5 to 10 mph. when the approaches are congested;
that the existing highway traffic is approximately 50,000
automobiles daily and the railway traffic consists of 20
transfers or switching movements at yard speed. It was
submitted that the said subway which carries north-south
traffic along St. Laurent Boulevard is inadequate; that there
is no street across the railway in an east-west direction
between Jean Talon Street and St. Joseph Boulevard, a
distance of one and one-half miles; that approximately 40%
of the existing traffic using the present subway is east-west
traffic and that instead of reconstructing the subway on St.
Laurent Boulevard, which would be very costly, as well as
difficult under present traffic conditions, that an overhead
bridge would be constructed over the Railway to carry a
connecting road in an east-west direction between Rose-
mont Boulevard and Van Home Avenue which would ease
the traffic problem at St. Laurent Boulevard at the existing
subway.
The application for payment out of the Rail
way Grade Crossing Fund was based on the
view that the new viaduct was constructed to
remedy the situation resulting from the fact that
the subway that was constructed under the rail
way at St. Laurent Boulevard in 1909 and that
was the only crossing available for traffic for a
distance along the railway of one and one-half
miles had become grossly inadequate for the
traffic that it had to serve.
The portion of the Committee's Decision
which shows its reasons for refusing a payment
out of the Fund reads as follows:
The Railway Transport Committee has considered the
matter and is satisfied that the proposed reconstruction is
one for a new crossing and not work actually done in
respect of reconstruction and improvement of grade separa
tions that are in existence, and that the main purpose of the
reconstruction is to relieve traffic congestion on city streets,
rather than for the protection, safety and convenience of
the public. The Committee is accordingly satisfied that the
proposed construction is in fact a new elevated crossing
over the right-of-way of Canadian Pacific Limited, at mile
age 4.95 of its Park Avenue Subdivision and, therefore, the
work is not actually done in respect of a crossing at rail
level in existence at least three years prior to the said Order
and not in respect of reconstruction and improvement of a
grade separation that was in existence on June 28, 1955 and
is not adequate in the opinion of the Commission, by reason
of its location, design or size, for the highway traffic using
it. The construction does not fall within the terms of Section
202 of the Railway Act and the request of the City of
Montreal is hereby denied.
The request of the City of Montreal, pursuant to Section
202 of the Railway Act for a contribution from the Railway
Grade Crossing Fund for the construction of an overpass to
join Rosemont Boulevard and Van Home Avenue crossing
the right-of-way and tracks of Canadian Pacific Limited in
the City of Montreal, County of L'Isle de Montréal, Prov
ince of Quebec, at mileage 4.95, Park Avenue Subdivision is
hereby denied ...
As I read this decision, it is, in effect, that
this request for payment out of the Railway
Grade Crossing Fund is refused because, on the
facts, the Commission has no jurisdiction to
grant the request.
There are three decisions of the Supreme
Court of Canada as to the ambit of the authority
to make payments out of the Railway Grade
Crossing Fund under the different statutes
applicable to that Fund.
In In re Railway Grade Crossing Fund [1933]
S.C.R. 81 the Board of Railway Commissioners,
in pursuance of a statutory authority to pose
questions of law to the Supreme Court of
Canada, put to the Court the following
question:
Has the Board jurisdiction, under section 262 of the
Railway Act, as amended by c. 43 of the statutes of Canada,
1928, to allow contributions from "The Railway Grade
Crossing Fund" in the case of highway diversions, whereby
rail level crossings which are not eliminated are relieved
from a substantial volume of highway traffic?
Section 262 of the Railway Act as referred to in
the question read in part as follows:
..."The Railway Grade Crossing Fund" ... shall ... be
applied by the Board ... solely towards the cost ... of
actual construction work for the protection, safety and
convenience of the public in respect of crossings ... at rail
level in existence on the first day of April, one thousand
nine hundred and nine ...
The judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada
was delivered in 1932 by Rinfret J. (as he then
was) and the reasons for giving a negative
answer to the question put by the Board are to
be found in the following part of that judgment
[at page 84]:
It does not appear to us that, when enacting the legisla
tion in question, Parliament intended to confer on the Board
any special power distinct and independent from its normal
railway jurisdiction. The fund was appropriated by Parlia
ment towards actual construction work for the protection,
safety and convenience of the public in respect of highway
crossings of railways at rail level, and the Board was not to
allow contributions from that fund, except in dealing with
works over which it held jurisdiction and as an incident of
the exercise of its ordinary powers in railway matters. The
statute does not contemplate that direct applications for
payments out of the fund may be made to the Board to aid
works outside the sphere of its usual competence. The
intention was that when the Board was regularly seized of
an application in respect of an existing crossing at rail level
(railway crossing of a highway or highway crossing of a
railway), it might, when granting the application and subject
to certain conditions and restrictions, order at the same time
that a certain sum be allowed out of the Crossing Fund to
aid the actual construction work ordered by it.
Moreover, the question submitted assumes that the rail
level crossing will not be eliminated. It follows that there
will be no highway diversion at the crossing. The highway
will continue to cross the railway. The new highway where
by it is claimed that the crossing is relieved from a substan
tial volume of traffic, was or will be constructed by the
provincial or the municipal authorities entirely of their own
motion, without any intervention of the Board and, in fact,
without the Board having any right to interfere. It does not,
therefore, come within the definition of "crossing" in sec
tion 262 as being
one work * * * in respect of one or more railways of
as many tracks crossing or so crossed an in the discre
tion of the Board determined;
nor does it come within the classification of construction
works ordered or authorized by the Board "in respect of
highway crossings of railways at rail level."
Our conclusion is that the question submitted ought to be
answered in the negative.
In The Minister of Roads, Quebec v. C.N.R.
(1950) 66 C.R.T.C. 1, there was an appeal from
a decision of the Board of Transport Commis
sioners refusing to authorize a contribution
from the Railway Grade Crossing Fund. In this
case a provincial highway had crossed the rail
way by way of a level crossing. The route of the
highway was changed so that it crossed the
railway at a different point by means of a
viaduct. The old level crossing was to continue
in existence to be used as a private crossing and
not as a highway crossing. The Board refused to
authorize a payment out of the Fund on the
ground that the Fund was to be applied only for
the protection, improvement or elimination of
an existing highway crossing, and that the
Board had no power to allow a contribution
from the Fund in the case of a highway diver
sion unless the existing highway crossing was
eliminated. In taking that position, the Board
relied on the Supreme Court's earlier decision
concerning the Fund. The same statutory provi
sion was applicable to the two cases. Leave to
appeal from the Board's decision was granted
on the following question of law:
In view of the evidence adduced in this case and upon the
assumption that the present crossing will continue to exist
for the sole benefit of Price Bros. owners of the land on
both sides of the right-of-way, did the Board err in hold
ing ... that the Board had no power to apply money from
the Railway Grade Crossing Fund towards the cost of
construction of the works . ?
Rinfret C.J.C., giving the judgment of the
Supreme Court of Canada, having pointed out
that the old crossing had ceased to exist as a
highway crossing and had ceased to be the kind
of crossing contemplated by section 262, dealt
with the matter as follows [at pages 5, 61:
It is equally clear that the judgment of this Court in Re
Railway Grade Crossing Fund, supra, does not deal with the
same matter. The question there was: "Has the Board
jurisdiction, under s. 262 of the Railway Act, as amended
by c. 43 of the Statutes of Canada, 1928, to allow contribu
tions from 'the Railway Grade Crossing Fund' in the case of
highway diversions, whereby rail level crossings which are
not eliminated are relieved from a substantial volume of
highway traffic?"
In that case the facts were that the existing highway
crossing remained untouched and continued to be a highway
crossing; and the new highway, whereby it was claimed that
the crossing was relieved from a substantial volume of
traffic, was to be constructed by the provincial or municipal
authorities entirely of their own motion, without any inter
vention of the Board, and, in fact, without the Board having
any right to interfere with it. Undoubtedly this new highway
was to run along the railway, but it was not to cross the
latter; and it was pointed out that the jurisdiction of the
Board was limited to that portion of the highway which lies
at the crossing proper. As was said in Re Closing Highways
at Railway Crossings (1913), 12 D.L.R. 389, 15 C.R.C. 305:
"It (the jurisdiction of the Board) is confined entirely to the
extinguishment of the public right to cross the railway
company's right-of-way."
The authority of the Board upon the highway exists only
so far as concerns the crossing. Otherwise, the highway
remains under the control of the provincial or municipal
authorities, and, in the words of Chief Com'r Carvell, "[the]
Board has nothing whatever to do with it". (See Chief
Com'r Carvell's memorandum, dated June 9, 1921, referred
to in [1933], 1 D.L.R. at p. 663, p. 83 S.C.R., 40 C.R.C. at
p. 113.)
In Re Railway Grade Crossing Fund, this Court, under the
above mentioned circumstances, decided that the Board
was without jurisdiction to deal with the new highway
where no highway crossing of the railway was provided.
In the present case it is clear that the viaduct crosses the
railway. It forms part of the highway and, therefore, here
we have a highway crossing of the railway, or, in other
words, a highway, a railway, and a crossing. In the former
case submitted to this Court there was to be no new
crossing. Therefore, the distinction between the two cases is
obvious.
In Attorney General of Quebec v. C.P.R.
[1965] S.C.R. 729, the Board of Transport
Commissioners held that it had no jurisdiction
to authorize a contribution under the Railway
Grade Crossing Fund when, instead of enlarging
a railway subway that was inadequate for high
way traffic, the highway was diverted to pass
under a nearby existing railway bridge. The
question arose under section 265 of the Railway
Act, as it was at that time, which is for present
purposes the same as section 202 of the present
Railway Act, the relevant portion of which has
already been quoted. Leave to appeal was
granted from the Board's decision on the ques
tion whether the Board erred in holding that it
had neither the power nor the jurisdiction under
section 265(1)(b), which was the same as sec
tion 202(1)(b) of the present statute, to author
ize a grant from the Fund towards the cost of
the work in question. Abbott J. delivered the
judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada,
which read in part as follows [at page 733]:
The sole issue in this appeal is whether the highway
diversion referred to, was an improvement of an existing
grade separation within the meaning of s. 265(1)(b) of the
Railway Act.
Under the provisions of ss. 39 and 266 of the said Act,
the Board is vested with exclusive authority to authorize
grade crossing changes and to apportion the cost of making
such changes.
The "Railway Grade Crossing Fund" consists of monies
voted from time to time by Parliament. The Fund was
established to provide financial assistance to the railways
and to local authorities towards the cost of the construction,
reconstruction and improvement of grade crossings,
required for the protection, safety and convenience of the
public and made necessary by changing traffic conditions.
Within the limits set by the Act the contribution, if any, to
be made out of the Fund to the cost of a particular work, is
fixed by the Board.
In the present case the existing subway facilities at Pont
Rouge admittedly had become inadequate. The diversion
proposed by the railway company was more efficient and
less costly than it would have been to enlarge the existing
underpass. In my opinion this diversion is an improvement
of an existing grade separation within the meaning of s.
265(1)(b) and that in consequence the Board is empowered
to authorize a grant from the Railway Graade Crossing Fund
towards the cost of the work authorized by its Order No.
111583.
I would allow the appeal and answer the question submit
ted in the affirmative.
A reference to one of the plans filed as an
exhibit in the 1965 case shows that the facts
there were very like the facts in the 1950 case.
There had been a minor diversion of the high
way to cause it to cross the railway at a place
where the crossing could be more economically
constructed and there had been an apparent
abandonment of the old inadequate crossing.
The statement by Abbott J. that reads, "In my
opinion this diversion is an improvement of an
existing grade separation within the meaning of
s. 265(1)(b) and that in consequence the Board
is empowered to authorize a grant from the
Railway Grade Crossing Fund towards the cost
of the work ..." must be read in the light of
this fact and in the light of the statement earlier
in his judgment that "The sole issue in this
appeal is whether the highway diversion
referred to, was an improvement of an existing
grade separation within the meaning of s.
265(1)(b) of the Railway Act". It seems clear
that it was common ground that the crossing
had been "reconstructed" in the sense that the
old one had been abandoned and a new one
constructed in its place and this requirement of
section 265(1)(b) was not, therefore, in issue
before the Supreme Court of Canada.
I turn now to the question of law raised by
this proceeding which, as I see it, is whether the
Committee erred in law in holding, as it did, that
the work in question did not fall within section
202 of the Railway Act.
At the outset it is to be noted that the Com
mittee, in its decision in this case, makes no
reference to having obtained any information as
to facts other than that placed before it by the
City of Montreal. It follows, in my view, that
the Committee must be taken to have disposed
of the matter on the basis that, assuming the
correctness of those facts, there was no authori
ty to make a grant under section 202 of the
Railway Act. I say this because, in my view, if
the Committee had received further information
that, in its opinion, materially changed the case
as presented by the City, it should have given
the City an opportunity to answer such further
information and it seems clear that no such
opportunity was given. Compare Minister of
National Revenue v. Wrights' Canadian Ropes
Ltd. [1947] A.C. 109 per Lord Greene M.R. at
pages 124-25.
In so far as relevant, section 202(1) of the
Railway Act may be read as follows:
(1) ... "The Railway Grade Crossing Fund" ... shall .. .
be applied by the Commission in its discretion ... solely
toward the cost ... of
(a) work actually done for the protection, safety and
convenience of the public in respect of existing crossings
at rail level,
(b) work actually done in respect of reconstruction and
improvement of grade separations that are in existence at
crossings on the 28th day of June 1955 and that, in the
opinion of the Commission, are not adequate, by reason
of their location, design or size, for the highway traffic
using them, and
(c) placing reflective markings on the sides of railway
cars.
If, on the facts on which the City based its
application, there is authority for the Commis
sion to authorize a contribution out of the Fund,
it must be under section 202(1)(b). The work in
question was clearly not a work "in respect of
existing crossings at rail level" within section
202(1)(a). I turn, therefore, to a consideration
of section 202(1)(b).
Before a "work" can fall within section
202(1)(b), it must satisfy two requirements. It
must be a "work" done in respect of "recon-
struction" of a grade separation of the kind
described in section 202(1)(b) and it must also
be a "work" in respect of "improvement" of
such a grade separation. I will consider first
whether the "work" in question here is, as a
matter of law, an "improvement" of the old St.
Laurent Boulevard grade separation.
On the facts as submitted by the City, prior to
the construction of the "work" in respect of
which the application was made, a large volume
of traffic had to use the St. Laurent Boulevard
subway to cross the Canadian Pacific right-of-
way. This traffic was greater than could be
handled efficiently by that subway. In addition,
owing to the configuration of the streets that
constituted the approaches to the subway, forc
ing all that traffic through the subway created a
dangerous traffic situation. By the "work" in
question, a portion of the traffic was diverted
from the subway and the dangerous character
of the traffic pattern in question was substan
tially eliminated. The Supreme Court of Canada
held, in the 1965 decision already referred to,
that the substitution of a new and improved
grade separation for an old grade separation
was an "improvement" of the old grade separa
tion within the meaning of those words in the
provision as it then was. It follows, in my view,
that a "work" such as we have here, whereby
there is diverted from an old grade separation
and its approaches a sufficient portion of the
traffic to substantially improve the traffic flow
through the old grade separation and to substan
tially reduce traffic dangers constitutes an "im-
provement" of the old grade separation. I
cannot see that the continued use of the old
grade separation is inconsistent in any way with
that conclusion. I am, therefore, of opinion that,
assuming the correctness of the facts put for
ward by the City, the work in question here is a
work that is described by the words in section
202(1)(b) "done in respect of ... improvement
of" the old St. Laurent Boulevard grade
separation.
I come now to the real difficulty in this case,
as I view it. That is the question whether the
work in question falls within the words
"work ... done in respect of reconstruction .. .
of grade separations ..."
In dealing with this question, in the context of
this matter, it is particularly important to have
in mind the fundamental principle that, once the
basic facts are established, the question wheth
er they fall within the ambit of a statutory
provision is a question of law and not a ques
tion of fact. (Compare Edwards v. Bairstow
[1955] 3 All E.R. 48 (H.L.).) This principle is
illustrated by the 1965 decision of the Supreme
Court of Canada already referred to where the
question as to whether a "work" was done in
respect of "improvement" of a grade separation
was decided as a question of law.
When one examines the portion of the Com
mittee's Decision that shows its reasons for
refusing a payment out of the fund and elimi
nates the portion thereof that has reference
only to the terms of section 202(1)(a), one finds
that the reasons given for holding that the work
in this case does not fall within section
202(1)(b) read as follows:
The Railway Transport Committee has considered the
matter and is satisfied that the proposed reconstruction is
one for a new crossing and not work actually done in
respect of reconstruction and improvement of grade separa
tions that are in existence ... The Committee is accordingly
satisfied that the proposed construction is in fact a new
elevated crossing over the right-of-way of Canadian Pacific
Limited ... and, therefore, the work is not ... in respect of
reconstruction and improvement of a grade separation that
was in existence on June 28, 1955 and is not adequate in the
opinion of the Commission, by reason of its location, design
or size, for the highway traffic using it.
As I understand what the Committee was
saying, it is that, because the "work", consid
ered by itself, is a "new elevated crossing" it
cannot be a work in respect of reconstruction
and improvement of grade separations in exist
ence and it cannot, therefore, be in respect of
reconstruction and improvement of grade sepa
rations of the limited class referred to in section
202(1)(b).
I am of opinion that, in coming to this conclu
sion, the Committee erred in law as is shown by
the 1965 decision of the Supreme Court of
Canada where it was held that a new grade
separation on a diversion of a highway was an
improvement of the grade separation on the
part of the highway that was abandoned and
where it must have been common ground that it
was a reconstruction of that other grade
separation.
That is not, however, an end of the matter
because it must also be considered whether, on
the facts of this case, that error of law has led
the Committee to a wrong result.
The basic difference between the facts in this
case and the facts before the Supreme Court of
Canada in the 1965 case is that in that case the
new grade separation completely replaced the
old grade separation whereas, in this case, that
is not true. Accepting it that, when a highway is
diverted so as to require a grade separation at a
different point on a railway, the construction of
the new grade separation is a "reconstruction"
of the one that is abandoned, it does not follow
that construction of a new grade separation to
relieve the traffic situation in an old grade sepa
ration that is to continue in existence is a "re-
construction" of that old grade separation. It
becomes necessary, therefore, to examine the
facts in this case with some care and to consid
er them in relation to the relevant words in
section 202(1)(b).
The facts, as accepted by the Committee for
the purpose of its decision, show that the old
grade separation served, in effect, two traffic
streams. There was the traffic north and south
on St. Laurent Boulevard and there was the
traffic east and west that entered St. Laurent
Boulevard for the purpose of using the old
grade separation and left it after emerging
therefrom to follow its east or west route. What
was done by the City was to establish a
"bridge" which carried the east and west traffic
over the railway so that, in place of having a
single way for the combined traffic to get over
the railway at that point, there was a complex
consisting of a subway for one stream and a
viaduct for the other stream. Together the two
components now carry all the traffic previously
carried by the old subway. Moreover, that traf
fic is carried over the railway, for practical
purposes, across the part of the railway where it
was previously carried across just as the traffic
in the case that was before the Supreme Court
of Canada in 1965 was, for practical purposes,
carried across the railway where it was previ
ously carried across.
The question is, therefore, whether, in these
circumstances, the "work" of creating the via
duct falls within the words in section 202(1)(b)
"work . .. done in respect of reconstruction ...
of grade separations that are in existence at
crossings ...".
Having regard to the 1965 Decision of the
Supreme Court of Canada, there does not
appear to be any doubt that, if the viaduct in
question had been designed so that it would
carry both streams of traffic over the railway
and if the old subway had been abandoned, it
would have been a work in respect of the recon
struction of that grade separation. Moreover, as
it seems to me, if the "work" had consisted in
merely doubling the width of the old subway
but continuing the existence of that subway as
part of the new and broader subway, there
would equally be no doubt that it was a "recon-
struction" of the previously existing subway.
That being so, I find it difficult to distinguish a
case where a combination of the two methods is
adopted as being the most economical way of
accomplishing the same result.
My conclusion on this question is, therefore,
although not without considerable doubt, that
the "work" here in question is a "work ... done
in respect of reconstruction" of the previously
existing grade separation.
It follows that, assuming the correctness of
the basic facts set out in the Committee's Deci
sion read with the material constituting the case
as fixed by this Court's order of October 13,
1972, and assuming that, in the opinion of the
Commission, the previously existing grade sepa
ration on St. Laurent Boulevard was not ade
quate, by reason of its location, design or size,
for the highway traffic that was in fact using it
before the "work" in question was constructed,
that work was a work falling within section
202(1)(b). I am, therefore, of opinion that the
Decision in question should be set aside and
that the matter should be referred back to the
Commission with a direction that, unless it finds
that those facts are not correct in some material
respect or it reaches the conclusion that the
grade crossing on St. Laurent Boulevard as it
existed before the work in question does not
fall within section 202(1), it consider the City of
Montreal's request for a payment out of the
Railway Grade Crossing Fund in the manner
contemplated by section 202.
* *
Perrier and Choquette D.JJ. concurred.
You are being directed to the most recent version of the statute which may not be the version considered at the time of the judgment.